nature of humanity research paper

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Human Nature

Talk of human nature is a common feature of moral and political discourse among people on the street and among philosophers, political scientists and sociologists. This is largely due to the widespread assumption that true descriptive or explanatory claims making use of the concept of human nature have, or would have, considerable normative significance. Some think that human nature excludes the possibility of certain forms of social organisation—for example, that it excludes any broadly egalitarian society. Others make the stronger claim that a true normative ethical theory has to be built on prior knowledge of human nature. Still others believe that there are specific moral prohibitions concerning the alteration of, or interference in, the set of properties that make up human nature. Finally, there are those who argue that the normative significance derives from the fact that merely deploying the concept is typically, or even necessarily, pernicious.

Alongside such varying and frequently conflicting normative uses of the expression “human nature”, there are serious disagreements concerning the concept’s content and explanatory significance—the starkest being whether the expression “human nature” refers to anything at all. Some reasons given for saying there is no human nature are anthropological, grounded in views concerning the relationship between natural and cultural features of human life. Other reasons given are biological, deriving from the character of the human species as, like other species, an essentially historical product of evolution. Whether these reasons justify the claim that there is no human nature depends, at least in part, on what it is exactly that the expression is supposed to be picking out. Many contemporary proposals differ significantly in their answers to this question.

Understanding the debates around the philosophical use of the expression “human nature” requires clarity on the reasons both for (1) adopting specific adequacy conditions for the term’s use and for (2) accepting particular substantial claims made within the framework thus adopted. One obstacle to such clarity is historical: we have inherited from the beginnings of Western philosophy, via its Medieval reception, the idea that talk of human nature brings into play a number of different, but related claims. One such set of claims derives from different meanings of the Greek equivalents of the term “nature”. This bundle of claims, which can be labelled the traditional package , is a set of adequacy conditions for any substantial claim that uses the expression “human nature”. The beginnings of Western philosophy have also handed down to us a number of such substantial claims . Examples are that humans are “rational animals” or “political animals”. We can call these claims the traditional slogans . The traditional package is a set of specifications of how claims along the lines of the traditional slogans are to be understood, i.e., what it means to claim that it is “human nature” to be, for example, a rational animal.

Various developments in Western thought have cast doubt both on the coherence of the traditional package and on the possibility that the adequacy conditions for the individual claims can be fulfilled. Foremost among these developments are the Enlightenment rejection of teleological metaphysics, the Historicist emphasis on the significance of culture for understanding human action and the Darwinian introduction of history into biological kinds. This entry aims to help clarify the adequacy conditions for claims about human nature, the satisfiability of such conditions and the reasons why the truth of claims with the relevant conditions might seem important. It proceeds in five steps. Section 1 unpacks the traditional package, paying particular attention to the importance of Aristotelian themes and to the distinction between the scientific and participant perspectives from which human nature claims can be raised. Section 2 explains why evolutionary biology raises serious problems both for the coherence of this package and for the truth of its individual component claims. Sections 3 and 4 then focus on attempts to secure scientific conceptions of human nature in the face of the challenge from evolutionary biology. The entry concludes with a discussion of accounts of human nature developed from a participant perspective, in particular accounts that, in spite of the evolutionary challenge, are taken to have normative consequences.

1.1 “Humans”

1.2 unpacking the traditional package, 1.3 essentialisms, 1.4 on the status of the traditional slogan, 2.1 the nature of the species taxon, 2.2 the nature of species specimens as species specimens, 2.3 responding to the evolutionary verdict on classificatory essences, 3.1 privileging properties, 3.2 statistical normality or robust causality, 4.1 genetically based psychological adaptations, 4.2 abandoning intrinsicality, 4.3 secondary altriciality as a game-changer, 5.1. human nature from a participant perspective, 5.2.1. sidestepping the darwinian challenge, 5.2.2. human flourishing, 5.3. reason as the unique structural property, other internet resources, related entries, 1. “humans”, slogans and the traditional package.

Before we begin unpacking, it should be noted that the adjective “human” is polysemous, a fact that often goes unnoticed in discussions of human nature, but makes a big difference to both the methodological tractability and truth of claims that employ the expression. The natural assumption may appear to be that we are talking about specimens of the biological species Homo sapiens , that is, organisms belonging to the taxon that split from the rest of the hominin lineage an estimated 150,000 years ago. However, certain claims seem to be best understood as at least potentially referring to organisms belonging to various older species within the subtribe Homo , with whom specimens of Homo sapiens share properties that have often been deemed significant (Sterelny 2018: 114).

On the other hand, the “nature” that is of interest often appears to be that of organisms belonging to a more restricted group. There may have been a significant time lag between the speciation of anatomically modern humans ( Homo sapiens ) and the evolution of behaviourally modern humans, i.e., human populations whose life forms involved symbol use, complex tool making, coordinated hunting and increased geographic range. Behavioural modernity’s development is often believed only to have been completed by 50,000 years ago. If, as is sometimes claimed, behavioural modernity requires psychological capacities for planning, abstract thought, innovativeness and symbolism (McBrearty & Brooks 2000: 492) and if these were not yet widely or sufficiently present for several tens of thousands of years after speciation, then it may well be behaviourally, rather than anatomically modern humans whose “nature” is of interest to many theories. Perhaps the restriction might be drawn even tighter to include only contemporary humans, that is, those specimens of the species who, since the introduction of agriculture around 12,000 years ago, evolved the skills and capacities necessary for life in large sedentary, impersonal and hierarchical groups (Kappeler, Fichtel, & van Schaik 2019: 68).

It was, after all, a Greek living less than two and a half millennia ago within such a sedentary, hierarchically organised population structure, who could have had no conception of the prehistory of the beings he called anthrôpoi , whose thoughts on their “nature” have been decisive for the history of philosophical reflection on the subject. It seems highly likely that, without the influence of Aristotle, discussions of “human nature” would not be structured as they are until today.

We can usefully distinguish four types of claim that have been traditionally made using the expression “human nature”. As a result of a particular feature of Aristotle’s philosophy, to which we will come in a moment, these four claims are associated with five different uses of the expression. Uses of the first type seem to have their origin in Plato; uses of the second, third and fourth type are Aristotelian; and, although uses of the fifth type have historically been associated with Aristotle, this association seems to derive from a misreading in the context of the religiously motivated Mediaeval reception of his philosophy.

A first , thin, contrastive use of the expression “human nature” is provided by the application of a thin, generic concept of nature to humans. In this minimal variant, nature is understood in purely contrastive or negative terms. Phusis is contrasted in Plato and Aristotle with technē , where the latter is the product of intention and a corresponding intervention of agency. If the entire cosmos is taken to be the product of divine agency, then, as Plato argued (Nadaf 2005: 1ff.), conceptualisations of the cosmos as natural in this sense are mistaken. Absent divine agency, the types of agents whose intentions are relevant for the status of anything as natural are human agents. Applied to humans, then, this concept of nature picks out human features that are not the results of human intentional action. Thus understood, human nature is the set of human features or processes that remain after subtraction of those picked out by concepts of the non-natural, concepts such as “culture”, “nurture”, or “socialisation”.

A second component in the package supplies the thin concept with substantial content that confers on it explanatory power. According to Aristotle, natural entities are those that contain in themselves the principle of their own production or development, in the way that acorns contain a blueprint for their own realisation as oak trees ( Physics 192b; Metaphysics 1014b). The “nature” of natural entities thus conceptualised is a subset of the features that make up their nature in the first sense. The human specification of this explanatory concept of nature aims to pick out human features that similarly function as blueprints for something like a fully realised form. According to Aristotle, for all animals that blueprint is “the soul”, that is, the integrated functional capacities that characterise the fully developed entity. The blueprint is realised when matter, i.e., the body, has attained the level of organisation required to instantiate the animal’s living functions (Charles 2000: 320ff.; Lennox 2009: 356).

A terminological complication is introduced here by the fact that the fully developed form of an entity is itself also frequently designated as its “nature” (Aristotle, Physics 193b; Politics 1252b). In Aristotle’s teleological metaphysics, this is the entity’s end, “that for the sake of which a thing is” ( Metaphysics 1050a; Charles 2000: 259). Thus, a human’s “nature”, like that of any other being, may be either the features in virtue of which it is disposed to develop to a certain mature form or, thirdly , the form to which it is disposed to develop.

Importantly, the particularly prominent focus on the idea of a fully developed form in Aristotle’s discussions of humans derives from its dual role. It is not only the form to the realisation of which human neonates are disposed; it is also the form that mature members of the species ought to realise ( Politics 1253a). This normative specification is the fourth component of the traditional package. The second, third and fourth uses of “nature” are all in the original package firmly anchored in a teleological metaphysics. One question for systematic claims about human nature is whether any of these components remain plausible if we reject a teleology firmly anchored in theology (Sedley 2010: 5ff.).

A fifth and last component of the package that has traditionally been taken to have been handed down from antiquity is classificatory. Here, the property or set of properties named by the expression “human nature” is that property or property set in virtue of the possession of which particular organisms belong to a particular biological taxon: what we now identify as the species taxon Homo sapiens . This is human nature typologically understood.

This, then, is the traditional package:

The sort of properties that have traditionally been taken to support the classificatory practices relevant to TP5 are intrinsic to the individual organisms in question. Moreover, they have been taken to be able to fulfil this role in virtue of being necessary and sufficient for the organism’s membership of the species, i.e., “essential” in one meaning of the term. This view of species membership, and the associated view of species themselves, has been influentially dubbed “typological thinking” (Mayr 1959 [1976: 27f.]; cf. Mayr 1982: 260) and “essentialism” (Hull 1965: 314ff.; cf. Mayr 1968 [1976: 428f.]). The former characterisation involves an epistemological focus on the classificatory procedure, the latter a metaphysical focus on the properties thus singled out. Ernst Mayr claimed that the classificatory approach originates in Plato’s theory of forms, and, as a result, involves the further assumption that the properties are unchanging. According to David Hull, its root cause is the attempt to fit the ontology of species taxa to an Aristotelian theory of definition.

The theory of definition developed in Aristotle’s logical works assigns entities to a genus and distinguishes them from other members of the genus, i.e., from other “species”, by their differentiae ( Topics 103b). The procedure is descended from the “method of division” of Plato, who provides a crude example as applied to humans, when he has the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman characterise them as featherless bipeds (266e). Hull and many scholars in his wake (Dupré 2001: 102f.) have claimed that this simple schema for picking out essential conditions for species membership had a seriously deleterious effect on biological taxonomy until Darwin (cf. Winsor 2006).

However, there is now widespread agreement that Aristotle was no taxonomic essentialist (Balme 1980: 5ff.; Mayr 1982: 150ff.; Balme 1987: 72ff.; Ereshefsky 2001: 20f; Richards 2010: 21ff.; Wilkins 2018: 9ff.). First, the distinction between genus and differentiae was for Aristotle relative to the task at hand, so that a “species” picked out in this manner could then count as the genus for further differentiation. Second, the Latin term “species”, a translation of the Greek eidos , was a logical category with no privileged relationship to biological entities; a prime example in the Topics is the species justice, distinguished within the genus virtue (143a). Third, in a key methodological passage, Parts of Animals , I.2–3 (642b–644b), Aristotle explicitly rejects the method of “dichotomous division”, which assigns entities to a genus and then seeks a single differentia, as inappropriate to the individuation of animal kinds. Instead, he claims, a multiplicity of differentiae should be brought to bear. He emphasises this point in relation to humans (644a).

According to Pierre Pellegrin and David Balme, Aristotle did not seek to establish a taxonomic system in his biological works (Pellegrin 1982 [1986: 113ff.]; Balme 1987, 72). Rather, he simply accepted the everyday common sense partitioning of the animal world (Pellegrin 1982 [1986: 120]; Richards 2010: 24; but cf. Charles 2000: 343ff.). If this is correct, Aristotle didn’t even ask after the conditions for belonging to the species Homo sapiens . So he wasn’t proposing any particular answer, and specifically not the “essentialist” answer advanced by TP5. In as far as such an answer has been employed in biological taxonomy (cf. Winsor 2003), its roots appear to lie in Neoplatonic, Catholic misinterpretations of Aristotle (Richards 2010: 34ff.; Wilkins 2018: 22ff.). Be that as it may, the fifth use of “human nature” transported by tradition—to pick out essential conditions for an organism’s belonging to the species—is of eminent interest. The systematic concern behind Mayr and Hull’s historical claims is that accounts of the form of TP5 are incompatible with evolutionary theory. We shall look at this concern in section 2 of this entry.

Because the term “essentialism” recurs with different meanings in discussions of human nature and because some of the theoretical claims thus summarised are assumed to be Aristotelian in origin, it is worth spending a moment here to register what claims can be singled out by the expression. The first , purely classificatory conception just discussed should be distinguished from a second view that is also frequently labelled “essentialist” and which goes back to Locke’s concept of “real essence” (1689: III, iii, 15). According to essentialism thus understood, an essence is the intrinsic feature or features of an entity that fulfils or fulfil a dual role: firstly, of being that in virtue of which something belongs to a kind and, secondly, of explaining why things of that kind typically have a particular set of observable features. Thus conceived, “essence” has both a classificatory and an explanatory function and is the core of a highly influential, “essentialist” theory of natural kinds, developed in the wake of Kripke’s and Putnam’s theories of reference.

An account of human nature that is essentialist in this sense would take the nature of the human natural kind to be a set of microstructural properties that have two roles: first, they constitute an organism’s membership of the species Homo sapiens . Second, they are causally responsible for the organism manifesting morphological and behavioural properties typical of species members. Paradigms of entities with such natures or essences are chemical elements. An example is the element with the atomic number 79, the microstructural feature that accounts for surface properties of gold such as yellowness. Applied to organisms, it seems that the relevant explanatory relationship will be developmental, the microstructures providing something like a blueprint for the properties of the mature individual. Kripke assumed that some such blueprint is the “internal structure” responsible for the typical development of tigers as striped, carnivorous quadrupeds (Kripke 1972 [1980: 120f.]).

As the first, pseudo-Aristotelian version of essentialism illustrates, the classificatory and explanatory components of what we might call “Kripkean essentialism” can be taken apart. Thus, “human nature” can also be understood in exclusively explanatory terms, viz. as the set of microstructural properties responsible for typical human morphological and behavioural features. In such an account, the ability to pick out the relevant organisms is simply presupposed. As we shall see in section 4 of this entry, accounts of this kind have been popular in the contemporary debate. The subtraction of the classificatory function of the properties in these conceptions has generally seemed to warrant withholding from them the label “essentialist”. However, because some authors have still seen the term as applicable (Dupré 2001: 162), we might think of such accounts as constituting a third , weak or deflationary variant of essentialism.

Such purely explanatory accounts are descendants of the second use of “human nature” in the traditional package, the difference being that they don’t usually presuppose some notion of the fully developed human form. However, where some such presupposition is made, there are stronger grounds for talking of an “essentialist” account. Elliott Sober has argued that the key to essentialism is not classification in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but the postulation of some “privileged state”, to the realisation of which specimens of a species tend, as long as no extrinsic factors “interfere” (Sober 1980: 358ff.). Such a dispositional-teleological conception, dissociated from classificatory ambitions, would be a fourth form of essentialism. Sober rightly associates such an account with Aristotle, citing Aristotle’s claims in his zoological writings that interfering forces are responsible for deviations, i.e., morphological differences, both within and between species. A contemporary account of human nature with this structure will be discussed in section 4 .

A fifth and final form of essentialism is even more clearly Aristotelian. Here, an explicitly normative status is conferred on the set of properties to the development of which human organisms tend. For normative essentialism, “the human essence” or “human nature” is a normative standard for the evaluation of organisms belonging to the species. Where the first, third and fourth uses of the expression have tended to be made with critical intent (for defensive exceptions, see Charles 2000: 348ff.; Walsh 2006; Devitt 2008; Boulter 2012), this fifth use is more often a self-ascription (e.g., Nussbaum 1992). It is intended to emphasise metaethical claims of a specific type. According to such claims, an organism’s belonging to the human species entails or in some way involves the applicability to the organism of moral norms that ground in the value of the fully developed human form. According to one version of this thought, humans ought be, or ought to be enabled to be, rational because rationality is a key feature of the fully developed human form. Such normative-teleological accounts of human nature will be the focus of section 5.2 .

We can summarise the variants of essentialism and their relationship to the components of the traditional package as follows:

Section 2 and section 5 of this entry deal with the purely classificatory and the normative teleological conceptions of human nature respectively, and with the associated types of essentialism. Section 3 discusses attempts to downgrade TP5, moving from essential to merely characteristic properties. Section 4 focuses on accounts of an explanatory human nature, both on attempts to provide a modernized version of the teleological blueprint model ( §4.1 ) and on explanatory conceptions with deflationary intent relative to the claims of TP2 and TP3 ( §4.2 and §4.3 ).

The traditional package specifies a set of conditions some or all of which substantial claims about “human nature” are supposed to meet. Before we turn to the systematic arguments central to contemporary debates on whether such conditions can be met, it will be helpful to spend a moment considering one highly influential substantial claim. Aristotle’s writings prominently contain two such claims that have been handed down in slogan form. The first is that the human being (more accurately: “man”) is an animal that is in some important sense social (“zoon politikon”, History of Animals 487b; Politics 1253a; Nicomachean Ethics 1169b). According to the second, “he” is a rational animal ( Politics 1253a, where Aristotle doesn’t actually use the traditionally ascribed slogan, “zoon logon echon”).

Aristotle makes both claims in very different theoretical contexts, on the one hand, in his zoological writings and, on the other, in his ethical and political works. This fact, together with the fact that Aristotle’s philosophy of nature and his practical philosophy are united by a teleological metaphysics, may make it appear obvious that the slogans are biological claims that provide a foundation for normative claims in ethics and politics. The slogans do indeed function as foundations in the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics respectively (on the latter, see section 5 of this entry). It is, however, unclear whether they are to be understood as biological claims. Let us focus on the slogan that has traditionally dominated discussions of human nature in Western philosophy, that humans are “rational animals”.

First, if Pellegrin and Balme are right that Aristotelian zoology is uninterested in classifying species, then ascribing the capacity for “rationality” cannot have the function of naming a biological trait that distinguishes humans from other animals. This is supported by two further sets of considerations. To begin with, Aristotle’s explicit assertion that a series of differentiae would be needed to “define” humans ( Parts of Animals 644a) is cashed out in the long list of features he takes to be their distinguishing marks, such as speech, having hair on both eyelids, blinking, having hands, upright posture, breasts in front, the largest and moistest brain, fleshy legs and buttocks (Lloyd 1983: 29ff.). Furthermore, there is in Aristotle no capacity for reason that is both exclusive to, and universal among anthropoi . One part or kind of reason, “practical intelligence” ( phronesis ), is, Aristotle claims, found in both humans and other animals, being merely superior in the former ( Parts of Animals , 687a). Now, there are other forms of reasoning of which this is not true, forms whose presence are sufficient for being human: humans are the only animals capable of deliberation ( History of Animals 488b) and reasoning ( to noein ), in as far as this extends to mathematics and first philosophy. Nevertheless, these forms of reasoning are unnecessary: slaves, who Aristotle includes among humans ( Politics 1255a), are said to have no deliberative faculty ( to bouleutikon ) at all ( Politics 1260a; cf. Richter 2011: 42ff.). Presumably, they will also be without the capacities necessary for first philosophy.

Second, these Aristotelian claims raise the question as to whether the ascription of rationality is even intended as an ascription to an individual in as far as she or he belongs to a biological kind. The answer might appear to be obviously affirmative. Aristotle uses the claim that a higher level of reason is characteristic of humans to teleologically explain other morphological features, in particular upright gait and the morphology of the hands ( Parts of Animals 686a, 687a). However, the kind of reason at issue here is practical intelligence, the kind humans and animals share, not the capacity for mathematics and metaphysics, which among animals is exercised exclusively by humans. In as far as humans are able to exercise this latter capacity in contemplation, Aristotle claims that they “partake of the divine” ( Parts of Animals 656a), a claim of which he makes extensive use when grounding his ethics in human rationality ( Nicomachean Ethics 1177b–1178b). When, in a passage to which James Lennox has drawn attention (Lennox 1999), Aristotle declares that the rational part of the soul cannot be the object of natural science ( Parts of Animals 645a), it seems to be the contemplative part of the soul that is thus excluded from biological investigation, precisely the feature that is named in the influential slogan. If it is the “something divine … present in” humans that is decisively distinctive of their kind, it seems unclear whether the relevant kind is biological.

It is not the aim of this entry to decide questions of Aristotle interpretation. What is important is that the relationship of the question of “human nature” to biology is, from the beginning of the concept’s career, not as unequivocal as is often assumed (e.g., Hull 1986: 7; Richards 2010: 217f.). This is particularly true of the slogan according to which humans are rational animals. In the history of philosophy, this slogan has frequently been detached from any attempt to provide criteria for biological classification or characterisation. When Aquinas picks up the slogan, he is concerned to emphasise that human nature involves a material, corporeal aspect. This aspect is, however, not thought of in biological terms. Humans are decisively “rational substances”, i.e., persons. As such they also belong to a kind whose members also number angels and God (three times) (Eberl 2004). Similarly, Kant is primarily, indeed almost exclusively, interested in human beings as examples of “rational nature”, “human nature” being only one way in which rational nature can be instantiated (Kant 1785, 64, 76, 85). For this reason, Kant generally talks of “rational beings”, rather than of “rational animals” (1785, 45, 95).

There is, then, a perspective on humans that is plausibly present in Aristotle, stronger in Aquinas and dominant in Kant and that involves seeing them as instances of a kind other than the “human kind”, i.e., seeing the human animal “as a rational being” (Kant 1785 [1996: 45]). According to this view, the “nature” of humans that is most worthy of philosophical interest is the one they possess not insofar as they are human, but insofar as they are rational. Where this is the relevant use of the concept of human nature, being a specimen of the biological species is unnecessary for possessing the corresponding property. Specimens of other species, as well as non-biological entities may also belong to the relevant kind. It is also insufficient, as not all humans will have the properties necessary for membership in that kind.

As both a biologist and ethicist, Aristotle is at once a detached scientist and a participant in forms of interpersonal and political interaction only available to contemporary humans living in large, sedentary subpopulations. It seems plausible that a participant perspective may have suggested a different take on what it is to be human, perhaps even a different take on the sense in which humans might be rational animals, to that of biological science. We will return to this difference in section 5 of the entry.

2. The Nature of the Evolutionary Unit Homo sapiens and its Specimens

Detailing the features in virtue of which an organism is a specimen of the species Homo sapiens is a purely biological task. Whether such specification is achievable and, if so how, is controversial. It is controversial for the same reasons for which it is controversial what conditions need to be met for an organism to be a specimen of any species. These reasons derive from the theory of evolution.

A first step to understanding these reasons involves noting a further ambiguity in the use of the expression “human nature”, this time an ambiguity specific to taxonomy. The term can be used to pick out a set of properties as an answer to two different questions. The first concerns the properties of some organism which make it the case that it belongs to the species Homo sapiens . The second concerns the properties in virtue of which a population or metapopulation is the species Homo sapiens . Correspondingly, “human nature” can pick out either the properties of organisms that constitute their partaking in the species Homo sapiens or the properties of some higher-level entity that constitute it as that species. Human nature might then either be the nature of the species or the nature of species specimens as specimens of the species.

It is evolution that confers on this distinction its particular form and importance. The variation among organismic traits, without which there would be no evolution, has its decisive effects at the level of populations. These are groups of organisms that in some way cohere at a time in spite of the variation of traits among the component organisms. It is population-level groupings, taxa, not organisms, that evolve and it is taxa, such as species, that provide the organisms that belong to them with genetic resources (Ghiselin 1987: 141). The species Homo sapiens appears to be a metapopulation that coheres at least in part because of the gene flow between its component organisms brought about by interbreeding (cf. Ereshefsky 1991: 96ff.). Hence, according to evolutionary theory, Homo sapiens is plausibly a higher-level entity—a unit of evolution—consisting of the lower-level entities that are individual human beings. The two questions phrased in terms of “human nature” thus concern the conditions for individuation of the population-level entity and the conditions under which organisms are components of that entity.

The theory of evolution transforms the way we should understand the relationship between human organisms and the species to which they belong. The taxonomic assumption of TP5 was that species are individuated by means of intrinsic properties that are individually instantiated by certain organisms. Instantiating those properties is taken to be necessary and sufficient for those organisms to belong to the species. Evolutionary theory makes it clear that species, as population-level entities, cannot be individuated by means of the properties of lower-level constituents, in our case, of individual human organisms (Sober 1980: 355).

The exclusion of this possibility grounds a decisive difference from the way natural kinds are standardly construed in the wake of Locke and Kripke. Recall that, in this Kripkean construal, lumps of matter are instances of chemical kinds because of their satisfaction of intrinsic necessary and sufficient conditions, viz. their atoms possessing a certain number of protons. The same conditions also individuate the chemical kinds themselves. Chemical kinds are thus spatiotemporally unrestricted sets. This means that there are no metaphysical barriers to the chance generation of members of the kind, independently of whether the kind is instantiated at any contiguous time or place. Nitrogen could come to exist by metaphysical happenstance, should an element with the atomic number 14 somehow come into being, even in a world in which up to that point no nitrogen has existed (Hull 1978: 349; 1984: 22).

In contrast, a species can only exist at time \(t_n\) if either it or a parent species existed at \(t_{n-1}\) and there was some relationship of spatial contiguity between component individuals of the species at \(t_n\) and the individuals belonging to either the same species or the parent species at \(t_{n-1}\). This is because of the essential role of the causal relationship of heredity. Heredity generates both the coherence across a population requisite for the existence of a species and the variability of predominant traits within the population, without which a species would not evolve.

For this reason, the species Homo sapiens , like every other species taxon, must meet a historical or genealogical condition. (For pluralistic objections to even this condition, see Kitcher 1984: 320ff.; Dupré 1993: 49f.) This condition is best expressed as a segment of a population-level phylogenetic tree, where such trees represent ancestor-descendent series (Hull 1978: 349; de Queiroz 1999: 50ff.; 2005). Species, as the point is often put, are historical entities, rather than kinds or classes (Hull 1978: 338ff.; 1984: 19). The fact that species are not only temporally, but also spatially restricted has also led to the stronger claim that they are individuals (Ghiselin 1974; 1997: 14ff.; Hull 1978: 338). If this is correct, then organisms are not members, but parts of species taxa. Independently of whether this claim is true for all biological species, Homo sapiens is a good candidate for a species that belongs to the category individual . This is because the species is characterised not only by spatiotemporal continuity, but also by causal processes that account for the coherence between its component parts. These processes plausibly include not only interbreeding, but also conspecific recognition and particular forms of communication (Richards 2010: 158ff., 218).

Importantly, the genealogical condition is only a necessary condition, as genealogy unites all the segments of one lineage. The segment of the phylogenetic tree that represents some species taxon begins with a node that represents a lineage-splitting or speciation event. Determining that node requires attention to general speciation theory, which has proposed various competing criteria (Dupré 1993: 48f.; Okasha 2002: 201; Coyne & Orr 2004). In the case of Homo sapiens , it requires attention to the specifics of the human case, which are also controversial (see Crow 2003; Cela-Conde & Ayala 2017: 11ff.). The end point of the segment is marked either by some further speciation event or, as may seem likely in the case of Homo sapiens , by the destruction of the metapopulation. Only when the temporal boundaries of the segment have become determinate would it be possible to adduce sufficient conditions for the existence of such a historical entity. Hence, if “human nature” is understood to pick out the necessary and sufficient conditions that individuate the species taxon Homo sapiens , its content is not only controversial, but epistemically unavailable to us.

If we take such a view of the individuating conditions for the species Homo sapiens , what are the consequences for the question of which organisms belong to the species? It might appear that it leaves open the possibility that speciation has resulted in some intrinsic property or set of properties establishing the cohesion specific to the taxon and that such properties count as necessary and sufficient for belonging to it (cf. Devitt 2008: 17ff.). This appearance would be deceptive. To begin with, no intrinsic property can be necessary because of the sheer empirical improbability that all species specimens grouped together by the relevant lineage segment instantiate any such candidate property. For example, there are individuals who are missing legs, inner organs or the capacity for language, but who remain biologically human (Hull 1986: 5). Evolutionary theory clarifies why this is so: variability, secured by mechanisms such as mutation and recombination, is the key to evolution, so that, should some qualitative property happen to be universal among all extant species specimens immediately after the completion of speciation, that is no guarantee that it will continue to be so throughout the lifespan of the taxon (Hull 1984: 35; Ereshefsky 2008: 101). The common thought that there must be at least some genetic property common to all human organisms is also false (R. Wilson 1999a: 190; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 7; Okasha 2002: 196f.): phenotypical properties that are shared in a population are frequently co-instantiated as a result of the complex interaction of differing gene-regulatory networks. Conversely, the same network can under different circumstances lead to differing phenotypical consequences (Walsh 2006: 437ff.). Even if it should turn out that every human organism instantiated some property, this would be a contingent, rather than a necessary fact (Sober 1980: 354; Hull 1986: 3).

Moreover, the chances of any such universal property also being sufficient are vanishingly small, as the sharing of properties by specimens of other species can result from various mechanisms, in particular from the inheritance of common genes in related species and from parallel evolution. This doesn’t entail that there may be no intrinsic properties that are sufficient belonging to the species. There are fairly good candidates for such properties, if we compare humans with other terrestrial organisms. Language use and a self-understanding as moral agents come to mind. However, whether non-terrestrial entities might possess such properties is an open question. And decisively, they are obviously hopeless as necessary conditions (cf. Samuels 2012: 9).

This leaves only the possibility that the conditions for belonging to the species are, like the individuating conditions for the species taxon, relational. Lineage-based individuation of a taxon depends on its component organisms being spatially and temporally situated in such a way that the causal processes necessary for the inheritance of traits can take place. In the human case, the key processes are those of sexual reproduction. Therefore, being an organism that belongs to the species Homo sapiens is a matter of being connected reproductively to organisms situated unequivocally on the relevant lineage segment. In other words, the key necessary condition is having been sexually reproduced by specimens of the species (Kronfeldner 2018: 100). Hull suggests that the causal condition may be disjunctive, as it could also be fulfilled by a synthetic entity created by scientists that produces offspring with humans who have been generated in the standard manner (Hull 1978: 349). Provided that the species is not in the throes of speciation, such direct descent or integration into the reproductive community, i.e., participation in the “complex network […] of mating and reproduction” (Hull 1986: 4), will also be sufficient.

The lack of a “human essence” in the sense of intrinsic necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to the species taxon Homo sapiens , has led a number of philosophers to deny that there is any such thing as human nature (Hull 1984: 19; 1986; Ghiselin 1997: 1; de Sousa 2000). As this negative claim concerns properties intrinsic both to relevant organisms and to the taxon, it is equally directed at the “nature” of the organisms as species specimens and at that of the species taxon itself. An alternative consists in retracting the condition that a classificatory essence must be intrinsic, a move which allows talk of a historical or relational essence and a corresponding relational conception of taxonomic human nature (Okasha 2002: 202).

Which of these ways of responding to the challenge from evolutionary theory appears best is likely to depend on how one takes it that the classificatory issues relate to the other matters at stake in the original human nature package. These concern the explanatory and normative questions raised by TP1–TP4. We turn to these in the following three sections of this article.

An exclusively genealogical conception of human nature is clearly not well placed to fulfil an explanatory role comparable to that envisaged in the traditional package. What might have an explanatory function are the properties of the entities from which the taxon or its specimens are descended. Human nature, genealogically understood, might serve as the conduit for explanations in terms of such properties, but will not itself explain anything. After all, integration in a network of sexual reproduction will be partly definitive of the specimens of all sexual species, whilst what is to be explained will vary enormously across taxa.

This lack of fit between classificatory and explanatory roles confronts us with a number of further theoretical possibilities. For example, one might see this incompatibility as strengthening the worries of eliminativists such as Ghiselin and Hull: even if the subtraction of intrinsicality were not on its own sufficient to justify abandoning talk of human nature, its conjunction with a lack of explanatory power, one might think, certainly is (Dupré 2003: 109f.; Lewens 2012: 473). Or one might argue that it is the classificatory ambitions associated with talk of human nature that should be abandoned. Once this is done, one might hope that certain sets of intrinsic properties can be distinguished that figure decisively in explanations and that can still justifiably be labelled “human nature” (Roughley 2011: 15; Godfrey-Smith 2014: 140).

Taking this second line in turn raises two questions: first, in what sense are the properties thus picked out specifically “human”, if they are neither universal among, nor unique to species specimens? Second, in what sense are the properties “natural”? Naturalness as independence from the effects of human intentional action is a key feature of the original package (TP1). Whether some such conception can be coherently applied to humans is a challenge for any non-classificatory account.

3. Characteristic Human Properties

The answer given by TP2 to the first question was in terms of the fully developed human form, where “form” does not refer solely to observable physical or behavioural characteristics, but also includes psychological features. This answer entails two claims: first, that there is one single such “form”, i.e., property or set of properties, that figures in explanations that range across individual human organisms. It also entails that there is a point in human development that counts as “full”, that is, as development’s goal or “telos”. These claims go hand in hand with the assumption that there is a distinction to be drawn between normal and abnormal adult specimens of the species. There is, common sense tells us, a sense in which normal adult humans have two legs, two eyes, one heart and two kidneys at specific locations in the body; they also have various dispositions, for instance, to feel pain and to feel emotions, and a set of capacities, such as for perception and for reasoning. And these, so it seems, may be missing, or under- or overdeveloped in abnormal specimens.

Sober has influentially described accounts that work with such teleological assumptions as adhering to an Aristotelian “Natural State Model” (Sober 1980: 353ff.). Such accounts work with a distinction that has no place in evolutionary biology, according to which variation of properties across populations is the key to evolution. Hence, no particular end states of organisms are privileged as “natural” or “normal” (Hull 1986: 7ff.). So any account that privileges particular morphological, behavioural or psychological human features has to provide good reasons that are both non-evolutionary and yet compatible with the evolutionary account of species. Because of the way that the notion of the normal is frequently employed to exclude and oppress, those reasons should be particularly good (Silvers 1998; Dupré 2003: 119ff.; Richter 2011: 43ff.; Kronfeldner 2018: 15ff.).

The kinds of reasons that may be advanced could either be internal to, or independent of the biological sciences. If the former, then various theoretical options may seem viable. The first grounds in the claim that, although species are not natural kinds and are thus unsuited to figuring in laws of nature (Hull 1987: 171), they do support descriptions with a significant degree of generality, some of which may be important (Hull 1984: 19). A theory of human nature developed on this basis should explain the kind of importance on the basis of which particular properties are emphasised. The second theoretical option is pluralism about the metaphysics of species: in spite of the fairly broad consensus that species are defined as units of evolution, the pluralist can deny the primacy of evolutionary dynamics, arguing that other epistemic aims allow the ecologist, the systematist or the ethologist to work with an equally legitimate concept of species that is not, or not exclusively genealogical (cf. Hull 1984: 36; Kitcher 1986: 320ff.; Hull 1987: 178–81; Dupré 1993: 43f.). The third option involves a relaxation of the concept of natural kinds, such that it no longer entails the instantiation of intrinsic, necessary, sufficient and spatiotemporally unrestricted properties, but is nevertheless able to support causal explanations. Such accounts aim to reunite taxonomic and explanatory criteria, thus allowing species taxa to count as natural kinds after all (Boyd 1999a; R. Wilson, Barker, & Brigandt 2007: 196ff.). Where, finally , the reasons advanced for privileging certain properties are independent of biology, these tend to concern features of humans’—“our”—self-understanding as participants in, rather than observers of, a particular form of life. These are likely to be connected to normative considerations. Here again, it seems that a special explanation will be required for why these privileged properties should be grouped under the rubric “human nature”.

The accounts to be described in the next subsection (3.2) of this entry are examples of the first strategy. Section 4 includes discussion of the relaxed natural kinds strategy. Section 5 focuses on accounts of human nature developed from a participant perspective and also notes the support that the pluralist metaphysical strategy might be taken to provide.

Begin, then, with the idea that to provide an account of “human nature” is to circumscribe a set of generalisations concerning humans. An approach of this sort sees the properties thus itemised as specifically “human” in as far as they are common among species specimens. So the privilege accorded to these properties is purely statistical and “normal” means statistically normal. Note that taking the set of statistically normal properties of humans as a non-teleological replacement for the fully developed human form retains from the original package the possibility of labelling as “human nature” either those properties themselves (TP3) or their developmental cause (TP2). Either approach avoids the classificatory worries dealt with in section 2 : it presupposes that those organisms whose properties are relevant are already distinguished as such specimens. What is to be explained is, then, the ways humans generally, though not universally, are. And among these ways are ways they may share with most specimens of some other species, in particular those that belong to the same order (primates) and the same class (mammals).

One should be clear what follows from this interpretation of “human”. The organisms among whom statistical frequency is sought range over those generated after speciation around 150,000 years ago to those that will exist immediately prior to the species’ extinction. On the one hand, because of the variability intrinsic to species, we are in the dark as to the properties that may or may not characterise those organisms that will turn out to be the last of the taxon. On the other hand, the time lag of around 100,000 years between the first anatomically modern humans and the general onset of behavioural modernity around the beginning of the Upper Palaeolithic means that there are likely to be many widespread psychological properties of contemporary humans that were not possessed by the majority of the species’ specimens during two thirds of the species’ history. This is true even if the practices seen as the signatures of behavioural modernity (see §1.1 ) developed sporadically, disappeared and reappeared at far removed points of time and space over tens of thousands of years before 50,000 ka (McBrearty & Brooks 2000; Sterelny 2011).

According to several authors (Machery 2008; 2018; Samuels 2012; Ramsey 2013), the expression “human nature” should be used to group properties that are the focus of much current behavioural, psychological and social science. However, as the cognitive and psychological sciences are generally interested in present-day humans, there is a mismatch between scientific focus and a grouping criterion that takes in all the properties generally or typically instantiated by specimens of the entire taxon. For this reason, the expression “human nature” is likely to refer to properties of an even more temporally restricted set of organisms belonging to the species. That restriction can be thought of in indexical terms, i.e., as a restriction to contemporary humans. However, some authors claim explicitly that their accounts entail that human nature can change (Ramsey 2013: 992; Machery 2018: 20). Human nature would then be the object of temporally indexed investigations, as is, for example, the weight of individual humans in everyday contexts. (Without temporal specification, there is no determinate answer to a question such as “How much did David Hume weigh?”) An example of Machery’s is dark skin colour. This characteristic, he claims, ceased to be a feature of human nature thus understood 7,000 years ago, if that was when skin pigmentation became polymorphic. The example indicates that the temporal range may be extremely narrow from an evolutionary point of view.

Such accounts are both compatible with evolutionary theory and coherent. However, in as far as they are mere summary or list conceptions, it is unclear what their epistemic value might be. They will tend to accord with everyday common sense, for which “human nature” may in a fairly low-key sense simply be the properties that (contemporary) humans generally tend to manifest (Roughley 2011: 16). They will also conform to one level of the expression’s use in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), which, in an attempt to provide a human “mental geography” (1748 [1970: 13]), lists a whole series of features, such as prejudice (1739–40, I,iii,13), selfishness (III,ii,5), a tendency to temporal discounting (III,ii,7) and an addiction to general rules (III,ii,9).

Accounts of this kind have been seen as similar in content to field guides for other animals (Machery 2008: 323; Godfrey-Smith 2014: 139). As Hull points out, within a restricted ecological context and a short period of evolutionary time, the ascription of readily observable morphological or behavioural characteristics to species specimens is a straightforward and unproblematic enterprise (Hull 1987: 175). However, the analogy is fairly unhelpful, as the primary function of assertions in field guides is to provide a heuristics for amateur classification. In contrast, a list conception of the statistically normal properties of contemporary humans presupposes identification of the organisms in question as humans. Moreover, such accounts certainly do not entail easy epistemic access to the properties in question, which may only be experimentally discovered. Nevertheless, there remains something correct about the analogy, as such accounts are a collection of assertions linked only by the fact that they are about the same group of organisms (Sterelny 2018: 123).

More sophisticated nature documentaries may summarise causal features of the lives of animals belonging to specific species. An analogous conception of human nature has also been proposed, according to which human nature is a set of pervasive and robust causal nexuses amongst humans. The list that picks out this set would specify causal connections between antecedent properties, such as having been exposed to benzene or subject to abuse as a child, and consequent properties, such as developing cancer or being aggressive towards one’s own children (Ramsey 2013: 988ff.). Human nature thus understood would have an explanatory component, a component internal to each item on the list. Human nature itself would, however, not be explanatory, but rather the label for a list of highly diverse causal connections.

An alternative way to integrate an explanatory component in a statistical normality account involves picking out that set of statistically common properties that have a purely evolutionary explanation (Machery 2008; 2018). This reinterpretation of the concept of naturalness that featured in the original package (TP1) involves a contrast with social learning. Processes grouped together under this latter description are taken to be alternative explanations to those provided by evolution. However, learning plays a central role, not only in the development of individual humans, but also in the iterated interaction of entire populations with environments structured and restructured through such interaction (Stotz 2010: 488ff.; Sterelny 2012: 23ff.). Hence, the proposal raises serious epistemic questions as to how the distinction is precisely to be drawn and operationalised. (For discussion, see Prinz 2012; Lewens 2012: 464ff.; Ramsey 2013: 985; Machery 2018: 15ff.; Sterelny 2018: 116; Kronfeldner 2018: 147ff.).

4. Explanatory Human Properties

The replacement of the concept of a fully developed form with a statistical notion yields a deflationary account of human nature with, at most, restricted explanatory import. The correlative, explanatory notion in the original package, that of the fully developed form’s blueprint (TP2), has to some authors seemed worth reframing in terms made possible by advances in modern biology, particularly in genetics.

Clearly, there must be explanations of why humans generally walk on two legs, speak and plan many of their actions in advance. Genealogical, or what have been called “ultimate” (Mayr) or “historical” (Kitcher) explanations can advert to the accumulation of coherence among entrenched, stable properties along a lineage. These may well have resulted from selection pressures shared by the relevant organisms (cf. Wimsatt 2003; Lewens 2009). The fact that there are exceptions to any generalisations concerning contemporary humans does not entail that there is no need for explanations of such exception-allowing generalisations. Plausibly, these general, though not universal truths will have “structural explanations”, that is, explanations in terms of underlying structures or mechanisms (Kitcher 1986: 320; Devitt 2008: 353). These structures, so seems, might to a significant degree be inscribed in humans’ DNA.

The precise details of rapidly developing empirical science will improve our understanding of the extent to which there is a determinate relationship between contemporary humans’ genome and their physical, psychological and behavioural properties. There is, however, little plausibility that the blueprint metaphor might be applicable to the way DNA is transcribed, translated and interacts with its cellular environment. Such interaction is itself subject to influence by the organism’s external environment, including its social environment (Dupré 2001: 29ff.; 2003: 111ff.; Griffiths 2011: 326; Prinz 2012: 17ff.; Griffiths & Tabery 2013: 71ff.; Griffiths & Stotz 2013: 98ff., 143ff.). For example, the feature of contemporary human life for which there must according to Aristotle be some kind of blueprint, viz. rational agency, is, as Sterelny has argued, so strongly dependent on social scaffolding that any claim to the effect that human rationality is somehow genetically programmed ignores the causal contributions of manifestly indispensable environmental factors (Sterelny 2018: 120).

Nevertheless, humans do generally develop a specific set of physiological features, such as two lungs, one stomach, one pancreas and two eyes. Moreover, having such a bodily architecture is, according to the evidence from genetics, to a significant extent the result of developmental programmes that ground in gene regulatory networks (GRNs). These are stretches of non-coding DNA that regulate gene transcription. GRNs are modular, more or less strongly entrenched structures. The most highly conserved of these tend to be the phylogenetically most archaic (Carroll 2000; Walsh 2006: 436ff.; Willmore 2012: 227ff.). The GRNs responsible for basic physiological features may be taken, in a fairly innocuous sense, to belong to an evolved human nature.

Importantly, purely morphological features have generally not been the explananda of accounts that have gone under the rubric “human nature”. What has frequently motivated explanatory accounts thus labelled is the search for underlying structures responsible for generally shared psychological features. “Evolutionary Psychologists” have built a research programme around the claim that humans share a psychological architecture that parallels that of their physiology. This, they believe, consists of a structured set of psychological “organs” or modules (Tooby & Cosmides 1990: 29f.; 1992: 38, 113). This architecture is, they claim, in turn the product of developmental programmes inscribed in humans’ DNA (1992: 45). Such generally distributed developmental programmes they label “human nature” (1990: 23).

This conception raises the question of how analogous the characteristic physical and psychological “architectures” are. For one thing, the physical properties that tend to appear in such lists are far more coarse-grained than the candidates for shared psychological properties (D. Wilson 1994: 224ff.): the claim is not just that humans tend to have perceptual, desiderative, doxastic and emotional capacities, but that the mental states that realise these capacities tend to have contents of specific types. Perhaps an architecture of the former kind—of a formal psychology—is a plausible, if relatively unexciting candidate for the mental side of what an evolved human nature should explain. Either way, any such conception needs to adduce criteria for the individuation of such “mental organs” (D. Wilson 1994: 233). Relatedly, if the most strongly entrenched developmental programmes are the most archaic, it follows that, although these will be species-typical, they will not be species-specific. Programmes for the development of body parts have been identified for higher taxa, rather than for species.

A further issue that dogs any such attempts to explicate the “human” dimension of human nature in terms of developmental programmes inscribed in human DNA concerns Evolutionary Psychologists’ assertion that the programmes are the same in every specimen of the species. This assertion goes hand in hand with the claim that what is explained by such programmes is a deep psychological structure that is common to almost all humans and underlies the surface diversity of behavioural and psychological phenomena (Tooby & Cosmides 1990: 23f.). For Evolutionary Psychologists, the (near-)universality of both developmental programmes and deep psychological structure has an ultimate explanation in evolutionary processes that mark their products as natural in the sense of TP1. Both, they claim, are adaptations. These are features that were selected for because their possession in the past conferred a fitness advantage on their possessors. Evolutionary Psychologists conceive that advantage as conferred by the fulfilment of some specific function. They summarise selection for that function as “design”, which they take to have operated equally on all species specimens since the Pleistocene. This move reintroduces the teleological idea of a fully developed form beyond mere statistical normality (TP3).

This move has been extensively criticised. First, selection pressures operate at the level of groups and hence need not lead to the same structures in all a group’s members (D. Wilson 1994: 227ff.; Griffiths 2011: 325; Sterelny 2018: 120). Second, other evolutionary mechanisms than natural selection might be explanatorily decisive. Genetic drift or mutation and recombination might, for example, also confer “naturalness” in the sense of evolutionary genesis (Buller 2000: 436). Third, as we have every reason to assume that the evolution of human psychology is ongoing, evolutionary biology provides little support for the claim that particular programmes and associated traits evolved to fixity in the Pleistocene (Buller 2000: 477ff.; Downes 2010).

Perhaps, however, there might turn out to be gene control networks that do generally structure certain features of the psychological development of contemporary humans (Walsh 2006: 440ff.). The quest for such GNRs can, then, count as the search for an explanatory nature of contemporary humans, where the explanatory function thus sought is divorced from any classificatory role.

There has, however, been a move in general philosophy of science that, if acceptable, would transform the relationship between the taxonomic and explanatory features of species. This move was influentially initiated by Richard Boyd (1999a). It begins with the claim that the attempt to define natural kinds in terms of spatiotemporally unrestricted, intrinsic, necessary and sufficient conditions is a hangover from empiricism that should be abandoned by realist metaphysics. Instead, natural kinds should be understood as kinds that support induction and explanation, where generalisations at work in such processes need not be exceptionless. Thus understood, essences of natural kinds, i.e., their “natures”, need be neither intrinsic nor be possessed by all and only members of the kinds. Instead, essences consist of property clusters integrated by stabilising mechanisms (“homeostatic property clusters”, HPCs). These are networks of causal relations such that the presence of certain properties tends to generate or uphold others and the workings of underlying mechanisms contribute to the same effect. Boyd names storms, galaxies and capitalism as plausible examples (Boyd 1999b: 82ff.). However, he takes species to be the paradigmatic HPC kinds. According to this view, the genealogical character of a species’ nature does not undermine its causal role. Rather, it helps to explain the specific way in which the properties cohere that make up the taxon’s essence. Moreover, these can include extrinsic properties, for example, properties of constructed niches (Boyd 1991: 142, 1999a: 164ff.; Griffiths 1999: 219ff.; R. Wilson et al. 2007: 202ff.).

Whether such an account can indeed adequately explain taxonomic practice for species taxa is a question that can be left open here (see Ereshefsky & Matthen 2005: 16ff.). By its own lights the account does not identify conditions for belonging to a species such as Homo sapiens (Samuels 2012: 25f.). Whether it enables the identification of factors that play the explanatory roles that the term “human nature” might be supposed to pick out is perhaps the most interesting question. Two ways in which an account of human nature might be developed from such a starting point have been sketched.

According to Richard Samuels’ proposal, human nature should be understood as the empirically discoverable proximal mechanisms responsible for psychological development and for the manifestation of psychological capacities. These will include physiological mechanisms, such as the development of the neural tube, as well as environmentally scaffolded learning procedures; they will also include the various modular systems distinguished by cognitive science, such as visual processing and memory systems (Samuels 2012: 22ff.). Like mere list conceptions (cf. §3.2 ), such an account has a precedent in Hume, for whom human nature also includes causal “principles” that structure operations of the human mind (1739–40, Intro.), for example, the mechanisms of sympathy (III,iii,1; II,ii,6). Hume, however, thought of the relevant causal principles as intrinsic.

A second proposal, advanced by Paul Griffiths and Karola Stotz, explicitly suggests taking explanandum and explanans to be picked out by different uses of the expression "human nature". In both cases, the “nature” in question is that of the taxon, not of individual organisms. The former use simply refers to “what human beings are like”, where “human beings” means all species specimens. Importantly, this characterisation does not aim at shared characteristics, but is open for polymorphisms both across a population and across life stages of individual organisms. The causal conception of human nature, what explains this spectrum of similarity and difference in life histories, is equated by Griffiths and Stotz with the organism-environment system that supports human development. It thus includes all the genetic, epigenetic and environmental resources responsible for varying human life cycles (Griffiths 2011: 319; Stotz & Griffiths 2018, 66f.). It follows that explanatory human nature at one point in time can be radically different from human nature at some other point in time.

Griffiths and Stotz are clear that this account diverges significantly from traditional accounts, as it rejects assumptions that human development has a goal, that human nature is possessed by all and only specimens of the species and that it consists of intrinsic properties. They see these assumptions as features of the folk biology of human nature that is as scientifically relevant as are folk conceptions of heat for its scientific understanding (Stotz 2010: 488; Griffiths 2011: 319ff.; Stotz & Griffiths 2018: 60ff.). This raises the question as to whether such a developmental systems account should not simply advocate abandoning the term, as is suggested by Sterelny (2018) on the basis of closely related considerations. A reason for not doing so might lie in the fact that, as talk of “human nature” is often practised with normative intent or at least with normative consequences (Stotz & Griffiths 2018: 71f.), use of the term to pick out the real, complex explanatory factors at work might help to counter those normative uses that employ false, folk biological assumptions.

Explanatory accounts that emphasise developmental plasticity in the products of human DNA, in the neural architecture of the brain and in the human mind tend to reject the assumption that explanations of what humans are like should focus on intrinsic features. It should, however, be noted that such accounts can be interpreted as assigning the feature of heightened plasticity the key role in such explanations (cf. Montagu 1956: 79). Accounts that make plasticity causally central also raise the question as to whether there are not biological features that in turn explain it and should therefore be assigned a more central status in a theory of explanatory human nature.

A prime candidate for this role is what the zoologist Adolf Portmann labelled human “secondary altriciality”, a unique constellation of features of the human neonate relative to other primates: human neonates are, in their helplessness and possession of a relatively undeveloped brain, neurologically and behaviourally altricial, that is, in need of care. However they are also born with open and fully functioning sense organs, otherwise a mark of precocial species, in which neonates are able to fend for themselves (Portmann 1951: 44ff.). The facts that the human neonate brain is less than 30% of the size of the adult brain and that brain development after birth continues at the fetal rate for the first year (Walker & Ruff 1993, 227) led the anthropologist Ashley Montagu to talk of “exterogestation” (Montagu 1961: 156). With these features in mind, Portmann characterised the care structures required by prolonged infant helplessness as the “social uterus” (Portmann 1967: 330). Finally, the fact that the rapid development of the infant brain takes place during a time in which the infant’s sense organs are open and functioning places an adaptive premium on learning that is unparalleled among organisms (Gould 1977: 401; cf. Stotz & Griffiths 2018: 70).

Of course, these features are themselves contingent products of evolution that could be outlived by the species. Gould sees them as components of a general retardation of development that has characterised human evolution (Gould 1977: 365ff.), where “human” should be seen as referring to the clade—all the descendants of a common ancestor—rather than to the species. Anthropologists estimate that secondary altriciality characterised the lineage as from Homo erectus 1.5 million years ago (Rosenberg & Trevathan 1995: 167). We are, then, dealing with a set of deeply entrenched features, features that were in place long before behavioural modernity.

It is conceivable that the advent of secondary altriciality was a key transformation in generating the radical plasticity of human development beginning with early hominins. However, as Sterelny points out, there are serious difficulties with isolating any particular game changer. Secondary altriciality, or the plasticity that may in part be explained by it, would thus seem to fall victim to the same verdict as the game changers named by the traditional human nature slogans. However, maybe it is more plausible to think in terms of a matrix of traits: perhaps a game-changing constellation of properties present in the population after the split from pan can be shown to have generated forms of niche construction that fed back into and modified the original traits. These modifications may in turn have had further psychological and behavioural consequences in steps that plausibly brought selective advantages (Sterelny 2018: 115).

5. Human Nature, the Participant Perspective and Morality

In such a culture-mind coevolutionary account, there may be a place for the referents of some of the traditional philosophical slogans intended to pin down “the human essence“ or “human nature”—reason, linguistic capacity ( “ the speaking animal”, Herder 1772 [2008: 97]), a more general symbolic capacity ( animal symbolicum , Cassirer 1944: 44), freedom of the will (Pico della Mirandola 1486 [1965: 5]; Sartre 1946 [2007: 29, 47]), a specific, “political” form of sociality, or a unique type of moral motivation (Hutcheson 1730: §15). These are likely, at best, to be the (still evolving) products in contemporary humans of processes set in motion by a trait constellation that includes proto-versions of (some of) these capacities. Such a view may also be compatible with an account of “what contemporary humans are like” that abstracts from the evolutionary time scale of eons and focuses instead on the present (cf. Dupré 1993: 43), whilst neither merely cataloguing widely distributed traits ( §3.2 ) nor attempting explanations in terms of the human genome ( §4.1 ). The traditional slogans appear to be attempts to summarise some such accounts. It seems clear, though, that their aims are significantly different from those of the biologically, or otherwise scientifically orientated positions thus far surveyed.

Two features of such accounts are worth emphasising, both of which we already encountered in Aristotle’s contribution to the original package. The first involves a shift in perspective from that of the scientific observer to that of a participant in a contemporary human life form. Whereas the human—or non-human—biologist may ask what modern humans are like, just as they may ask what bonobos are like, the question that traditional philosophical accounts of human nature are plausibly attempting to answer is what it is like to live one’s life as a contemporary human. This question is likely to provoke the counter-question as to whether there is anything that it is like to live simply as a contemporary human, rather than as a human-in-a-specific-historical-and-cultural context (Habermas 1958: 32; Geertz 1973: 52f.; Dupré 2003: 110f.). For the traditional sloganeers, the answer is clearly affirmative. The second feature of such accounts is that they tend to take it that reference to the capacities named in the traditional slogans is in some sense normatively , in particular, ethically significant .

The first claim of such accounts, then, is that there is some property of contemporary humans that is in some way descriptively or causally central to participating in their form of life. The second is that such participation involves subjection to normative standards rooted in the possession of some such property. Importantly, there is a step from the first to the second form of significance, and justification of the step requires argument. Even from a participant perspective, there is no automatic move from explanatory to normative significance.

According to an “internal”, participant account of human nature, certain capacities of contemporary, perhaps modern humans unavoidably structure the way they (we) live their (our) lives. Talk of “structuring” refers to three kinds of contributions to the matrix of capacities and dispositions that both enable and constrain the ways humans live their lives. These are contributions, first, to the specific shape other features of humans lives have and, second, to the way other such features hang together (Midgley 2000: 56ff.; Roughley 2011: 16ff.). Relatedly, they also make possible a whole new set of practices. All three relations are explanatory, although their explanatory role appears not necessarily to correspond to the role corresponding features, or earlier versions of the features, might have played in the evolutionary genealogy of contemporary human psychology. Having linguistic capacities is a prime candidate for the role of such a structural property: human perception, emotion, action planning and thought are all plausibly transformed in linguistic creatures, as are the connections between perception and belief, and the myriad relationships between thought and behaviour, connections exploited and deepened in a rich set of practices unavailable to non-linguistic animals. Similar things could be claimed for other properties named by the traditional slogans.

In contrast to the ways in which such capacities have frequently been referred to in the slogan mode, particularly to the pathos that has tended to accompany it, it seems highly implausible that any one such property will stand alone as structurally significant. It is more likely that we should be picking out a constellation of properties, a constellation that may well include properties variants of which are possessed by other animals. Other properties, including capacities that may be specific to contemporary humans, such as humour, may be less plausible candidates for a structural role.

Note that the fact that such accounts aim to answer a question asked from the participant perspective does not rule out that the features in question may be illuminated in their role for human self-understanding by data from empirical science. On the contrary, it seems highly likely that disciplines such as developmental and comparative psychology, and neuroscience will contribute significantly to an understanding of the possibilities and constraints inherent in the relevant capacities and in the way they interact.

5.2. Human Nature and the Human ergon

The paradigmatic strategy for deriving ethical consequences from claims about structural features of the human life form is the Platonic and Aristotelian ergon or function argument. The first premise of Aristotle’s version ( Nicomachean Ethics 1097b–1098a) connects function and goodness: if the characteristic function of an entity of a type X is to φ, then a good entity of type X is one that φs well. Aristotle confers plausibility on the claim by using examples such as social roles and bodily organs. If the function of an eye as an exemplar of its kind is to enable seeing, then a good eye is one that enables its bearer to see well. The second premise of the argument is a claim we encountered in section 1.4 of this entry, a claim we can now see as predicating a structural property of human life, the exercise of reason. According to this claim, the function or end of individual humans as humans is, depending on interpretation (Nussbaum 1995: 113ff.), either the exercise of reason or life according to reason. If this is correct, it follows that a good human being is one whose life centrally involves the exercise of, or life in accordance with, reason.

In the light of the discussion so far, it ought to be clear that, as it stands, the second premise of this argument is incompatible with the evolutionary biology of species. It asserts that the exercise of reason is not only the key structural property of human life, but also the realization of the fully developed human form. No sense can be made of this latter notion in evolutionary terms. Nevertheless, a series of prominent contemporary ethicists—Alasdair MacIntyre (1999), Rosalind Hursthouse (1999), Philippa Foot (2001) and Martha Nussbaum (2006)—have all made variants of the ergon argument central to their ethical theories. As each of these authors advance some version of the second premise, it is instructive to examine the ways in which they aim to avoid the challenge from evolutionary biology.

Before doing so, it is first worth noting that any ethical theory or theory of value is engaged in an enterprise that has no clear place in an evolutionary analysis. If we want to know what goodness is or what “good” means, evolutionary theory is not the obvious place to look. This is particularly clear in view of the fact that evolutionary theory operates at the level of populations (Sober 1980: 370; Walsh 2006: 434), whereas ethical theory operates, at least primarily, at the level of individual agents. However, the specific conflict between evolutionary biology and neo-Aristotelian ethics results from the latter’s constructive use of the concept of species and, in particular, of a teleological conception of a fully developed form of individual members of the species “ qua members of [the] species” (MacIntyre 1999: 64, 71; cf. Thompson 2008: 29; Foot 2001: 27). The characterisation of achieving that form as fulfilling a “function”, which helps the analogy with bodily organs and social roles, is frequently replaced in contemporary discussions by talk of “flourishing” (Aristotle’s eudaimonia ). Such talk more naturally suggests comparisons with the lives of other organisms (although Aristotle himself excludes other animals from eudaimonia ; cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1009b). The concept of flourishing in turn picks out biological—etymologically: botanical—processes, but again not of a sort that play a role in evolutionary theory. It also seems primarily predicated of individual organisms. It may play a role in ecology; it is, however, most clearly at home in practical applications of biological knowledge, as in horticulture. In this respect, it is comparable to the concept of health.

Neo-Aristotelians claim that to describe an organism, whether a plant or a non-human or human animal, as flourishing is to measure it against a standard that is specific to the species to which it belongs. To do so is to evaluate it as a more or less good “specimen of its species (or sub-species)” (Hursthouse 1999: 198). The key move is then to claim that moral evaluation is, “quite seriously” (Foot 2001: 16), evaluation of the same sort: just as a non-defective animal or plant exemplifies flourishing within the relevant species’ life form, someone who is morally good is someone who exemplifies human flourishing, i.e., the fully developed form of the species. This metaethical claim has provoked the worry as to whether such attributions to other organisms are really anything more than classifications, or at most evaluations of “stretched and deflated” kinds that are missing the key feature of authority that we require for genuine normativity (Lenman 2005: 46ff.).

Independently of questions concerning their theory of value, ethical Neo-Aristotelians need to respond to the question of how reference to a fully developed form of the species can survive the challenge from evolutionary theory. Three kinds of response may appear promising.

The first adverts to the plurality of forms of biological science, claiming that there are life sciences, such as physiology, botany, zoology and ethology in the context of which such evaluations have a place (Hursthouse 1999: 202; 2012: 172; MacIntyre 1999: 65). And if ethology can legitimately attribute not only characteristic features, but also defects or flourishing to species members, in spite of species not being natural kinds, then there is little reason why ethics shouldn’t do so too. This strategy might ground in one of the moves sketched in section 3.1 of this entry. It might be argued, with Kitcher and Dupré, that such attributions are legitimate in other branches of biological science because there is a plurality of species concepts, indeed of kinds of species, where these are relative to epistemic interests. Or the claim might simply rest on a difference in what is taken to be the relevant time frame, where temporal relevance is indexed relative to the present. In ethics we are, it might be claimed, interested in humans as they are “at the moment and for a few millennia back and for maybe not much longer in the future” (Hursthouse 2012: 171).

This move amounts to the concession that talk of “the human species” is not to be understood literally. Whether this concession undermines the ethical theories that use the term is perhaps unclear. It leaves open the possibility that, as human nature may change significantly, there may be significant changes in what it means for humans to flourish and therefore in what is ethically required. This might be seen as a virtue, rather than a vice of the view.

A second response to the challenge from evolutionary biology aims to draw metaphysical consequences from epistemic or semantic claims. Michael Thompson has argued that what he calls alternatively “the human life form” and “the human species” is an a priori category. Thompson substantiates this claim by examining forms of discourse touched on in section 3.2 , forms of discourse that are generally taken to be of mere heuristic importance for amateur practices of identification, viz. field guides or animal documentaries. Statements such as “The domestic cat has four legs, two eyes, two ears and guts in its belly”, are, Thompson claims, instances of an important kind of predication that is neither tensed nor quantifiable. He calls these “natural historical descriptions” or “Aristotelian categoricals” (Thompson 2008: 64ff.). Such generic claims are not, he argues, made false where what is predicated is less than universal, or even statistically rare. Decisively, according to Thompson, our access to the notion of the human life form is non-empirical. It is, he claims, a presupposition of understanding ourselves from the first-person perspective as breathing, eating or feeling pain (Thompson 2004: 66ff.). Thus understood, the concept is independent of biology and therefore, if coherent, immune to problems raised by the Darwinian challenge.

Like Foot and Hursthouse, Thompson thinks that his Aristotelian categoricals allow inferences to specific judgments that members of species are defective (Thompson 2004: 54ff.; 2008: 80). He admits that such judgments in the case of the human life form are likely to be fraught with difficulties, but nevertheless believes that judgments of (non-)defective realization of a life form are the model for ethical evaluation (Thompson 2004: 30, 81f.). It may seem unclear how this might be the case in view of the fact that access to the human life form is supposed to be given as a presupposition of using the concept of “I”. Another worry is that the everyday understanding on which Thompson draws may be nothing other than a branch of folk biology. The folk tendency to ascribe teleological essences to species, as to “races” and genders, is no indication of the reality of such essences (Lewens 2012: 469f.; Stotz & Griffiths 2018: 60ff.; cf. Pellegrin 1982 [1986: 16ff., 120] and Charles 2000: 343ff., 368, on Aristotle’s own orientation to the usage of “the people”).

A final response to evolutionary biologists’ worries aims equally to distinguish the Neo-Aristotelian account of human nature from that of the sciences. However, it does so not by introducing a special metaphysics of “life forms”, but by explicitly constructing an ethical concept of human nature. Martha Nussbaum argues that the notion of human nature in play in what she calls “Aristotelian essentialism” is, as she puts it, “internal and evaluative”. It is a hermeneutic product of “human” self-understanding, constructed from within our best ethical outlook: “an ethical theory of human nature”, she claims,

should force us to answer for ourselves, on the basis of our very own ethical judgment, the question which beings are fully human ones. (Nussbaum 1995: 121f.; cf. Nussbaum 1992: 212ff.; 2006: 181ff.; McDowell 1980 [1998: 18ff.]; Hursthouse 1999: 229; 2012: 174f.)

There can be no question here of moving from a biological “is” to an ethical “ought”; rather, which features are taken to belong to human nature is itself seen as the result of ethical deliberation. Such a conception maintains the claim that the key ethical standard is that of human flourishing. However, it is clear that what counts as flourishing can only be specified on the basis of ethical deliberation, understood as striving for reflective equilibrium (Nussbaum 2006: 352ff.). In view of such a methodological proposal, there is a serious question as to what work is precisely done by the concept of human nature.

Neo-Aristotelians vary in the extent to which they flesh out a conception of species-specific flourishing. Nussbaum draws up a comprehensive, open-ended catalogue of what she calls “the central human capacities”. These are in part picked out because of their vulnerability to undermining or support by political measures. They include both basic bodily needs and more specifically human capacities, such as for humour, play, autonomy and practical reason (Nussbaum 1992: 216ff.; 2006: 76ff.). Such a catalogue allows the setting of three thresholds, below which a human organism would not count as living a human life at all (anencephalic children, for instance), as living a fully human life or as living a good human life (Nussbaum 2006: 181). Nussbaum explicitly argues that being of human parents is insufficient for crossing the first, evaluatively set threshold. Her conception is partly intended to provide guidelines as to how societies should conceive disability and as to when it is appropriate to take political measures in order to enable agents with nonstandard physical or mental conditions to cross the second and third thresholds.

Nussbaum has been careful to insist that enabling independence, rather than providing care, should be the prime aim. Nevertheless, the structure of an account that insists on a “species norm”, below which humans lacking certain capacities count as less than fully flourishing, has prompted accusations of illiberality. According to the complaint, it disrespects the right of members of, for example, deaf communities to set the standards for their own forms of life (Glackin 2016: 320ff.).

Other accounts of species-specific flourishing have been considerably more abstract. According to Hursthouse, plants flourish when their parts and operations are well suited to the ends of individual survival and continuance of the species. In social animals, flourishing also tends to involve characteristic pleasure and freedom from pain, and a contribution to appropriate functioning of relevant social groups (Hursthouse 1999: 197ff.). The good of human character traits conducive to pursuit of these four ends is transformed, Hursthouse claims, by the addition of “rationality”. As a result, humans flourish when they do what they correctly take themselves to have reason to do—under the constraint that they do not thereby cease to foster the four ends set for other social animals (Hursthouse 1999: 222ff.). Impersonal benevolence is, for example, because of this constraint, unlikely to be a virtue. In such an ethical outlook, what particular agents have reason to do is the primary standard; it just seems to be applied under particular constraints. A key question is thus whether the content of this primary standard is really determined by the notion of species-specific flourishing.

Where Hursthouse’s account builds up to, and attempts to provide a “natural” framework for, the traditional Aristotelian ergon of reason, MacIntyre builds his account around the claim that flourishing specific to the human “species” is essentially a matter of becoming an “independent practical reasoner” (MacIntyre 1999: 67ff.). It is because of the central importance of reasoning that, although human flourishing shares certain preconditions with the flourishing, say, of dolphins, it is also vulnerable in specific ways. MacIntyre argues that particular kinds of social practices enable the development of human reasoning capacities and that, because independent practical reasoning is, paradoxically, at core cooperatively developed and structured, the general aim of human flourishing is attained by participation in networks in local communities (MacIntyre 1999: 108). “Independent practical reasoners” are “dependent rational animals”. MacIntyre’s account thus makes room on an explanatory level for the evolutionary insight that humans can only become rational in a socio-cultural context which provides scaffolding for the development and exercise of rationality ( §4 ). Normatively, however, this point is subordinated to the claim that, from the point of view of participation in the contemporary human life form, flourishing corresponds to the traditional slogan.

MacIntyre, Hursthouse and Nussbaum (Nussbaum 2006: 159f.) all aim to locate the human capacity for reasoning within a framework that encompasses other animals. Each argues that, although the capacities to recognise reasons as reasons and for deliberation on their basis transform the needs and abilities humans share with other animals, the reasons in question remain in some way dependent on humans’ embodied and social form of life. This emphasis is intended to distinguish an Aristotelian approach from other approaches for which the capacity to evaluate reasons for action as reasons and to distance oneself from ones desires is also the “central difference” between humans and other animals (Korsgaard 2006: 104; 2018: 38ff.; cf. MacIntyre 1999: 71ff.). According to Korsgaard’s Kantian interpretation of Aristotle’s ergon argument, humans cannot act without taking a normative stand on whether their desires provide them with reasons to act. This she takes to be the key structural feature of their life, which brings with it “a whole new way of functioning well or badly” (Korsgaard 2018: 48; cf. 1996: 93). In such an account, “human nature” is monistically understood as this one structural feature which is so transformative that the concept of life applicable to organisms that instantiate it is no longer that applicable to organisms that don’t. Only “humans” live their lives, because only they possess the type of intentional control over their bodily movements that grounds in evaluation of their actions and self-evaluation as agents (Korsgaard 2006: 118; 2008: 141ff.; cf. Plessner 1928 [1975: 309f.]).

We have arrived at an interpretation of the traditional slogan that cuts it off from a metaphysics with any claims to be “naturalistic”. The claim now is that the structural effect of the capacity for reasoning transforms those features of humans that they share with other animals so thoroughly that those features pale into insignificance. What is “natural” about the capacity for reasoning for humans here is its unavoidability for contemporary members of the species, at least for those without serious mental disabilities. Such assertions also tend to shade into normative claims that discount the normative status of “animal” needs in view of the normative authority of human reasoning (cf. McDowell 1996 [1998: 172f.]).

The most radical version of this thought leads to the claim encountered towards the end of section 1.4 : that talk of “human nature” involves no essential reference at all to the species Homo sapiens or to the hominin lineage. According to this view, the kind to which contemporary humans belong is a kind to which entities could also belong who have no genealogical relationship to humans. That kind is the kind of entities that act and believe in accordance with the reasons they take themselves to have. Aliens, synthetically created agents and angels are further candidates for membership in the kind, which would, unlike biological taxa, be spatiotemporally unrestricted. The traditional term for the kind, as employed by Aquinas and Kant, is “person” (cf. Hull 1986: 9).

Roger Scruton has recently taken this line, arguing that persons can only be adequately understood in terms of a web of concepts inapplicable to other animals, concepts whose applicability grounds in an essential moral dimension of the personal life form. The concepts pick out components of a life form that is permeated by relationships of responsibility, as expressed in reactive attitudes such as indignation, guilt and gratitude. Such emotions he takes to involve a demand for accountability, and as such to be exclusive to the personal life form, not variants of animal emotions (Scruton 2017: 52). As a result, he claims, they situate their bearers in some sense “outside the natural order” (Scruton 2017: 26). According to such an account, we should embrace a methodological dualism with respect to humans: as animals, they are subject to the same kinds of biological explanations as all other organisms, but as persons, they are subject to explanations that are radically different in kind. These are explanations in terms of reasons and meanings, that is, exercises in “Verstehen”, whose applicability Scruton takes to be independent of causal explanation (Scruton 2017: 30ff., 46).

Such an account demonstrates with admirable clarity that there is no necessary connection between a theory of “human nature” and metaphysical naturalism. It also reinforces the fact, emphasised throughout this entry, that discussions of “human nature” require both serious conceptual spadework and explicit justification of the use of any one such concept rather than another.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

[Please contact the author with suggestions.]

Aquinas, Thomas | Aristotle, General Topics: biology | Aristotle, General Topics: ethics | ethics: virtue | evolution | Kant, Immanuel | Locke, John: on real essence | naturalism: moral | natural kinds | psychology: evolutionary | species

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Michelle Hooge, Maria Kronfeldner, Nick Laskowski and Hichem Naar for their comments on earlier drafts.

Copyright © 2021 by Neil Roughley < neil . roughley @ uni-due . de >

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Theories of Human Nature: Key Issues

2012, Philosophy Compass

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Mikael Stenmark

Jonathan Jong

The notion of ‘human nature’ has long since captured the interest and imagina- tion of philosophers, theologians, and scientists; as such, it appears that the study of human nature is one amenable to inter-disciplinary cross-fertilization. However, it is not obvious that there is a single coherent project being undertaken, neither between nor within disciplines. Rather, we argue that there are three main quests for human nature – the quest for universal human nature, the quest for human unique- ness, and the quest for innate human nature – and that different philosophical, theo- logical, and scientific enterprises emphasize (or, indeed, neglect) different quests. Furthermore, these different intellectual enterprises may differ more fundamen- tally, namely in their very object of enquiry, the definition of the theoretical term ‘human being.’ For scientists, the term ‘human being’ is often treated as being coter- minous with the term Homo sapiens; that is, ‘human being’ is a biological category, a species. This definition is now, rightly or wrongly, taken for granted by philosophers and theologians, but it is not necessarily the most appropriate. It remains an open question whether, for any given philosophical and/or theological project, the bio- logical concept Homo sapiens is the most appropriate way to understand the term ‘human being.’ This paper considers these issues by scrutinizing two cases – from evolutionary psychology and theological anthropology – in each case examining the adequacy of the biological concept Homo sapiens for its purpose, as well as the viability of each of the three quests for human nature.

usama binjunaid

عہہأيہہشہہ فہہوور

We live at a time of multiple revolutions in science, particularly in medical science and technology. Profound innovations are emerging that will not just change the problems we address or the ways we respond to problems, but which may transform the sorts of creatures that we are. Our species may be changed for better or worse by what is in prospect. The nature of the human species is therefore at stake. " The Past, Present and Future of Human Nature " might seem all encompassing, but it leaves almost everything out. For most of the time that living creatures have existed there have been no humans and thus no human nature. We are a recent and probably transient phenomenon; we are well advised to keep that humbling fact in mind. Still, as a member of this recent but disarmingly clever species, I have an interest in understanding what our nature is, what it might become, and how that might depend on the choices we make. It is distinctively human to engage in self-conscious reflection on our own nature. Doing so has gone on for all of recorded human history and must have been going on longer than that. Wonder is among the most salient distinguishing characteristics of humans: we are the self-reflective creature. Our intellectual history centers prominently on efforts to understand our own behavior and motivations, our relationship to nature, and our place in the universe or, on some views, beyond. We have devoted much thought to exploring whether we are by nature altruistic or selfish, warlike or peace-loving, monogamous or polygamous, shaped more by genetics or by experience and environment, driven by deterministic causes or free to make autonomous choices. We have sought answers to understand the human condition, and to know whether we are the result of purposive design or the chance product of natural processes. We have long wondered about the relationship among our minds, our brains, and the baffling phenomena of consciousness, personal identity, and self-awareness. These issues were historically addressed primarily by philosophers and theologians; now, they are also vigorously pursued by others such as sociobiologists, cognitive neuroscientists, computational linguists, and physicists. We have sought to discern what about ourselves is inherent in our nature and what is socially constructed. We find ourselves unendingly fascinating. On the traditional Judeo-Christian view, humans were the apex of God's intentional creation; distinct from the rest of the world, they exerted dominion over nature. Other views, such as those of some Native American cultures, saw humans as being at one with nature, properly seeking harmony with the larger whole. Science, even in its earliest iterations, is the human effort to understand what nature

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Currently, there is significant divergence in scholarly opinion as to whether or not human nature exists. In my PhD thesis, I argue for the existence of human nature. In so doing, I critique rival views on human nature and orthodox entry points into the issue. I also offer a partial explanation as to why such a strong divergence of expert opinion may exist, and argue that accuracy on the issue is important with respect to individual and collective problem solving. The view of human nature I defend is what I call ‘ecological.’ This construct aligns with the fact that biological systems exist at multiple levels of organization and relative to varying ecologies, developmental stages, frames of reference, and viable systems of orientation. Given this, I contend human nature is not something that ‘inheres’ and projects out from the organism; rather, human nature is diffuse and exists at simultaneous levels of biological organization, and at the intersection of genetic and epigenetic factors, past and present, and scientific truth and pragmatism.

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Home » Humanities Research – Types, Methods and Examples

Humanities Research – Types, Methods and Examples

Table of Contents

Humanities Research

Definition:

Humanities research is a systematic and critical investigation of human culture, values, beliefs, and practices, including the study of literature, philosophy, history, art, languages, religion, and other aspects of human experience.

Types of Humanities Research

Types of Humanities Research are as follows:

Historical Research

This type of research involves studying the past to understand how societies and cultures have evolved over time. Historical research may involve examining primary sources such as documents, artifacts, and other cultural products, as well as secondary sources such as scholarly articles and books.

Cultural Studies

This type of research involves examining the cultural expressions and practices of a particular society or community. Cultural studies may involve analyzing literature, art, music, film, and other forms of cultural production to understand their social and cultural significance.

Linguistics Research

This type of research involves studying language and its role in shaping cultural and social practices. Linguistics research may involve analyzing the structure and use of language, as well as its historical development and cultural variations.

Anthropological Research

This type of research involves studying human cultures and societies from a comparative and cross-cultural perspective. Anthropological research may involve ethnographic fieldwork, participant observation, interviews, and other qualitative research methods.

Philosophy Research

This type of research involves examining fundamental questions about the nature of reality, knowledge, morality, and other philosophical concepts. Philosophy research may involve analyzing philosophical texts, conducting thought experiments, and engaging in philosophical discourse.

Art History Research

This type of research involves studying the history and significance of art and visual culture. Art history research may involve analyzing the formal and aesthetic qualities of art, as well as its historical context and cultural significance.

Literary Studies Research

This type of research involves analyzing literature and other forms of written expression. Literary studies research may involve examining the formal and structural qualities of literature, as well as its historical and cultural context.

Digital Humanities Research

This type of research involves using digital technologies to study and analyze cultural artifacts and practices. Digital humanities research may involve analyzing large datasets, creating digital archives, and using computational methods to study cultural phenomena.

Data Collection Methods

Data Collection Methods in Humanities Research are as follows:

• Interviews : This method involves conducting face-to-face, phone or virtual interviews with individuals who are knowledgeable about the research topic. Interviews may be structured, semi-structured, or unstructured, depending on the research questions and objectives. Interviews are often used in qualitative research to gain in-depth insights and perspectives.
• Surveys : This method involves distributing questionnaires or surveys to a sample of individuals or groups. Surveys may be conducted in person, through the mail, or online. Surveys are often used in quantitative research to collect data on attitudes, behaviors, and other characteristics of a population.
• Observations : This method involves observing and recording behavior or events in a natural or controlled setting. Observations may be structured or unstructured, and may involve the use of audio or video recording equipment. Observations are often used in qualitative research to collect data on social practices and behaviors.
• Archival Research: This method involves collecting data from historical documents, artifacts, and other cultural products. Archival research may involve accessing physical archives or online databases. Archival research is often used in historical and cultural studies to study the past.
• Case Studies : This method involves examining a single case or a small number of cases in depth. Case studies may involve collecting data through interviews, observations, and archival research. Case studies are often used in cultural studies, anthropology, and sociology to understand specific social or cultural phenomena.
• Focus Groups : This method involves bringing together a small group of individuals to discuss a particular topic or issue. Focus groups may be conducted in person or online, and are often used in qualitative research to gain insights into social and cultural practices and attitudes.
• Participatory Action Research : This method involves engaging with individuals or communities in the research process, with the goal of promoting social change or addressing a specific social problem. Participatory action research may involve conducting focus groups, interviews, or surveys, as well as involving participants in data analysis and interpretation.

Data Analysis Methods

Some common data analysis methods used in humanities research:

• Content Analysis : This method involves analyzing the content of texts or cultural artifacts to identify patterns, themes, and meanings. Content analysis is often used in literary studies, media studies, and cultural studies to analyze the meanings and representations conveyed in cultural products.
• Discourse Analysis: This method involves analyzing the use of language and discourse to understand social and cultural practices and identities. Discourse analysis may involve analyzing the structure, meaning, and power dynamics of language and discourse in different social contexts.
• Narrative Analysis: This method involves analyzing the structure, content, and meaning of narratives in different cultural contexts. Narrative analysis may involve analyzing the themes, symbols, and narrative devices used in literary texts or other cultural products.
• Ethnographic Analysis : This method involves analyzing ethnographic data collected through participant observation, interviews, and other qualitative methods. Ethnographic analysis may involve identifying patterns and themes in the data, as well as interpreting the meaning and significance of social and cultural practices.
• Statistical Analysis: This method involves using statistical methods to analyze quantitative data collected through surveys or other quantitative methods. Statistical analysis may involve using descriptive statistics to describe the characteristics of the data, or inferential statistics to test hypotheses and make inferences about a population.
• Network Analysis: This method involves analyzing the structure and dynamics of social networks to understand social and cultural practices and relationships. Network analysis may involve analyzing patterns of social interaction, communication, and influence.
• Visual Analysis : This method involves analyzing visual data, such as images, photographs, and art, to understand their cultural and social significance. Visual analysis may involve analyzing the formal and aesthetic qualities of visual products, as well as their historical and cultural context.

Examples of Humanities Research

Some Examples of Humanities Research are as follows:

• Literary research on diversity and representation: Scholars of literature are exploring the representation of different groups in literature and how those representations have changed over time. They are also studying how literature can promote empathy and understanding across different cultures and communities.
• Philosophical research on ethics and technology: Philosophers are examining the ethical implications of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and biotechnology. They are asking questions about what it means to be human in a world where technology is becoming increasingly advanced.
• Anthropological research on cultural identity: Anthropologists are studying the ways in which culture shapes individual and collective identities. They are exploring how cultural practices and beliefs can shape social and political systems, as well as how individuals and communities resist or adapt to dominant cultural norms.
• Linguistic research on language and communication: Linguists are studying the ways in which language use and communication can impact social and political power dynamics. They are exploring how language can reinforce or challenge social hierarchies and how language use can reflect cultural values and norms.

How to Conduct Humanities Research

Conducting humanities research involves a number of steps, including:

• Define your research question or topic : Identify a question or topic that you want to explore in-depth. This can be a broad or narrow topic, depending on the scope of your research project.
• Conduct a literature review: Before beginning your research, read extensively on your topic. This will help you understand the existing scholarship and identify gaps in the literature that your research can address.
• Develop a research methodology: Determine the methods you will use to collect and analyze data, such as interviews, surveys, archival research, or textual analysis. Your methodology should be appropriate to your research question and topic.
• Collect data: Collect data using the methods you have chosen. This may involve conducting interviews, surveys, or archival research, or analyzing primary or secondary sources.
• Analyze data: Once you have collected data, analyze it using appropriate methods. This may involve coding, categorizing, or comparing data, or interpreting texts or other sources.
• Draw conclusions: Based on your analysis, draw conclusions about your research question or topic. These conclusions should be supported by your data and should contribute to existing scholarship.
• Communicate your findings : Communicate your findings through writing, presentations, or other forms of dissemination. Your work should be clearly written and accessible to a broad audience.

Applications of Humanities Research

Humanities research has many practical applications in various fields, including:

• Policy-making: Humanities research can inform policy-making by providing insights into social, cultural, and historical contexts. It can help policymakers understand the impact of policies on communities and identify potential unintended consequences.
• Education: Humanities research can inform curriculum development and pedagogy. It can provide insights into how to teach critical thinking, cross-cultural understanding, and communication skills.
• Cultural heritage preservation: Humanities research can help to preserve cultural heritage by documenting and analyzing cultural practices, traditions, and artifacts. It can also help to promote cultural tourism and support local economies.
• Business and industry: Humanities research can provide insights into consumer behavior, cultural preferences, and historical trends that can inform marketing, branding, and product design.
• Healthcare : Humanities research can contribute to the development of patient-centered healthcare by exploring the impact of social and cultural factors on health and illness. It can also help to promote cross-cultural understanding and empathy in healthcare settings.
• Social justice: Humanities research can contribute to social justice by providing insights into the experiences of marginalized communities, documenting historical injustices, and promoting cross-cultural understanding.

Purpose of Humanities Research

The purpose of humanities research is to deepen our understanding of human experience, culture, and history. Humanities research aims to explore the human condition and to provide insights into the diversity of human perspectives, values, and beliefs.

Humanities research can contribute to knowledge in various fields, including history, literature, philosophy, anthropology, and more. It can help us to understand how societies and cultures have evolved over time, how they have been shaped by various factors, and how they continue to change.

Humanities research also aims to promote critical thinking and creativity. It encourages us to question assumptions, to challenge dominant narratives, and to seek out new perspectives. Humanities research can help us to develop empathy and understanding for different cultures and communities, and to appreciate the richness and complexity of human experience.

Overall, the purpose of humanities research is to contribute to a deeper understanding of ourselves, our communities, and our world. It helps us to grapple with fundamental questions about the human experience and to develop the skills and insights needed to address the challenges of the future.

When to use Humanities Research

Humanities research can be used in various contexts where a deeper understanding of human experience, culture, and history is required. Here are some examples of when humanities research may be appropriate:

• Exploring social and cultural phenomena: Humanities research can be used to explore social and cultural phenomena such as art, literature, religion, and politics. It can help to understand how these phenomena have evolved over time and how they relate to broader social, cultural, and historical contexts.
• Understanding historical events: Humanities research can be used to understand historical events such as wars, revolutions, and social movements. It can provide insights into the motivations, experiences, and perspectives of the people involved, and help to contextualize these events within broader historical trends.
• Promoting cultural understanding : Humanities research can be used to promote cross-cultural understanding and to challenge stereotypes and biases. It can provide insights into the diversity of human experiences, values, and beliefs, and help to build empathy and mutual respect across different cultures and communities.
• Informing policy-making: Humanities research can be used to inform policy-making by providing insights into social, cultural, and historical contexts. It can help policymakers understand the impact of policies on communities and identify potential unintended consequences.
• Promoting innovation and creativity : Humanities research can be used to promote innovation and creativity in various fields. It can help to generate new ideas, perspectives, and approaches to complex problems, and to challenge conventional thinking and assumptions.

Characteristics of Humanities Research

Some of the key characteristics of humanities research:

• Focus on human experience: Humanities research focuses on the study of human experience, culture, and history. It aims to understand the human condition, explore human values and beliefs, and analyze the ways in which societies and cultures have evolved over time.
• Interpretive approach: Humanities research takes an interpretive approach to data analysis. It seeks to understand the meaning behind texts, artifacts, and cultural practices, and to explore the multiple perspectives and contexts that shape human experience.
• Contextualization : Humanities research emphasizes the importance of contextualization. It seeks to understand how social, cultural, and historical factors shape human experience, and to place individual phenomena within broader cultural and historical contexts.
• Subjectivity : Humanities research recognizes the subjective nature of human experience. It acknowledges that human values, beliefs, and experiences are shaped by individual perspectives, and that these perspectives can vary across cultures, communities, and time periods.
• Narrative analysis : Humanities research often uses narrative analysis to explore the stories, myths, and cultural narratives that shape human experience. It seeks to understand how these narratives are constructed, how they evolve over time, and how they influence individual and collective identity.
• Multi-disciplinary: Humanities research is often interdisciplinary, drawing on a range of disciplines such as history, literature, philosophy, anthropology, and more. It seeks to bring together different perspectives and approaches to understand complex human phenomena.

Advantages of Humanities Research

Some of the key advantages of humanities research:

• Promotes critical thinking: Humanities research encourages critical thinking by challenging assumptions and exploring different perspectives. It requires researchers to analyze and interpret complex texts, artifacts, and cultural practices, and to make connections between different phenomena.
• Enhances cultural understanding : Humanities research promotes cross-cultural understanding by exploring the diversity of human experiences, values, and beliefs. It helps to challenge stereotypes and biases and to build empathy and mutual respect across different cultures and communities.
• Builds historical awareness: Humanities research helps us to understand the historical context of current events and social issues. It provides insights into how societies and cultures have evolved over time and how they have been shaped by various factors, and helps us to contextualize current social, political, and cultural trends.
• Contributes to public discourse: Humanities research contributes to public discourse by providing insights into complex social, cultural, and historical phenomena. It helps to inform public policy and public debate by providing evidence-based analysis and insights into social issues and problems.
• Promotes creativity and innovation: Humanities research promotes creativity and innovation by challenging conventional thinking and assumptions. It encourages researchers to generate new ideas and perspectives and to explore alternative ways of understanding and addressing complex problems.
• Builds communication skills: Humanities research requires strong communication skills, including the ability to analyze and interpret complex texts, artifacts, and cultural practices, and to communicate findings and insights in a clear and compelling way.

Limitations of Humanities Research

Some of the key limitations of humanities research:

• Subjectivity: Humanities research relies heavily on interpretation and analysis, which are inherently subjective. Researchers bring their own perspectives, biases, and values to the analysis, which can affect the conclusions they draw.
• Lack of generalizability : Humanities research often focuses on specific texts, artifacts, or cultural practices, which can limit the generalizability of findings to other contexts. It is difficult to make broad generalizations based on limited samples, which can be a challenge when trying to draw broader conclusions.
• Limited quantitative data : Humanities research often relies on qualitative data, such as texts, images, and cultural practices, which can be difficult to quantify. This can make it difficult to conduct statistical analyses or to draw quantitative conclusions.
• Limited replicability: Humanities research often involves in-depth analysis of specific texts, artifacts, or cultural practices, which can make it difficult to replicate studies. This can make it challenging to test the validity of findings or to compare results across studies.
• Limited funding: Humanities research may not always receive the same level of funding as other types of research. This can make it challenging for researchers to conduct large-scale studies or to have access to the same resources as other researchers in different fields.
• Limited impact : Humanities research may not always have the same level of impact as research in other fields, particularly in terms of policy and practical applications. This can make it challenging for researchers to demonstrate the relevance and impact of their work.

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The intricate diversity of human–nature relations: Evidence from Finland

• Research Article
• Open access
• Published: 29 September 2023
• Volume 53 , pages 181–200, ( 2024 )

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• Kaisa J. Raatikainen   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-3099-8962 1 , 2 ,
• Anna-Kaisa Tupala   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-7571-3190 2 , 3 ,
• Riikka Niemelä   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-1763-3643 2 , 4 &
• Anna-Mari Laulumaa   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-8654-652X 2 , 5  

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Supporting sustainability requires understanding human–nature relations, which we approached as social constructions that can be studied through nature-related discourses. We examined human–nature relations in Finland by combining approaches from environmental social sciences and arts-based research into a mixed-methods design. A public online survey ( n  = 726) and post-performance audience interviews ( n  = 71) portrayed nature positively. Respondents’ ideas of nature ranged from natural scientific to philosophical; from dualistic to holistic; and from ecocentric to anthropocentric. A factor analysis revealed discourses focusing on wellbeing, conservation, ecoanxiety, pro-environmentalism, outdoor activity, and enjoying nature. Interviews added spiritual and over-generational aspects and revealed the importance of embodied experiences in nature relations. We identified dimensions that structure the relations, including human–nature positionality, engagement and contact with nature, and conception and thought. The emotional and experiential aspects, and nature-related practices, deserve further research. We demonstrate how a diversity of human–nature relations co-exists and co-evolves.

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Introduction

People are connected to nature in various ways, which range from material dependencies to emotional and philosophical linkages (Ives et al. 2018 ). In the twenty-first century, these society–nature relations have gained unforeseen breadth, depth, and consequentiality—but in a worrying manner (Castree 2001 ). Modern societies are claimed to be distanced from nature, contributing to the ongoing ecological crisis and hindering efforts to solve environmental issues (e.g., Ives et al. 2017 ,  2018 ; IPBES 2019 , 2022 ; Barragan-Jason et al. 2022 ). A recent global meta-analysis (Barragan-Jason et al. 2022 ) demonstrated that the level of human–nature connectedness, i.e., the extent to which humans consider themselves as part of nature, corresponds to sustainability-oriented and pro-environmental mindsets and behaviors. Thus, it is logical to suggest that strengthening the connections between people and nature and uncovering the emotional attachment and positive values tied to nature support sustainability (Lumber et al. 2017 ; Ives et al. 2018 ; Yletyinen et al. 2022 ). People value nature differently across a range of worldviews and knowledge systems. Recognizing and respecting this plurality would benefit both people and nature (IPBES 2022 ).

Environmental education is the most popular means to cultivate pro-environmentalism, but it has proven inefficient in increasing pro-environmental behavior and individuals’ perceived connectedness to nature (Lumber et al. 2017 ; Barragan-Jason et al. 2022 ). This finding emphasizes the need to understand the complexity and resilience of cognitive frameworks on which people base their actions in respect to nature. Supporting environmentally beneficial human–nature relations is difficult in industrialized countries that predominantly prioritize instrumental values of nature (IPBES 2022 ). Research can help solving this challenge by unveiling the complex ways in which people relate to nature, discovering how to strengthen nature connectedness, and seeking ways to bring people closer to nature. For example, there is evidence that guided walks in nature increase the sense of nature connectedness, if the walk is enriched with sensory and emotional activities (Lumber et al. 2017 ). Also, arts-based practices increase environmental sensitivity and engagement with nature through inclusion of hands-on activities and emotional aspects (Raatikainen et al. 2020 ).

In this paper, we empirically examine the diversity of human–nature relations in Finland through a relationalist lens. With relationalism we refer to the idea that social phenomena are produced through dynamic interactions (Dépelteau 2018 ). Human–nature relations are, by default, based on interactions between people and nature. Human–nature relations are complex and everchanging (e.g., Williams 1980 ) and thereby appear elusive. Our research set out to study the diverse ways in which people and nature connect to each other and the multiple dimensions wherein human–nature relations evolve. We adopted a transdisciplinary research methodology based on art&science collaboration. Arts-based research methodologies are increasing in popularity in social sciences as they reach non-verbal, embodied and experiential types of knowledge, which are unattainable through more traditional research methods (Coutts et al. 2018 ; Chilton and Leavy 2020 ). Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods from the social sciences with post-performance audience interviews allowed us to gain a more comprehensive understanding on human–nature relations.

Our analytical starting point was to approach”nature” both as a physical actor and a concept that evolves in the interaction between humans and nature. Nature refers to physical things, but is also a social construction that allows people to position themselves in the world (Williams 1980 ; Castree 2001 ). Physical nature is an interactant, i.e., a thing that acts and is acted upon. Therefore, human–nature relations are reciprocal and processual: people’s actions have an impact on physical nature and simultaneously engagement with nature affects people (Schroeder 2007 ).

People situate themselves with respect to nature through discourses that define nature. Studying nature-related discourses enables grasping the reasoning behind different views of nature, understanding how attitudes and behaviors towards nature are formed (Muradian and Pascual 2018 ), and investigating how discourses enable related types of actions (Hugé et al. 2013 ). Based on these premises, we studied human–nature relations through data derived from a public survey and audience interviews. By applying arts-based inquiry we extended the analysis to the embodied and emotional aspects of experiencing nature. This mixed-methods approach allowed us to clarify how people understand, define, and act on nature (Hugé et al. 2013 ); and to shed light on the diversity of values shaping human–nature relations (Muradian and Pascual 2018 ).

We conducted our research in Finland, addressing the Finnish-speaking population. Finland is a North European welfare state, with ca. 70% of the gross domestic product derived from the services sector and 72% of the population urban (Statistics Finland 2023 ). Forests cover 75% of the area of Finland (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2023 ), and the use of forests has been an important driver for economic development (Björn 2000 ) and biodiversity loss (Kontula and Raunio 2018 ). Finns have access to nature based on the rights to roam (i.e., the legitimate right to responsibly move, camp, and forage in nature regardless of landownership). The importance of natural resource use and unrestricted access to nature are often mentioned as contributing to the appreciation of nature, specifically forests, in the Finnish society (Sitra and Kantar TNS 2021 ; Björklund et al. 2022 ; Finnish Environment Institute 2022 ). However, this involves contradictions between utilitarian and intrinsic values (Björklund et al. 2022 ). As such, Finland represents a case as a country in which industrialized market economy co-exists with a wide-spread cultural appreciation of nature.

From these points of departure, we formulated three research questions:

How nature is conceptualized in Finland in terms of associative words and freely formulated definitions? (RQ1)

Which discourses inform the ways in which people relate to nature in Finland, and which generalizable dimensions of human–nature relations can be found in these discourses? (RQ2)

What kinds of embodied and emotional nature experiences emerged from participating in a site-specific walking performance? (RQ3)

The next section explains how and why we applied relationalism as our theoretical framework. We then describe the transdisciplinary mixed-methods research approach. We present the empirical results based on a public online survey and audience interviews and interpret our findings regarding the diversity of human–nature relations. Lastly, we discuss ways in which human–nature relations are connected to sustainability-oriented mindsets and behaviors.

Theoretical framework

Discussions on human–nature relations are often laden with dualisms and divisionary debates. These easily oversimplify human–nature relations into single dimensions and highlight their opposite positions, such as ecocentrism vs. anthropocentrism or intrinsic vs. instrumental value (as discussed by, e.g., Ives and Fischer 2017 ; Manfredo et al. 2017 ; Bonnedahl and Heikkurinen 2019 ; Raatikainen et al. 2021 ). Yet, human–nature relations are diverse and dynamic, and we argue that there are several coexisting dimensions underlying this complexity. The existence of such dimensions can be inferred from the similarities in the verbal descriptions of human–nature relations. The similarities include, for example, notions of what is valued in nature, and how people position themselves in relation to nature. Various categorizations have addressed the dimensionality of human–nature relations, including ontological notions, ideologies, and material to philosophical connections with nature (Flint et al. 2013 ; Ives et al. 2017 ; Muradian and Pascual 2018 ). We have taken inspiration from earlier analytical frameworks on human–nature relations (Flint et al. 2013 ; Braito et al. 2017 ; Ives et al. 2017 ; Lumber et al. 2017 ; Muradian and Pascual 2018 ) to develop a theoretical lens suited for our research, which combines empirical research with relationalism (Fig.  1 ).

A theoretical framework indicating dimensions of human–nature relations for the purposes of the current study. The dimensions in the middle column were brought up in the transdisciplinary discussions among the authors and informed by literature (specifically Flint et al. 2013 ; Muradian and Pascual 2018 ). We interpreted empirical data into human–nature relations, expressed as discourses, and explored the characteristics of the relations using the above dimensions as an analytical tool

By examining conceptualizations, discourses, and experiences of nature, we set out to map different types of human–nature relations with the aim of positioning the empirical findings along theoretically defined dimensions of the relations. Here, a relational approach emphasizes that qualities of nature are not present in things but are derivative of relationships that occur directly between people and nature, or indirectly, i.e., between people but involving nature (Chan et al. 2016 ). In general, relationalism refers to an attempt to study social phenomena as fluid processes of interaction rather than solid, determining substances (Dépelteau 2018 ). Therefore, relationalism is well suited for exploring human–nature connections. Acknowledging that human–nature relations are in constant change helps to understand how they interact and influence each other (Ives et al. 2017 ).

As human–nature relations are constantly evolving, they hardly fit into fixed categories. There is some inertia in this process of becoming, though; human–nature relations are socially constructed and require shared cultural understanding to exist. To be able to co-create meaning for human–nature relations, people must share the verbal symbolism tied to the relations (Vandenberghe 2018 ). The relations are represented through language, conceptualizations, and manners of behavior. These evolve into discourses through repetition. Discourses portray shared ideas and guide practices in which different views of nature are embedded (Williams 1980 ). Subsequently, discourses encourage particular types of actions (Hugé et al. 2013 ). Thus, discourses encompass cognition and action as well as individual and collective perspectives. We argue that nature-related discourses provide a means to study the multidimensionality of human–nature relations, since discourses that differ content-wise (i.e., reflect different relations) can share similarities in their structure (i.e., underlying dimensions).

Flint et al. ( 2013 ) define three dimensions of human–nature relation: positionality of humans and nature, character of bond between humans and nature, and understanding of nature (see Fig.  1 ). This categorization was later used by Braito et al. ( 2017 ) to demonstrate how people’s behavior is connected to their individual nature relationship (how a person relates with nature). Actual interventions aiming at increased nature connectedness were studied by Lumber et al. ( 2017 ). According to them, experiential and affective factors such as perceived contact, emotion, meaningfulness, and compassion were predictors of connection with nature, whereas knowledge-based activities were not (Lumber et al. 2017 ). Ives et al. ( 2017 ) concluded that interventions targeting philosophical and emotional connections with nature had more potential to influence underlying values than interventions in cognitive, experiential, and material connections. Yet, values and other forms of cognition contribute to the emotional basis of interactions between people and nature (Jones et al. 2016 ; Ives et al. 2017 ), and the interactions turn into experiences that raise emotions (Raatikainen et al. 2020 ). Therefore, we wanted to examine also emotions and experiences, as well as actions and behaviors, as separate but interlinked dimensions with regards to conceptions and thoughts. In addition, we included two dimensions (engagement and practice) that have been highlighted as contributing to environmental behaviors (Muradian and Pascual 2018 ). By the dimension of engagement, we refer to the ways in which human–nature relations are concretized or operationalized (“main modes of interaction” sensu Muradian and Pascual 2018 ). Types of engagement include various forms, such as utilization and worship. The dimension of practice includes social rules, norms, and rituals that define acceptable actions and behaviors in relation to nature (Muradian and Pascual 2018 ). The other dimensions brought up by Muradian and Pascual ( 2018 ) corresponded to those of Flint et al. ( 2013 ) (Fig.  1 ).

Our analysis was inspired by the Maussian view on relational thinking that encourages a structural analysis of relations as a system of representations through which people are connected to each other (Vandenberghe 2018 ). In our case, nature-related discourses are such shared representations that are culturally produced in language. Communication in accordance with the discourses is a prerequisite for co-operation and collaboration, as any social action builds on shared meanings, norms, and values (Vandenberghe 2018 ). Yet, people give nature different meanings depending on the temporal, spatial, and social context (Williams 1980 ; Cronon 1996 ; Björklund et al. 2022 ), illustrating plurality in human–nature relations (IPBES 2022 ). Importantly, cultural representations of nature affect how people perceive nature and their own position in relation to nature. This has direct consequences on people’s worldviews and behavior (Castree 2001 ; Björklund et al. 2022 ; IPBES 2022 ). Therefore, by studying nature-related discourses we aimed to better understand the outcomes (actions, practices) of human–nature relations as well as their drivers (shared values and intentions), and the emotional and experiential factors that are important for individuals in deepening their nature connectedness and adopting pro-environmental behaviors.

Materials and methods

Data collection.

According to a convergent mixed-methods design, we collected survey and interview data parallel to each other and analyzed them separately (Creswell and Creswell 2018 ). We then compared and synthesized the results of the analyses, assuming that a combination of different types of information would give a more detailed understanding on the diversity of human–nature relations in the Finnish context (Fig.  2 ).

The mixed-methods approach of the study. Research questions and corresponding terminology used in Results section are in grey boxes. The white boxes refer to data collection (upper part) and analysis methods (lower part). Main data types are bounded with dashed lines, and colored boxes indicate data structure (sections in the survey and the interviews). The colors indicate connections with the theoretical dimensions of human–nature relations (Fig.  1 ). Arrows illustrate workflow, and the thicker lines at the bottom show comparisons between the results from the different analyses

We conducted a public online survey in between August 7th and November 2nd 2020, to collect qualitative and quantitative data on human–nature relations in the Finnish context (RQ1 and RQ2). The timing overlapped with the walking performance arranged on August 22nd and 23rd, 2020. The qualitative data collected through interviewing the audience was analyzed to explore the experiential aspects of human–nature relations (RQ3).

Details of the survey and sampling are provided in Appendix S1 , and the questionnaire form is in Appendix S2 . The anonymized survey dataset generated during the study is available in the JYX Digital Repository (Raatikainen et al. 2023 ). The following sections provide brief summaries of the analyses, which are described in more detail in Appendices S3 (thematic analysis on nature conceptualizations), S4 (factor analysis on shared nature discourses), S5 (respondents’ background), S6 (audience interviews), and S7 (code system for the deductive content analysis).

Analyses on survey data

We analyzed textual data from two open-ended survey questions: respondents’ definitions of ”nature”, and the associative word lists by which they described nature. We analyzed these data by grouping the content of the responses under emergent themes (Appendix S3 ). The nature definitions were interpreted into ideas of nature that were shared by respondents, and the associative words were summarized into a condensed list of repetitive nature concepts.

Likert-scale numerical data was collected on respondents’ agreement with 84 nature-related statements. These data were analyzed using exploratory factor analysis (Appendix S4 ). Here we assumed that quantifiable patterns in respondents’ statement agreement and disagreement could be translated into shared discourses. The content of the discourses was interpreted based on statement associations within each factor and examination of statements with high loadings to each factor.

After a final set of six factors was formed, we calculated score values of each factor for every respondent. The factor scores indicated respondent’s agreement with the discourses, and we used them as response variables in analyzing the effect of respondent background on the discourses using generalized linear modelling (GLM; Appendix S5 ). In addition, we identified 20 respondents who had the highest scores for each factor. Their responses to open-ended questions were used to identify the connections between factor-based discourses (RQ2) and qualitatively interpreted nature conceptualizations (RQ1).

Analysis on audience interviews

We applied arts-based methodology in the qualitative data collection. We interviewed audience members of a site-specific walking performance that was arranged at the Hitonhauta conservation area in Central Finland. The performance included a guided, silent walk trespassing the area. Eight acts were performed at different locations along the route, representing different aspects of human–nature relations in Finland. The arts-based research approach is described by Niemelä et al. ( 2023 ).

After the performance, the audience could voluntarily participate in a structured research interview (Appendix S6 ). At the onset of the interview, participants gave their informed consent and agreed with data collecting privacy policy and audio-recording. As the data collection included participation in public event, we did not collect participants’ background information to minimize the amount of personal data collected.

The interviews were transcribed verbatim and their content was qualitatively analyzed in two phases. First, we coded the transcripts deductively (Elo and Kyngäs 2008 ). We developed the code system (Appendix S7 ; Table 5 ) to detect which parts of the data were most informative according to RQ3. In the second phase of the content analysis, a query tool was applied on the coded data to search for overlapping and neighboring co-occurrences of code groups Emotions, Actions, Place, and Walking performance (Fig.  3 ). The derived parts of the data were coded again, this time using an inductive approach to detect emergent themes (Elo and Kyngäs 2008 ).

The interview data were queried to derive parts with overlapping content under selected code groups (i.e., areas covered with multiple circles). Extracted accounts indicated participants’ emotional reactions or embodied and sensorial experiences (code group Emotions) and content describing different actions and behaviors in nature (code group Actions), either of which coincided or were located near to codes under groups Place or Walking performance. Code group Place included participants’ observations on nature at the location such as habitats, weather, or landscape. Code group Walking performance included notions of the artwork

Survey: Respondent characteristics

A total of 726 respondents participated in the survey. Responses were received from all 19 Finnish provinces. A total of 466 respondents (64.2%) lived in Uusimaa, Central Finland, South-Western Finland, or Pirkanmaa regions. All other provinces had less than 50 respondents each (2 to 47; median was 17 respondents). Seven respondents (1.0%) lived outside of Finland. Most respondents (82.1%) lived in an urban or village environment whereas rural inhabitants were fewer (17.9%). A typical respondent was a middle-aged, employed female with higher education, living in a city or village (Table 1 ).

Over half of the respondents visited nature frequently: either on daily basis (20.1%) or at least 3–6 times per week (37.3%). Every fourth (24.5%) reported 1–2 nature visits per week, and nearly every fifth (17.9%) responded that they did not go into nature that often. One respondent did not provide information on the frequency of nature visits. Respondents were also asked for one or two most common activities they did while being in nature. They most often were spending leisure time or exercising (527 and 490 replies, respectively). Peaceful walking within the everyday environment was the most popular way of engaging with nature, although other kinds of nature relations and priorities were also evident in the data (Fig.  4 ).

Respondents’ nature relationship characterizations ( A ) and features they considered most important in nature ( B ). Respondents could choose one or two options in both cases. The bars show the total number of selections for each option

Survey: Nature-related conceptualizations

We examined concepts and ideas associated with nature to understand how survey respondents conceptualized nature. When asked to describe nature, respondents ( n  = 666) listed a total of 3925 associative words that we interpreted into 132 underlying concepts. The most frequent concepts expressed by the respondents were peace and beauty, followed with integrity, greenness, and purity (Table 2 ).

We derived nine broad ideas of nature from the respondents’ nature definitions (the right-hand column in Table 2 ). Two ideas (nature as “living systems” or “ecological elements”) represented a natural scientific approach and were cognitively grounded, but they differed in how they approached nature in epistemological terms. The idea of living systems defined nature as consisting of ecosystems and was clearly synthetic and process-oriented, representing principles of modern ecology; for example, “nature contains all biotic and also the abiotic things” (R551). The idea of nature as an assemblage of ecological elements was more atomistic and focused on observable entities in nature, reflecting the long-term heritage of taxonomy. Respondents characterized it with lists of species and habitats.

The natural scientific ideas took a value-neutral stance on nature, but this did not apply to the rest of the ideas. Overall, positive valuations of nature dominated in the data. We derived two ecocentric ideas that highlighted nature’s intrinsic value. One of these perceived nature as “wild and free” and represented strong normative claims towards untouched and undisturbed nature, defining it as “primordial, pure, unspoiled environment” (R464). The hard ecocentrism of wild and free nature was somewhat softened in the other idea, which we named as “unbuilt environment”. This latter idea conceptualized and valued nature as something outside of human influence: “Nature is what is outside of the walls. The thing that comes in if not kept away” (R185). Both ecocentric ideas were dualistic as they positioned people and nature against each other.

Nature was perceived as intrinsically valuable also in a non-dualistic sense. The “essence of life” idea adopted a holistic perspective that placed people as part of nature and highlighted spiritual and philosophical relations to nature. In this sense, nature was defined as the source and prerequisite of all life, people included: “I am part of nature. Nature is the foundation of all being” (R290).

We also found three ideas of nature that were inclined towards anthropocentrism. The first of these focused on the experience of nature connectedness. According to this idea nature was “sensed and valued” from a human perspective, and the deep meaning of nature for people, as well as the values people place on nature, were highlighted. Idea of nature as sensed and valued revealed the deeply interpretative character of nature conceptualizations. It even internalized nature into a bodily experience and a resulting state of mind. For example, nature was “experienced through different senses; landscapes and views; smell and touch, being in the middle of something larger and beyond control” (R256).

The other two anthropocentric ideas differed in their degree of utilitarianism. One of them defined nature as a “source of wellbeing” and perceived people as receivers of nature’s goods. Here people’s engagement with nature was described in passive terms: wellbeing was borne from peace and tranquility, and nature provided these by offering a place for rest. Typically, nature was defined “as a place to calm down and enjoy. Place where my soul and body get well” (R32). Nature as a source of wellbeing was contrasted with another utilitarian idea, which we named “provider for people”. Here, too, nature was seen as benefiting people, but people were described as active takers and co-creators of such benefits. Some accounts portraying nature as a provider for people brought up also material and physical connections between people and nature, including nutrition and work. One such example was a succinct definition of nature as “prerequisite of life” (R273).

Finally, we discovered an idea that defined nature as something “related to culture”. This idea approached nature as an oxymoron that was defined in terms of decreasing human influence while arising from deeply cultural origin. This conceptual fluidity revealed an intellectual struggle on what nature is: how its meaning can be constructed in various ways, and how the concept of nature exists because of its cultural context. For example, R226 defined nature as “a culturally constructed concept, the opposite of ‘culture’”, and R146 noted that “nature is always defined by people, it changes through time”.

When we compared the respondents’ nature definitions with their word lists, we observed diverse connections. Respondents combined several ideas and concepts in their accounts. R24 exemplified this by defining nature as “nearly everything you see when you walk out through the door. The terrain, sky, rivers and lakes, and animals”, and describing nature using words “peace, fresh air, diversity, primitiveness”. She conceptualized nature as consisting of items observed through senses, existing beyond the walls of one’s home, encompassing both abiotic and biotic variation, having mental and physical impacts, and under minimal human impact.

Survey: Nature-related discourses

The factor analysis on nature-related statements found six discourses, each focusing on different kinds of human–nature relations (Table 3 ). The overall consistency of the statement data was high (Cronbach’s α = 0.94), thus indicating strong reliability. The cumulative overall variance explained by the six factors was 0.36, and the mean item complexity was 2.4.

The most prevalent factor (ML1 wellbeing) reflected a discourse focusing on individual-level impacts of nature, including mental and physical benefits and health effects. It was followed by two factors that explained an equal amount of variance in the dataset. We interpreted these into a discourse tied to the overall conservation value of different kinds of natural habitats (ML4 natural habitats) on the one hand, and a discourse on strong environmental concern linked to intrinsic valuation of nature and human–nature dualism (ML6 ecoanxiety) on the other hand. The latter resembled the following factor (ML3 pro-environmentalism) due to its focus on environmental issues. A key difference between the two was the allocation of the more pessimistic and emotionally loaded statements into the ecoanxiety discourse, whereas the pro-environmentalist discourse focused on lifestyle- and solution-oriented topics.

We interpreted the final two factors into an action-oriented discourse (ML5 outdoor activity) and a discourse on the positive impacts of being in and sensing of nature (ML2 enjoyment). The importance of access to nature, and direct contact with nature, was evident in the outdoor activity discourse. Its emphasis was on doing whereas the enjoyment discourse highlighted being in nature. The enjoyment discourse shared content on the restorative impacts of nature with the wellbeing discourse, while focusing more on the transient character of nature experience. The wellbeing discourse spoke more of consequences of nature contact when compared to the enjoyment discourse.

The GLM analyses provided information on how the respondents’ background affected their relatedness with the discourses (Table 4 ). The wellbeing discourse was tied to an increasing number of nature visits, and this effect was similar in all age classes. Contrastingly, two other discourses were connected to respondent age but not to the frequency of visiting nature. The natural habitats discourse, which highlighted targets of conservation effort, was more common among older respondents, whereas younger respondents had higher relatedness with the ecoanxiety discourse. The discourses on pro-environmentalism and outdoor activity were more prevalent among younger respondents, as well as among those respondents who visited nature more often, thus expressing an interaction between respondent age and frequency of nature visits. Finally, the enjoyment discourse was indifferent according to both respondent age and the frequency of nature visits.

Based on the high-scoring respondents’ nature definitions we observed that several ideas of nature were connected to each discourse. For example, the wellbeing discourse was linked to ideas of nature as a source of wellbeing, related to culture, unbuilt environment, and provider for people. We identified the most prevalent ideas based on the respondent accounts and discourse content and compared these interconnections to the dimensions compiled in our theoretical framework (Fig.  1 ). The resulting graph provides an overview on the observed dimensions and the focal contents of human–nature relations (Fig.  5 ). Figure  5 also illustrates how the similarities and differences among the relations become visible when they are placed according to different dimensions.

Interpretation of the survey results according to theoretical dimensions of human–nature relations. Grey ovals represent nature-related discourses and nature ideas are shown in italics . The positioning of the discourses and ideas is based on their content in relation to the dimensions shown ( A nature- or people-centered positionality vs. passive to active engagement; B emphasis either on emotion and experience or intention, action, and behavior vs. dualistic or holistic conception; C and D show alternative axis arrangements). The proximity of the discourses and the ideas indicate close connection; however, the actual distances of the items are not explicit since their placement along the dimensions is indicative. For example, in panels A and C , people’s active engagement with nature is depicted as a prerequisite for ideas of nature as essence of life, provider for people, and living systems (of which people are part of). These are contrasted with ideas of nature that display people’s role as more passive (nature as sensed and valued), abstract (related to culture), or undesirable (wild and free)

Audience interviews: overall content

Of the 140 persons attending the site-specific walking performance, 71 persons participated in research interviews. The interviews portrayed a further diversity of ideas of, and attitudes towards nature, and indicated that participation in the performance focused participants’ attention to a variety of sensory and embodied experiences as well as to the particularities of the location (Niemelä et al. 2023 ). Participants reflected on the performance and their nature experience, bringing up also topics relating to emotions, memories, philosophical ideas, and wellbeing.

The interviews were able to capture the emotional aspects of attending the performance. The code group Emotions had the highest frequency of coded data segments, containing participants’ emotional reactions and sensory experiences in relation to the performance and the site, as well as their memories of earlier visits there (Table 5 ). Other two frequent code groups were Walking performance, containing mentions regarding the performance, and Place, containing observations on the location, such as weather events, biotic and abiotic elements, and nature as stage of the performance.

The rest of the interview content covered diverse aspects on human–nature relations. Participants reflected on actions and behavior in nature, including activities during the performance and their own habits and preferences to spend time in nature (code group Actions). Perceiving one’s surroundings and staying still, being in silence and grounded in the moment, were often mentioned. Participants elaborated various ideas of nature and described individual-level and societal relations to nature (code group Views and conceptions). For example, cultural expressions of nature relations ranged from contemporary conservation practices to traditions rooted in mythology. Participants’ reflections on the positionality between humans and nature included, for example, notions of nature’s agency, people’s dependence on nature, and respect towards nature (code group Human–nature). Regarding the dimensionality of the human–nature relations, the content of the interviews supported the survey results. However, the qualitative analysis enabled us to acquire more detailed insight into the experience of being connected with nature.

Audience interviews: Embodied experiences

To examine the embodied aspects of human–nature relations, we explored nature-related experiences reflected by the participants ( n  = 71). The inductive content analysis targeted a specific part of the interview data, indicated with co-occurrences among code groups Walking performance, Place, Emotions, and Actions (see Fig.  3 ). We found five categories of nature-related experiences that emerged from the audience members’ accounts:

Sensory experience

Sense of connectedness

human–nature connection

human–human connection

connection to self

Feelings and other inner experiences

Values and norms

Sense of place

Each category described a different type of experience. The first group, sensory experience, included ways of being, perceiving, moving, and halting: staying still, in silence, focusing on the moment, and slow pace of walking. The sensory experiences were individual; based on participants’ physical presence in nature and mediated through their senses:

”Those things that I search for in nature were strongly present in the performance. In particular that tranquility, calming down, all that minimization of the sensory stimulus; it was built in the performance in a fine manner.”

Although the participants attended the performance as individuals, they experienced connection to nature, other participants, and themselves. We divided the sense of connectedness into three sub-categories depending on the direction of the experienced bond. Human–nature connections included accounts on interactions between people and nature, including those spanning over generations:

”I think that the performance was truly appealing, the cultural heritage was included and the way in which nature has been part of people’s life; how nature impacts people and all the good things nature does for us, how we are of nature.”

The social experience involving human–human connections became important during the walk, as the audience tackled the rough terrain together. The participants felt being connected to one another, and involved in the group:

”Everyone had to walk that rough path. In a way it started already in the beginning when we arrived at the setting. A small group of people, strange to each other, were sitting in the trailer of the tractor, and we saw only the treetops and the sky over the sides of the trailer. And then we landed and went through the terrain that was almost impassable to some. Everyone brought their bodies through it with their own strength and skills.”

The above quotation exemplifies the physical character of the experience: the participation required strength. This bodily connection to nature was accompanied with a consciousness of self and one’s capability to move in nature, denoting how the participants experienced independence while belonging to the group.

Participation in the event raised a range of feelings and other embodied and inner experiences, as the richest category according to the number of codes was Emotions. The participants expressed, for example, experiences of awe, calmness, groundedness, healing, and being safe:

”Some acts felt like they were made for me, they allowed me to look at myself as if from the outside; through the performers and the nature. There was that huge rock wall, it was exactly like the feelings that I’ve been going through lately.”

“…these people who performed with and without words, all this somehow nourished the experience and the nature made it much stronger. If I had seen these acts in a theatre, I might not have reached these same feelings. Here I could just curl up to myself in the lap of nature and it all went straight into emotions. It was amazing.”

The cultural aspects of engaging with nature were brought up by those participants who discussed values and norms in relation to their experience. Practices of working with nature and Finnish manners of relating to nature were mentioned. The topics ranged from traditions and memories to conservation actions and the global ecological crisis. Nature was approached as a place of harmony and wellbeing, as well as a source of livelihoods, material benefits, and wealth. The influences of the cultural interpretations of nature were discussed, as well as ideological changes:

”The [ecocentric] monolog in the end spoke of things that I already had started to think about: how this industrial world has gone out of control and we have lost our connection to nature; I guess it is the idea of control over nature, […] that idea has been a mistake and now we see how our relations to nature have changed.”

In general, interacting with nature was seen more intimate in the past than today:

”I was thinking about traditions and nature and how [they were entangled in the performance] — there were the blowing horns of the underworld, how the washing of the deceased was done, and all that.”

During the performance, the participants followed the path to and across the Hitonhauta gorge and experienced the place through their senses. They noted how the location played a key role in the performance. Their experienced sense of place included observations of nature as a stage, and how the performance, location, and nature seemed to merge:

“I thought that the performance was really made to this place, as it felt like the acts were growing from the sites where they were set. It was not just a performance brought to nature but a performance growing from nature.”

Participants contemplated also on nature’s agency and participation in the performance, and their accounts show how nature took the leading role, leaving the human performers aside:

“In many of the acts the human figure sort of lost its meaning.” “[Nature] was not just the frame and the place but the performance connected people with nature. Now, when I think about it, I would say that this was what the performance was about: it showed the place of humans in nature, as part of nature, in every act and scene.”

Overall, the accounts of the performance audience highlighted the diversity of experiences of nature. This richness was apparent in the manifold reflections provided by the interviews.

Human–nature relations in Finnish context

Our results demonstrate a diversity of human–nature relations coexisting within a relatively restricted context. In contemporary Finland, nature is largely viewed positively and considered important for the quality of people’s life. Qualities such as peacefulness, beauty, and integrity are often associated with nature. People spend time in nature, and are interested in nature-related matters. The awareness of environmental issues reflects a widespread concern over nature’s state. These overall findings are in line with two recent national surveys that also examined nature relationships in Finland (Sitra and Kantar TNS 2021 ; Finnish Environment Institute 2022 , n  = 2245; n  = 1057, respectively). However, our analysis revealed a broader range of views of nature and illustrated also discrepancies among human–nature relations, supporting Björklund et al.’s ( 2022 ) argument that a conception of a single type of “Finnish nature relationship” is misleading. Furthermore, we were able to unveil the intricate connections among concepts, ideas, discourses, and experiences that underlie human–nature relations in Finland.

Human–nature relations change through time (e.g., Williams 1980 ). Thus, it is important to acknowledge that multiple conceptions of nature coexist (Björklund et al. 2022 ; IPBES 2022 ), and approach nature as an evolving concept (Castree 2001 ). We found nine dominant ideas of nature that exemplify how nature conceptualizations are rooted in context and cultural legacies. These contexts include scientific disciplines such as ecology and taxonomy, values placed on nature (Chan et al. 2016 ; Jones et al. 2016 ), and ideologies such as admiration of the wilderness (Williams 1980 ; Cronon 1996 ). The dynamism of human–nature relations maintains a situation in which people adopt parallel worldviews (e.g., IPBES 2022 ). We observed how the wilderness-oriented dualistic separation between people and nature can be accompanied with holistic ideas of nature as the essence of all life, people included, as well as more recent systemic views on nature, both ecological and social-ecological. Such intermingling of worldviews means that diverse approaches are needed to mainstream pro-environmental mindsets and behaviors that support sustainability (Braito et al. 2017 ; Ives et al. 2017 ; Muradian and Pascual 2018 ; IPBES 2022 ).

We approached human–nature relations empirically as structured systems of representations reflected in nature-related discourses (Hugé et al. 2013 ; Vandenberghe 2018 ). Our analysis revealed six different nature-related discourses that are common in Finland. The dominant discourse emphasized mental and physical wellbeing and health benefits derived from nature. The wellbeing discourse emerged also in the results of our qualitative analyses, according to which nature provided wellbeing for people in multiple ways, including offering peace and tranquility. Similar results were acquired in other recent studies (Sitra and Kantar TNS 2021 ; Björklund et al. 2022 ; Finnish Environment Institute 2022 ), indicating that the wellbeing discourse is strong in Finland.

We distinguished also other contemporary topics that characterized the observed nature-related discourses. Specifically, our results portray a multitude of views in relation to environmental issues and conservation needs. Conservation of natural habitats, ecoanxiety, and pro-environmentalism formed independent discourses. Under the conservation discourse, the respondents gave nearly equal value to all mentioned habitat types. Surprisingly, they did not prioritize forest conservation, which has for long been the dominant topic in the heated conservation discussions in Finland (Berglund 2001 ). The pluralization of conservation priorities may follow the new information provided by the assessments of threatened habitat types during the 2000s (Raunio et al. 2008 ; Kontula and Raunio 2018 ).

Environmental degradation including pollution and littering, climate change, and biodiversity loss are considered as important threats to Finnish nature, and over half of Finns are willing to take action on nature’s behalf in their everyday life (Sitra and Kantar TNS 2021 ; Finnish Environment Institute 2022 ). Our results support earlier findings, but allow for a more nuanced interpretation. The separation between the ecoanxiety discourse and the pro-environmentalist discourse demonstrates how differently people view the ecocrisis and their role in it. There were clearly two main approaches: that of pessimistic and passive respondents who emphasize the severity of the crisis and feel burdened by their inability to halt the detrimental trajectory (the ecoanxiety discourse), and that of more optimistic respondents who held hope that their actions matter and were thus more willing to act (the pro-environmentalist discourse).

We did not find evidence for a nature-related discourse based on apathy (i.e., human–nature relation seen as unimportant or unrecognized; Braito et al. 2017 ). This may be due to sampling bias, as the survey respondents and the interview participants were interested in nature-related matters and this clearly motivated their participation in the research. Yet, with the combined cumulative evidence of other recent research on Finnish nature relations (Sitra and Kantar TNS 2021 ; Björklund et al. 2022 ; Finnish Environment Institute 2022 ), we are rather confident in arguing that apathic or dismissive attitudes towards nature are rare in contemporary Finland. However, we observed that the ecoanxiety discourse may hold similarities with nature-related apathy as its inherent pessimism may paralyze pro-environmental action, even though the environmental crisis is at the heart of ecoanxiety.

In our data, the preferred discourse in terms of sustainability was the pro-environmentalist one. However, it lacked prominence when compared to wellbeing, natural habitats, and ecoanxiety discourses. Also content-wise, the dominant discourse on nature-derived wellbeing lies far from pro-environmentalism (Fig.  5 ). This indicates potential in enriching wellbeing emphasis with pro-environmentalism and vice versa. One way to strengthen the connections between different discourses is to communicate their content using the nature-related concepts and ideas that are common to various discourses. Specifically, the passive and anthropocentric tones of the wellbeing discourse would benefit from introducing action-orientation and ecocentric ideas. Here the idea of nature as consisting of ecological elements, combined with the familiar positive attributes of nature including purity, beauty, diversity, and intrinsic value, can act as an effective mediator.

In addition, we discovered human–nature relations building either on active doing (outdoor activity discourse) or sensing and being present in nature (enjoyment discourse). The content of these discourses and our qualitative findings on embodied nature experiences support results from parallel studies that contact with nature fosters the feeling of nature connectedness (Lumber et al. 2017 ; Sitra and Kantar TNS 2021 ; Finnish Environment Institute 2022 ). Overall, survey respondents considered themselves as frequent nature visitors. Their most common activities were walking and exercising, and they held easy access to nature important. In Finland, as in other Nordic countries, the rights to roam have allowed people to freely access nature for centuries. This cultural practice adds ease to being in contact with nature. Frequent nature visits supported the wellbeing, pro-environmentalist, and outdoor activity discourses. We discovered also further connections between the outdoor activity and pro-environmentalist discourses: both adopted an action-oriented stance and supported active engagement with nature (Fig.  5 ). We argue that synergies between these two discourses hold perhaps undervalued potential in mainstreaming sustainability. Recreational activities can be resource-intensive, specifically if they involve long-distance travelling, and pro-environmentalistic frugality would reduce their ecological footprint.

Although the enjoyment discourse was not statistically linked with visiting nature, the importance of experiencing connection with nature to enjoy it was evident in our qualitative data. This emphasizes the importance of pluralistically enhanced nature contact in strengthening nature connectedness (Lumber et al. 2017 ). We argue that emotional experiences grow often unconsciously from contact with nature and suggest that once nature attachment is emotionally formed, it persists even in the absence of recurring nature contact. Given that a person constitutes her/his relation with nature through interactions, cumulative nature-related experiences are important in the process. All experiences are mediated by senses and thus human–nature relations build on sensual events which feed into various conscious and unconscious processes within the human mind–body. This highlights how people are not aware of all ways in which they relate to nature, and the changes in human–nature relations may take time. A further aspect that emerged from the qualitative data was the sociocultural character of experiencing nature. Participation in a group that engaged with nature clearly added depth to the experience.

The sociocultural character of human–nature relations, which some survey respondents reflected under the idea of nature being defined in relation to culture, was positively emphasized by the participants of the walking performance. This illustrates how diverse human–nature relations coexist, and this complexity and contradicting values were central to the arts-based research method (Niemelä et al. 2023 ). Overall, the interviews illustrated similar discourses and respective human–nature relations compared to the survey, while adding experiential, embodied, philosophical, and over-generational aspects. The performance drew elements from mythology, traditions, history, religion, and ideologies, and some participants identified with these during the interviews. Wilderness-oriented accounts were fewer; in general, only few participants raised concerns over the fact that the performance took place on a conservation area, a concept that is in stark contradiction with the wilderness ideology and most conservation practices. Instead, many participants mentioned that the performance conveyed respect towards nature in diverse ways, eliciting wonder, gratitude, and environmental awareness among the participants.

Dimensions of human–nature relations

We examined the structural characteristics of nature-related discourses to gain information on the dimensionality underlying human–nature relations (Figs. 1 and 5 ). Our analysis revealed three main dimensions within the discourses: positionality of humans and nature (ranging from ecocentrism to anthropocentrism), engagement (assuming either active or passive role of people), and conception and thought (cognitive approaches ranging from dualistic to holistic). The human–nature positionality appears as a fundamental dimension in human–nature relations as it reflects the way nature representations tie into people’s worldviews (Williams 1980 ; Castree 2001 ; Flint et al. 2013 ; Muradian and Pascual 2018 ). Positionality, engagement, and conception are also central in the life frames approach (living from, with, in and as nature) introduced in the IPBES values assessment typology (2022).

Our results link also to other relational dimensions, although they may not be as evident. The latent character of dimensions of emotion and experience; intention, action, and behavior; and practice does not imply unimportance. Rather, they may indicate deeply rooted aspects of human–nature relations that can be hard to examine (Ives et al. 2017 ). The dimension of nature-related practices was least evident in our data, yet it can be seen as the sociocultural ‘glue’ connecting other dimensions to each other, as exemplified by the earlier example on accessing nature using the rights to roam. As we studied nature-related practices in a very limited manner, we suggest they deserve more research using the relational lens.

Our qualitative inquiry illustrated that information on embodied and emotional nature experiences can be reached through arts-based research methods. The audience interviews from the walking performance revealed five categories of nature-related experiences that are connected to other relational dimensions such as human–nature positionality, engagement, and conception and thought. The experiential perspective highlighted the importance of senses in human–nature relations. Sensing and interpretation of sensory information into experience are basic functions of any living organism, and therefore they underlie all organism–environment relations, people included. For people, constructions of reality are always emotionally mediated, as emotions tint all human experience (Tuan 1977 ). Therefore, it is not surprising that the experiential and emotional character of human–nature relations has lately received attention in research on nature connectedness (e.g., Lumber et al. 2017 ; Raatikainen et al. 2020 ). The experiential interactions that provide ground for human–nature relations are place-bound (Tuan 1977 ; Schroeder 2007 ), which was elaborated by the participants’ and the survey respondents’ accounts. Based on the premise that place-based approaches support sustainable communities (Horlings 2015 ), relations between people and specific places are increasingly studied by sustainability scientists (Balvanera et al. 2017 ; Ives et al. 2017 ). The role of place-based experience in human–nature relations is an important topic for participatory and transdisciplinary research.

There is ample evidence that societal goals, values, and intentions shape human–nature relations (Flint et al. 2013 ; Ives et al. 2018 ; Muradian and Pascual 2018 ; IPBES 2019 , 2022 ). These large-scale drivers are notoriously difficult to intervene (Ives et al. 2018 ). In Finland, utilitarian approaches to nature have dominated in politics and policy-making since the World War II (Björn 2000 ; Berglund 2001 ; Björklund et al. 2022 ). Utilitarianism continues to impact human–nature relations as long as nature is perceived as a source of raw materials and wealth. Our study did not differentiate actively utilitarian human–nature relations, but rather integrated utilitarian elements in the anthropocentric discourses, for example through the idea of nature as a provider for people. This dilution of utilitarianism was evident also in the interview accounts, where immaterial dependencies of people from nature were discussed more often than material benefits. We observed a similar process of attitudinal softening in relation to the wilderness ideology, as its abrupt, dualistic and ecocentric form was accompanied with softer ideas more inclusive of people’s handprint in nature. It is possible that such diversification is consequential for a general tendency to approve more pluralism in the Finnish society.

Conclusions

We have illustrated the complex character of human–nature relations. Human–nature relations are borne out of interactions between people and nature; they thrive in all social levels from individual to cultural; take various coexisting forms that are not always compatible with each other; and influence the ways people perceive the world and place themselves in the world. All humans belong to societies, and all societies exist in relation to their environment. Because of this interdependency, human–nature relations manifest social and cultural structures that greatly influence the environment, ecosystems, and the Earth system. Therefore, both the causes of the ecocrisis and the opportunities to solve it are rooted in human–nature relations.

Considering the urgent need to halt climate change and biodiversity loss, the observed diversity of human–nature relations is challenging. It emphasizes that there are no blueprint solutions for promoting pro-environmental behaviors (IPBES 2022 ). As people value nature in diverse and sometimes conflicting ways, the debates around human–nature relations will continue to exist. From the sustainability perspective, these include conflicts between conservation and land use, ethical issues, and the ways in which nature is valued within societies (e.g., whether the ecological basis of human societies is substitutable with other types of capital; see Bonnedahl and Heikkurinen 2019 ).

The fact that pluralism may cultivate conflicts means that the diverse human–nature relations need to be better understood and communicated (IPBES 2022 ). If only selected kinds of human–nature relations are included in public discussions and environmental policies, just solving of environmental issues and the conflicts around them remains impossible. Undeniably, achieving sustainability requires wider adoption of approaches that respect and value nature, among which pro-environmental human–nature relations are portrayed as preferable. Our results show that there are multiple relations that can benefit nature. In fact, through dimensional similarities, human–nature relations that seem distant to each other may influence one another and evolve in unison. According to our results, the similarities that connect different kinds of relations include compatible views on human–nature positionality, practices of engagement, action-orientation in environmental matters, emotional connectedness to nature, as well as understanding of nature. These synergies need further exploration in research and can be cultivated in education and public discussions. It is important also to understand better which aspects of human–nature relations are at odds with each other and why; one example is the ecocentrism of the proenvironmentalist discourse that contrasts with the anthropocentrism of the outdoor activity discourse. Although these two discourses support each other in how they value nature and promote action, the positional difference may inflict discrepancies. Thus, sustainability transformation should not be advanced in a single-minded manner but proactively, building on a range of human–nature relations and using their malleability to bring different nature-related discourses closer to each other.

Due to the dynamic character of human–nature relations, new perspectives will come into effect. A prominent example of this is the wellbeing discourse, which has gained traction in Finland during recent years. The recent surveys clearly demonstrate its strength. The wellbeing discourse appreciates people’s sense-based and emotional attachment and attunement with nature, which opens a new venue to promote sustainable mindsets through self-reflection, action, and time spent in nature. The possibility to access nature, preferably in near environment, is key in supporting this; and arts-based practices provide novel tools to support people’s emotional and embodied connections with nature.

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Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank all participants of the project, the Valkola village association for their help in arranging the walking performance, the landowners of the Hitonhauta conservation area, Timo Kypärä for conducting the ecological field survey of Hitonhauta, and Kone Foundation for funding (project 201905949). We are also grateful for the feedback provided by two anonymous reviewers, the Editor-in-Chief, and the Associate Editor-in-chief of the journal Ambio.

Open access funding provided by Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE).

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Raatikainen, K.J., Tupala, AK., Niemelä, R. et al. The intricate diversity of human–nature relations: Evidence from Finland. Ambio 53 , 181–200 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-023-01933-1

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Received : 07 July 2022

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-023-01933-1

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Nature, Reason, and the Good Life: Ethics for Human Beings

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At the centre of our ethical thought stands the human being. Facts about human nature determine the shape of ethical concepts in a variety of ways, and our pre-rational animal nature forms the basis of notions to do with rationality, virtue, and happiness, among other things. Life and Logos examines these themes while also arguing for the critical importance of language: only by attending to the social and empirical character of language use can we make headway with a number of problems in ethics. Thus what counts as a good or bad reason for action depends on the purposes of human enquiry, as embodied in the question ‘Why?’ - it does not depend (for example) on some abstract and higher Rationality connected with ‘the point of view of the cosmos’. Furthermore, considerations in philosophy of language and in philosophy of mind together show how emotions, desires, and pleasure - all crucial for ethics - turn out not to be inner states carrying a sort of subjective authority, above or below criticism or justification, and this fact helps undermine various forms of subjectivism and individualism to be found both in philosophy and in the wider culture. Starting from an examination of foundational issues, the book covers a range of topics, including animals, agency, enjoyment, the good life, contemplation, death, and the importance of philosophy. En route , there are critiques of a number of prevalent trends of thought, such as utilitarianism, anti-speciesism, relativism, scientism and even ‘ism’-ism.

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What is the impact of nature on human health? A scoping review of the literature

Rachel m nejade.

1 Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Imperial College London, London, UK

Daniel Grace

2 Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Health Board, NHS Wales, Swansea, UK

Leigh R Bowman

Associated data.

The burden of non-communicable diseases (including poor mental health) is increasing, and some practitioners are turning to nature to provide the solution. Nature-based interventions (NBIs) could offer cost-effective solutions by reconnecting individuals with nature, but the success of these interventions depends partially on the way in which people engage with blue and green spaces.

We conducted a scoping review in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses extension for Scoping Reviews (PRISMA-ScR) and Cochrane guidelines to establish the evidence base for treating poor mental and physical health with NBIs. We searched five databases and the grey literature. Exposure was the active engagement with natural environments. The primary outcome was mental health and the secondary outcome was physical health defined using established metrics. All data were extracted to a charting table and reported as a narrative synthesis.

952 studies were identified, of which 39 met the inclusion criteria. 92% demonstrated consistent improvements across any health outcome where individuals engaged with natural outdoor environments. Mental health outcomes improved across 98% of studies while physical and cognitive health outcomes showed improvement across 83% and 75% of studies respectively. Additionally, we identified 153 factors affecting engagement with nature, 78% of which facilitated engagement compared with 22% that reduced engagement. Aspects such as the sense of wilderness, accessibility, opportunities for physical activity and the absence of noise/ air pollution all increased engagement.

Conclusions

Further research (accompanied by a global improvement in study design) is needed to establish the magnitude and relative effect of nature-based interventions, and to quantify the compounding effect of factors that improve engagement with green and blue spaces. Nevertheless, this review has documented the increasing body of evidence in support of NBIs as effective tools to improve mental, physical, and cognitive health outcomes, and highlighted key factors that improve engagement with the natural world.

Registration

Open Science Framework: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/8J5Q3 .

It is estimated that 10% of the global population lives with a diagnosed mental health disorder, leading to negative health and economic impacts for both individuals and the broader society [ 1 ]. Of those affected, 10%-20% are children, half of whom are already suffering from a mental disorder by the age of 14 [ 2 , 3 ]. Neuropsychiatric and developmental disorders such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) are particularly common [ 4 ], while depression and anxiety are more prevalent among adults [ 1 ]. As individuals age into retirement, the risk of mental health illnesses increases, partly due to social exclusion, loneliness, changes to physical health, and the passing of friends and relatives [ 5 ]. If population estimates are correct, the global fraction of those aged >60 years will have increased from 12% to 22% by 2050 [ 5 ]. In the absence of effective interventions, the global burden of poor mental health will continue to climb.

In financial terms, the combined direct and indirect cost of mental health disorders across the UK in 2013 was estimated at between £70-100 billion annually [ 6 ]. Within the European Union (EU), these costs were estimated to be around €798 billion each year [ 7 ]. Worldwide, governments and international agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) have responded to the mental health epidemic by increasing funding for mental health research and services [ 8 , 9 ], yet first-line treatment for conditions such as depression, ADHD, and generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) still rely heavily on medications and psychotherapeutic treatments, such as cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) [ 10 , 11 ]. Although these strategies are often effective, medications come with a long list of potential side effects [ 12 , 13 ], not to mention financial barriers to access [ 14 , 15 ]; there are also often shortages of skilled mental health practitioners to match the demand for long-term individualised CBT.

In contrast to medicated interventions, there has been renewed interest in “natural” therapies, which are seen as less intrusive and more cost-effective [ 16 ]. Meditation, lifestyle changes such as increased physical exercise, community-based activities and engagement with natural environments are emerging as potential alternatives to complement or replace other forms of treatment [ 16 - 18 ]. Indeed, there is growing evidence suggesting that nature-based health interventions (NBIs) can improve mental and physical health outcomes while also addressing the growing demand for less intrusive and more cost-effective treatments [ 16 , 19 ]. However, challenges exist; NBIs must take place in natural outdoor environments (NOEs), defined as “any environment in which green vegetation or blue water resources can be found”, access to which is becoming increasingly difficult [ 20 , 21 ]. Indeed, many geographical, financial, and cultural barriers affect the way we interact with NOEs, and without significant changes to the way humans live, they will likely be compounded by increasing migration away from wild spaces, and further concentration of human populations within urban areas, where 68% of the world’s population is expected to reside by 2050 [ 22 ].

Through conducting a scoping review, we aimed to set a baseline for the impact of NBIs on mental and physical health outcomes and to help with understanding the factors that magnify or diminish engagement with NOEs.

Aim and objectives

We aimed to collate and assess the evidence base for NBIs and to define and assess the effect of enablers on engagement with natural outdoor environments. More specifically, we intended to locate and review the evidence base for nature-based interventions for mental and physical health outcomes, identify the enablers of, and barriers to, engagement with natural outdoor environments, and understand whether these enablers and barriers impact the effectiveness of nature-based interventions on mental and physical health outcomes.

Study design

We conducted this scoping review according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses Extension for Scoping Reviews (PRISMA-ScR) guidelines, and the Cochrane guidelines for scoping reviews [ 23 , 24 ]. A scoping review was considered the most appropriate method to answer the research question, due to its capacity to answer broad questions and summarise findings from a heterogeneous body of knowledge [ 25 ].

Study protocol

The protocol for this scoping review was drafted using the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-analysis Extension for Protocols (PRISMA-P) and was revised by the academic team [ 26 ]. It was disseminated through MedRxiv, the preprint server for health sciences on July 4, 2020 [ 19 ].

Search strategy

The search includes terms relating to NBIs: a) green care, b) blue care, c) mental health, d) physical health, e) environmental determinants of NOE use, and f) socio-economic determinants of NOE use. The primary outcome of interest was mental health, defined using a number of key metrics. The secondary outcome was physical health, based on a number of physiological variables [ 27 ]. Several NBI studies have used physical health measures either as the main outcome (eg, obesity) or as an objective measure to confirm mental health outcomes obtained from self-reporting (eg, the link between stress and cortisol) [ 28 - 50 ]. All the keywords used for the literature search can be found in Figure S1 in the Online Supplementary Document .

The terminology used in the literature search for green and blue care reflects the varied positions held by researchers and the lack of consensus surrounding their application.

We used the search terms to identify studies from the following five databases: PubMed, The Cochrane Library, Web of Science, Scopus, and OVID (including Embase, PsycINFO, Global Health, MEDLINE, Health Management Information Consortium (HMIC), Transport Database). All search terms were grouped using the Boolean “OR” and were then all combined using the Boolean “AND”, to produce the final number of relevant studies identified by each database. We also performed snowballing (or the search of reference lists from included articles). To limit the effect of publication bias, we searched grey literature through Google Scholar, and governmental and institutional websites (eg, Public Health England (PHE)). Mendeley and the Covidence software were used to store, organise, and manage all references. To promote transparency and ensure reproducibility, the full search strategy used for the PubMed database is available in Table S1 in the Online Supplementary Document .

Study selection criteria

The study selection was done based on the pre-defined inclusion and exclusion criteria and conducted in two stages: 1) title and abstract screening, and 2) full-text screening. If a dispute occurred on the inclusion of a study, a decision was made on the inclusion/exclusion when a consensus was achieved. We backtracked existing reviews so that any study included in both the existing review and our study was excluded from our analysis. Duplicates were removed from the search before the article screening.

As this is an emerging field, we kept the inclusion criteria for this scoping review intentionally broad. We included human studies and peer-reviewed articles on green spaces and blue spaces, with physical or mental health outcomes. Any study design was accepted. NOE exposure was based on participants’ presence in nature, whether that was confirmed through participants’ observation, interviews in nature, or through an intervention using activities in NOEs. We included any review including at least one study for which NOE exposure was confirmed by these means.

Considering the contemporary topic of this scoping review, the search included all results from 1980 onwards. Studies written in both English and French were included. We excluded any studies or reviews not pertaining to health, green spaces, and blue spaces, or that were solely descriptive in nature (eg, commentaries) and studies that only defined NOE exposure based on geospatial indicators (eg, normalised difference vegetation index (NDVI)). To avoid complexities associated with recall bias, we excluded any study that used self-reported measures of engagement with nature (eg, “number of visits to parks in the last week”) [ 51 , 52 ]. However, this restriction was not applied to our main outcomes when these were found in studies using self-reporting scores such as GAD-7 and General Health Questionnaire (GHQ), as the validity of these measures to assess mental or physical health outcomes has been widely accepted within the scientific community. Additionally, this exclusion criterion would also have greatly reduced the number of available studies [ 28 - 50 ]. The full inclusion and exclusion criteria can be found in Figure 1 .

Inclusion and exclusion criteria.

Data extraction and analysis

We performed data extraction (or charting) using a standardised data extraction form, adapted for this scoping review to address the research questions and objectives (Table S2 in the Online Supplementary Document ). Content analysis was used to group findings in categories based on similarities to create a narrative synthesis of the existing evidence informed by the data charting process.

Study Selection

The results of the literature search across the five databases and the grey literature were reported using a PRISMA flow diagram ( Figure 2 ). From the original 952 articles, 824 unique studies were identified for title and abstract screening, after the removal of 128 duplicates. Through title and abstract screening, 352 full-text articles were selected and downloaded for a full-text review (ie, eliminating 472 studies). 313 studies failed to meet the inclusion criteria at full-text screening (reasons detailed in Figure S2 in the Online Supplementary Document ). A total of 39 articles were selected for the final analysis [ 53 - 91 ].

PRISMA flow diagram.

Descriptive characteristics

A summary of each charted study can be found in Table S3 in the Online Supplementary Document . A total of 39 studies were included in the final analysis, 11 of which were observational, seven used qualitative methods [ 55 - 57 , 60 , 74 , 83 , 84 ], three used quantitative methods [ 63 , 85 , 88 ], and only one used mixed methods [ 75 ]. Among the 14 interventional studies, only one used qualitative methods [ 66 ], nine used quantitative methods [ 58 , 59 , 61 , 62 , 64 , 65 , 67 , 81 , 91 ], and four used mixed methods [ 53 , 54 , 87 , 89 ]. Finally, among the remaining 14 reviews, ten included systematic reviews [ 70 - 72 , 76 - 79 , 82 , 86 , 90 ], one was a scoping review [ 80 ] and three were literature reviews [ 68 , 69 , 73 ]. All studies were written in English, except for one that was written in French [ 82 ]. Additionally, all studies were carried out in the past five years, with the oldest study dating back to 2015 [ 57 ].

Most studies (85%) were conducted in higher-income countries (defined using the World Bank classification based on countries’ gross national income (GNI) per capita) [ 92 ]. Few studies were conducted in upper-middle-income countries: one observational study in Mexico [ 88 ], two interventional studies from China [ 67 ] and South Africa [ 61 ], and three reviews including Chinese [ 76 , 82 ] and Bulgarian studies [ 76 , 80 ] ( Figure 3 ).

Bar chart depicting the countries included in reviews, interventional and observational studies, grouped by study design.

Twenty out of the 39 studies (51%) assessed the effects of engagement with NOEs on mental and physical health across all age groups, with only ten studies (26%) focusing specifically on adults (18-60 years) [ 54 - 56 , 58 , 59 , 62 , 63 , 67 , 81 , 91 ], four (10%) on the elderly (age 60+) [ 57 , 73 , 74 , 83 ], as well as four (10%) on children [ 53 , 66 , 72 , 88 ] and one (3%) on adolescents (11 to 18 years) [ 61 ].

Overall, eight studies (20%) selected participants based on age group [ 53 , 57 , 61 , 72 , 74 , 76 , 86 , 88 ], two (5%) based on sex (in favour of women) [ 62 , 91 ], and six (15%) from volunteering [ 54 , 59 , 63 , 67 , 81 , 84 ]. Four other studies (10%) recruited local residents [ 58 , 60 , 65 , 75 ]. Moreover, eight studies (20%) included patient populations with pre-existing conditions [ 90 ]. These looked at people with autism [ 66 ], neurological disabilities [ 73 , 78 ], mental disorders [ 75 , 84 , 87 ], or those undergoing stroke rehabilitation [ 64 ]. Notably, some studies selected participants based on their existing use of natural environments, such as regular swimmers or members of outdoor associations in blue spaces [ 55 , 56 , 83 ], or through involvement in the conservation of green spaces [ 89 ]. Finally, eight reviews (20%) did not specify any sample populations [ 68 - 71 , 77 , 79 , 80 , 82 ].

Taxonomy for natural outdoor environments

Overall, three types of NOEs were identified across all studies: green spaces (51% (n = 20)), blue spaces (13% (n = 5)), and a mix of both (36% (n = 14)).

Green spaces encompassed both urban and rural environments, and most studies described green spaces as urban parks [ 57 , 62 , 65 , 69 , 74 , 82 , 85 , 88 , 91 ], natural environments [ 63 , 68 , 70 , 72 , 86 ], urban forests [ 53 , 62 , 78 , 81 ], or as gardens [ 64 , 73 , 74 , 78 ]. Other areas or features of green spaces were used less often, such as farms [ 53 , 66 , 78 ], micro-features [ 57 , 74 ], national parks or reserves [ 60 , 89 ], a game reserve [ 61 ], urban stream corridors [ 55 ], playgrounds [ 72 ], meadows [ 54 ], bogs [ 89 ], or neighbourhood greenness [ 77 ]. Similarly, blue spaces also covered urban and rural environments and were characterised by the terms: sea [ 56 , 90 ], blue environments [ 70 , 86 ], river [ 53 ], fountain/ seawall [ 74 ], coastal area [ 59 ], loch [ 61 ], wetlands [ 87 ], wilderness [ 90 ], ocean and beaches [ 83 ]. Finally, grey areas were typically considered as urban environments: urban city [ 54 , 62 , 65 , 91 ], built environment [ 58 , 79 ], urban sidewalk [ 59 ], shopping mall [ 62 ], hospital [ 64 ], urban landscape [ 72 ], roadside [ 81 ], home [ 91 ], swimming pools [ 83 ], and a field near a housing development [ 89 ].

Nature-based health interventions

All NBIs and their related activities reported across the selected studies were categorised ( Figure 4 ). Six types of NBI were identified: educational intervention, physical activity, wilderness therapy, leisure activity, gardening, and changes to the built environment.

All types of nature-based health interventions found in the selected studies. Green – green spaces, blue – blue spaces, and yellow – both green and blues spaces.

Health outcomes and nature-based interventions

All reported outcomes and their associated enablers are listed in Table S4 in the Online Supplementary Document . Almost all of the studies included at least one mental health outcome [ 53 , 54 , 56 - 66 , 68 - 87 , 89 - 91 ], except for three that focused solely on physical activity [ 55 , 88 ] and cardiovascular outcomes [ 67 ]. Many studies used multiple outcomes, and each of these is reviewed and discussed in the following order: mental health outcomes, physical health/physiological outcomes, and cognitive health outcomes.

Overall, there are clear positive trends between NOE engagement (through voluntary participation or primary care intervention) and psychological, physical, and cognitive health outcomes (described in Figure 5 by the bars labelled “positive findings”). In applicable studies [ 56 , 73 - 75 , 83 , 87 ], a decrease in the measurable outcome was considered a “positive finding” where this resulted in a gain for the individual eg, a reduction in social isolation. The studies displayed as “negative findings” refers to studies where health outcomes led to mixed or no positive effects [ 59 , 70 , 71 , 76 , 81 , 82 , 87 , 91 ].

Percentage of positive and negative findings stratified by health outcomes.

Mental health

Mental health was the most commonly studied outcome (62%). There were improvements across all mental health outcomes when engaging with nature (98%), with only one study reporting no effect (2%) [ 71 ]. No negative effects were found.

Engagement with NOEs led to an improved quality of life in 4% of all studies looking at mental health outcomes, as assessed by measures of Health-Related Quality of Life (HRQoL) [ 53 , 64 ] or Quality of Life (QoL) surveys [ 69 , 86 ]. Only one study reported improved “perceived mental health” (ie, restoration) of stream-corridor users, assessed using qualitative interviews [ 57 ]. Outcomes related to measures of well-being were the most studied ones and were usually positively associated with NOE engagement. It was measured differently across studies and relied on measures of hedonic and eudaimonic well-being [ 71 ], perceived well-being [ 56 , 73 - 75 , 83 , 90 ], and general well-being [ 54 , 58 , 63 , 68 , 71 , 76 , 86 , 87 ]. Only one systematic review reported mixed effects, which the authors attributed to poor study design and quality [ 71 ]. Finally, measures of depression [ 63 , 65 , 78 , 80 ] and anxiety [ 64 , 65 , 78 , 81 , 87 ] decreased when engaging with NOEs.

There was also a positive effect of NOE engagement on measures of emotional health outcomes across all studies. Most reported improved affect [ 58 , 64 , 70 , 73 , 81 - 83 , 86 , 87 ], mood [ 62 , 65 , 79 , 80 , 89 , 91 ], self-esteem [ 61 , 73 , 80 , 84 , 90 ], self-confidence [ 75 ], and vitality [ 62 , 66 ]. Others reported decreases in negative affect [ 63 , 81 , 83 , 86 ], mood disturbances [ 65 ], agitation [ 73 , 78 ], and behavioural problems (eg, hyperactivity or violence) [ 72 , 73 , 80 , 82 ].

Overall, engagement with NOEs led to improved social health across 100% of the fourteen studies that assessed their effects. Six studies reported reduced social isolation [ 56 , 73 - 75 , 83 , 87 ] and one found reduced social discomfort [ 91 ] following engagement with NOEs; seven noted increased social connectedness between individuals [ 66 , 68 , 78 , 82 - 84 , 90 ].

Finally, several studies assessed the effects of engagement with NOEs on stress. All studies reported positive associations with psychological resistance [ 54 , 56 , 90 ], perceived restoration [ 59 , 60 , 62 , 65 , 82 , 91 ], and stress reduction [ 54 , 63 , 66 , 73 , 81 - 84 , 89 ]. Only one study found a decrease in psychological distress [ 80 ], and three found decreases in perceived stress [ 63 , 86 , 87 ], which all translated into health benefits.

Physical/physiological health

83.3% of the studies considering physical and physiological health outcomes found benefits across a range of outcomes; 16.7% yielded no or negative effects for measures of obesity [ 70 , 76 , 82 , 87 ], heart rate [ 65 ], systolic and diastolic blood pressure (BP) [ 67 ], and heart rate variability (HRV) (2%) [ 79 ].

All measures of physical activity in natural environments demonstrated that engaging in NOEs led to increased physical activity. This was measured in several ways. Some studies used measurements of leisure-time physical activity [ 55 ] or reported use after urban green spaces interventions [ 69 , 74 , 82 ]. Others focused on increased exertion post-engagement with NOEs, using measures of moderate to vigorous physical activity (MVPA) [ 79 , 88 ]. Similar methodologies used measures of perceived physical activity [ 56 , 57 , 68 ] and physical fitness [ 90 ], or more broadly an increase in the use of NOEs for various activities like swimming [ 56 ] or walking in nature [ 60 , 76 ]. Finally, decreasing sedentary time was used as a measure in children populations [ 88 ].

One systematic review assessed the effect of engagement with green spaces on sleep during a walking intervention and found that engagement led to improvements in sleep quality and quantity [ 77 ]. Similarly, one study reported improved recovery from mental disorders after engaging in therapeutic horticulture as part of a recovery program [ 75 ].

Motor functioning was assessed differently by two studies [ 64 , 74 ]. Ottoni et al. [ 74 ] reported improved mobility after walking interventions in green spaces, while Pálsdóttir et al. [ 64 ] reported reductions in disability after engaging in horticulture therapy for post-stroke patients. Overall, improvements in disability were reported in both intervention and control groups, suggesting that the therapy itself may facilitate recovery more than the type of environment [ 64 ].

All studies measuring physical health outcomes found a positive association between physical health and NOE engagement when measured by GHQ [ 72 , 80 , 87 ]. Pálsdóttir et al. [ 64 ] used post-stroke fatigue (PSF) as their main outcome, which decreased following horticulture therapy. Importantly, both the intervention and control groups experienced decreases in PSF, thereby reducing the importance of the intervention in this context over other mainstream standards of care.

Four studies reported little to no effects on obesity (measured using body mass index) after engagement with NOEs [ 70 , 76 , 82 , 88 ]. Regarding mortality, only two studies investigated how NOE engagement affected all-cause mortality [ 70 , 79 ]. Both studies found a decrease in mortality following changes to the built environment [ 70 ] and after engaging in physical activity in nature [ 79 ].

Cardiovascular health was measured using diastolic and systolic BP [ 62 , 65 , 67 ], baseline resting heart rate [ 54 , 65 , 67 , 69 ], and HRV [ 62 , 79 , 91 ]. Heart rate was found to decrease in 80% of studies looking at this measure, except for one [ 65 ]. Similarly, BP was found to decrease in three studies, except for one by Ana et al. [ 67 ], which found no changes in BP after forest bathing. Results were also inconclusive for HRV, which tended to increase after NOEs exposure in two studies [ 62 , 91 ], but had no effects in another [ 79 ].

Physiological measures of stress were determined using cortisol samples; in two studies, there was a decrease in cortisol levels after engaging in NOEs [ 62 , 82 ].

Cognitive health

Although not initially included, cognitive health outcomes were identified on several occasions (8%) during the analytical process and were considered important for this review. Overall, NOE engagement had positive effects on cognitive health (58%), by reducing ADHD symptoms (8%) [ 72 ], and by improving cognitive functioning (50%) [ 53 , 54 , 66 , 72 , 79 ], except in one study (8%) [ 59 ]. Findings on memory were inconclusive (32%) [ 72 , 78 , 81 , 91 ].

Cognitive functioning was reported using measures of science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM)-capacity [ 53 ], attention restoration [ 54 , 72 ], and attention retention [ 59 , 66 , 79 , 82 ]. In 86% of these studies, cognitive functioning was positively associated with NOE engagement, except for one study which reported no change in attention retention [ 59 ]. However, attention retention was improved after exposure to natural environments in three studies [ 66 , 79 , 82 ], along with attention restoration [ 54 , 72 ]. One study also showed an improvement in children’s STEM-capacity following a nature-based education (NBE) intervention [ 53 ].

Memory was only assessed in four studies and yielded mixed findings [ 72 , 78 , 81 , 91 ]. While one found a positive association between spatial working memory and engaging in NOEs [ 72 ], the other found no effects [ 91 ]. Similarly, for executive functioning, one study found no effects [ 81 ], while the other saw improvements in executive memory [ 78 ].

During a wilderness expedition, trained therapists noticed a decrease in ADHD symptoms for children living with autism after exposure to animals and the natural environment [ 66 ] – which was supported by McCormick [ 72 ] in her systematic review.

Engagement with natural outdoor environments

Several factors influencing engagement were identified throughout the selected studies. These factors were divided into those that facilitated engagement (enablers ( ~ 78%)), vs those that hindered engagement (barriers: (22%)) ( Figure 6 ). These included environmental, social, individual, and structural processes, along with opportunities for physical activity and stress reduction. Poor study design and quality were considered barriers across all studies. A description of each enablers’ category can be found in Figure S3 in the Online Supplementary Document .

Number and percentage of enablers and barriers for each health outcome. Enablers in green; barriers in orange.

Environmental processes

Most enablers focused on environmental processes (38%), the most common being the type of environment (66%), where natural environments facilitated health benefits over built environments (ie, swimming pools, city centres, shopping malls, etc.) [ 53 - 56 , 58 , 59 , 62 , 63 , 65 - 67 , 70 , 72 , 73 , 77 - 84 , 86 - 91 ]. Although the variety of green space and blue space descriptors makes comparing studies difficult, some studies have found that urban forests were better than urban parks, as they reduced cortisol levels [ 62 ], BP [ 54 , 62 , 65 ], and heart rate [ 62 , 67 , 79 ], while increasing HRV [ 62 , 91 ]. Interestingly, one study even found that heart rate benefits were amplified if that forest was made of maple trees as opposed to birch or oak trees, while BP would not change if the temperature, humidity, and light spectrum (ie, green/blue light ratio) were too high [ 67 ]. Similarly, blue space users preferred wilder and more available water environments (eg, ocean) as they amplified psychological health benefits through increases in well-being and social health benefits by reducing social isolation [ 56 , 83 ].

Typically, biodiversity was shown to facilitate well-being [ 87 ], psychological restoration [ 85 ], social connectedness [ 87 ], positive affect [ 83 ], and overall health [ 87 ], while reducing anxiety [ 87 ] and stress [ 87 ]. Notably, biodiversity may also present a barrier if perceived as threatening or harmful (for example, due to the presence of sharks in blue spaces [ 83 ]). Other environmental processes such as good weather [ 83 ], heat reduction [ 70 ], seasons [ 65 ], perceived aesthetics [ 68 ], nature connectedness [ 58 , 71 ], the presence of farm animals for autistic children [ 66 ], and sensory qualities of the environment (ie, sound) [ 59 , 60 ] were all found to also improve mental, physical, physiological and cognitive health; however, other detrimental environmental processes such as air and noise-related pollution [ 62 , 76 ] negated these positive effects.

Structural processes

Structural processes were the second most common enablers discussed in this scoping review (37%). Among them, good accessibility was most commonly reported (24%), as it facilitated improvements in perceived mental health [ 57 ], overall health [ 72 ], positive affect [ 70 ], physical activity in NOEs [ 55 , 57 , 74 , 82 ], and attention restoration [ 72 ], while reducing social isolation [ 74 ], motor disability [ 74 ], behavioural problems, and psychological distress [ 80 ]. Similarly, geographic proximity to NOEs was also mentioned several times (11%) as facilitating well-being [ 76 ], physical activity [ 60 , 69 , 76 ], cognitive functioning and spatial working memory [ 72 ].

The type of intervention was also reported by six studies (16%) as facilitating the health benefits gained from engaging in NOEs. Britton et al. [ 83 ] and Ottoni et al. [ 90 ] recognised that activities in blue spaces, such as surfing or swimming, contribute to rehabilitation, stress reduction, and health promotion, and complementary evidence demonstrates that therapeutic horticulture led to improvements in PSF [ 64 ] and reductions in agitation for older adults [ 74 ]. Additionally, viewing nature decreased BP [ 62 ] and improved executive memory [ 78 ]. Interestingly, the outcomes improved with increases in the length of the activity [ 53 , 61 , 87 , 88 ]. One study found that activities performed in the afternoon instead of the morning improved sleep quality and quantity, believed to be caused by a two-process model where sleep and waking are regulated by circadian rhythms and homeostasis [ 77 , 93 ]. Good group organisation, transportation, and staff attitudes and knowledge were also considered enablers of the associations between health and nature [ 87 ]. However, when NBIs have limited resources, the strength of these associations is reduced [ 73 , 90 ], and hence, good NBI quality and design can amplify the health benefits gained from nature.

The quality and design of NOEs were also found to amplify health benefits when engaging with nature, as the presence of micro-features of the environments (eg, benches) was found on several occasions to improve well-being and self-esteem while reducing social isolation and stress in individuals with dementia [ 73 ]. Older adults also found that benches could help decrease social isolation [ 74 ] and improve their mobility and physical activity in NOEs [ 74 ]. Other studies also found general increases in physical activity and positive affect when these features were present [ 55 , 70 , 80 ]. Overall, positive changes to the environment through the implementation of micro-features were found to facilitate engagement in NOEs.

Individual processes

Most individual processes across the selected studies were considered barriers (74%) as opposed to enablers (26%).

Safety concerns were the most common barriers to engaging in NOEs (24%), as they worsened perceived mental health [ 57 ], positive affect [ 70 , 73 ], perceived restoration [ 60 ], physical activity [ 55 , 57 ], well-being and self-esteem [ 73 ] while increasing social isolation and stress [ 73 ]. Stigma was another recurrent barrier found across studies (12%) that diminished perceived well-being [ 73 , 90 ], physical activity [ 56 ], physical fitness, social connectedness and psychological resistance [ 90 ], as well as positive affect and self-esteem [ 73 ], while increasing social isolation [ 73 ] and stress [ 73 ].

Other barriers such as social prejudice [ 73 ], fear [ 56 , 90 ], negative self-perceptions [ 57 , 73 ], poor self-confidence [ 73 ], individual factors (eg, time pressure, changing identities) [ 74 , 77 ], and deprivation [ 80 , 84 ] were also detected. Conversely, some individual processes were found to facilitate the relationship between nature and health. These included cognitive functioning [ 72 ], some intrapersonal processes (ie, individual preferences) [ 68 ], gender (whereby women tended to benefit more than men) [ 61 , 74 ], and age (since younger adults and children had increased health benefits from engaging in NOEs due higher engagement in physical activity than older adults) [ 82 ].

Lower socio-economic status (SES) and ethnicity were identified as both enablers and barriers. While one study found that being South Asian and living in the UK led to worse health outcomes than being British white [ 80 ], another found that Arab women benefited more than Jewish women when engaging in NOEs [ 91 ]. The latter was thought to be influenced by levels of comfort at home, where Jewish women reported feeling more comfortable in their home than Arab women did and therefore gained fewer marginal improvements than Arab women when engaging in NOEs [ 91 ]. Similarly, lower SES was found to increase health gains through NOE engagement [ 82 ], whereas another found it led to worse health outcomes [ 76 ].

Opportunities for physical activity

Opportunities for physical activity were the third most frequent enabler found across studies (11%). They included physical activity (72%) and active engagement in NOEs (18%), as both were found to magnify the benefits for mental health [ 56 , 58 , 63 , 71 - 73 , 75 , 79 - 82 , 89 ], physical health [ 56 , 72 , 75 , 80 ], physiological health [ 79 ], and even cognitive health [ 72 , 78 , 79 ]. However, these benefits would be reduced if participants were injured or had mobility difficulties [ 74 , 78 ]. Physical activity could therefore be another mechanism by which nature positively influences health.

Social processes

Social processes were not as common as other enablers (7%), but were found to influence the nature’s impact on health. The presence of other people was the most common enabler (29%) and barrier (29%) across studies considering social processes. Indeed, two studies reported that sharing the experience of engaging in NOEs with others could facilitate gains in physical activity [ 55 ], recovery from mental disorders [ 75 ], social connectedness, self-esteem, and self-confidence [ 84 ] while reducing social isolation [ 75 ]. However, if other individuals were perceived as safety risks, well-being and physical activity would decrease, while stress would increase [ 63 ].

Additionally, social interactions, interpersonal processes, group membership, and the presence of caregivers also facilitated positive gains in psychological [ 68 , 78 , 89 ], social [ 68 , 83 ] and physical health [ 68 , 89 ]. Therefore, social processes are other mechanisms through which health benefits can be gained from nature.

Opportunities for stress reduction

Despite abundant evidence from the literature review, only 1% of all enablers focused on opportunities for stress reduction. Stressful life events were perceived as barriers, as they decreased the quality of life, well-being, positive affect, psychological resistance, and STEM capacity for children [ 52 , 63 ], while worsening depression in adults [ 63 ]. However, engaging in NOEs was shown to reduce stress in all studies looking at stress-related outcomes, considered measures of psychological health in this review [ 53 , 63 , 66 , 73 , 81 - 84 , 89 ]. Therefore, evidence for stress reduction as a mechanism in the relationship between health and nature is moderate, but not as conclusive as other enablers.

Study quality and design

Methodological choices when conducting studies (9%), such as the study design (44%), study quality (44%) or the choice of measurements (12%) were all found to negate the relationship between health and nature across selected studies [ 59 , 70 , 71 , 76 , 81 , 82 ]. They were responsible for the lack of evidence between NOE engagement and obesity [ 70 , 76 , 82 ], well-being [ 71 ], HRV [ 79 ], and on measures of memory [ 81 ] and cognitive functioning [ 59 ]. Therefore, the methods used within studies also act as potential mechanisms on nature and health.

This scoping review synthesised heterogeneous research documenting the impact of nature on health. Of the 39 included studies, nature-based interventions were found to have improved mental, physical/ physiological and cognitive health outcomes across 98%, 83%, and 75% of articles, respectively ( Figure 5 ). Furthermore, this study identified a breadth of factors that affect the level of engagement with NOEs, and by extension the likely success of nature-based interventions ( Figure 7 ).

Impact of natural outdoor environment (NOE) engagement and enablers on health.

Nature-based interventions and health

As a species, humans have become increasingly sedentary. Offices, schools, homes, and public spaces have been designed to optimise and prioritise efficiency. At least in part, this relatively new lifestyle (by historical standards) is driving an increase in non-communicable diseases, including poor mental health [ 94 ]. As individuals continue to seek work in urban areas, the opportunity to interact with green and blue spaces diminishes. Current estimates indicate that over 50% of people worldwide live in urban areas projected to increase to >68% by 2050 [ 22 , 95 ].

Considering this, it is not surprising that the reintroduction of nature into a person’s life, irrespective of baseline physical and mental health characteristics, can have a positive influence [ 96 ]. Research shows that individuals living in urban areas with more green space have both lower mental distress and higher well-being scores [ 97 ]. “Forest-bathing” (“shinrin-yoku” in Japanese) in Japan has been shown to significantly lower salivary and serum cortisol levels when compared to control groups [ 98 ], while Niedermeier et al. [ 99 ]f ound that hiking resulted in a statistically significant increase in “affective valence” (ie, pleasure) when compared to a sedentary control group and an indoor exercise group.

One theory that might begin to explain these mechanisms is that, when in natural outdoor environments, individuals experience a reduction in “rumination” – a maladaptive pattern of self-referential thought that is associated with heightened risk for depression and other mental illnesses [ 95 ]. Indeed, data suggest this might be plausible: functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanning performed on individuals who had spent 90 minutes on a nature walk showed reduced neural activity in the subgenual prefrontal cortex (sgPFC) – an area of the brain that displays increased activity during sadness and rumination. However, participants who went on an urban walk did not show these effects [ 95 ].

Such data makes clear the physiological responses that NBIs elicit in humans, and while further granular data are required, the mounting body of evidence generally supports nature-based interventions for the prevention and treatment of physical/ mental health ailments. Indeed, science is beginning to inform public health policy via the introduction of “green prescriptions”, which are clinically prescribed NBIs for treating physical and mental health disorders [ 100 , 101 ].

The broad evidence base uncovered by this scoping review demonstrates the positive impact of NBIs on mental, physical, and cognitive health outcomes. Indeed, the findings support national policies that integrate NBIs as effective preventative and curative tools for public health [ 16 , 19 , 100 , 101 ].

Factors impacting engagement with natural outdoor environments

Biodiversity and wilderness.

Our findings on the importance of biodiversity and wilderness as drivers of impactful NOE engagement provide support for a broader interconnectedness between humans and wild spaces. This applies to all projects at any scale, from school expeditions through urban greening to broader rewilding. Enabling interaction with NOEs through accessibility (both geographic proximity and improved infrastructure) magnifies the health benefits of NOEs [ 55 , 57 , 60 , 69 , 70 , 72 , 74 , 76 , 80 , 82 ] and facilitates interaction between the public and natural ecological systems [ 102 ], promoting greater understanding and awareness of nature’s importance. The creation and maintenance of long-distance trails [ 102 ], increasing the sense of “wild” in urban green spaces [ 83 , 85 , 87 ], and a departure from meticulous park management [ 55 , 70 , 73 , 74 , 80 ] are examples of practices that result in increased “quality”, accessibility, and biodiversity, leading to plausible health gains through greater NOE engagement [ 55 , 70 , 73 , 74 , 80 , 83 , 85 , 87 , 102 ]. This recommendation fits within the broader International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) vision for human interactions and ecosystem health to “[…] protect, sustainably manage, and restore natural or modified ecosystems, that address societal challenges effectively and adaptively, simultaneously providing human well-being and biodiversity benefits” [ 103 ].

Air and noise pollution

Our findings also support wider initiatives targeting reductions in air and noise pollution, as these were found to negatively impact the time that users would spend practising physical activities in NOEs [ 62 , 76 ]. Cleaner, greener environments would also encourage physical exercise and contribute to national and global targets to mitigate climate change [ 62 , 76 , 104 ]. Indeed nature-based initiatives, such as de-pollution and re-naturalisation of urban sites, are currently under consideration by the EU Commission as methods to achieve an increase in the number of publicly available green spaces, and reverse social inequalities [ 104 , 105 ].

Socio-economic status and stigma

Cultural and ethnic differences, as well as deprivation, were found to limit the health benefits gained from engagement with NOEs. Minority groups living in more deprived areas with poorer access to, and lower quality of, green spaces, had more behavioural difficulties than non-minority groups [ 80 , 91 ]. Despite mixed findings in this review [ 76 , 82 ], existing inequalities concerning access to urban green infrastructure remain, along with inequalities in the exposure to health hazards (eg, air and noise pollution), particularly for vulnerable groups such as children, the elderly, and individuals of lower socio-economic status [ 106 ]. These inequalities are well-documented in urban areas across many European countries and likely exist globally, highlighting the need for urban greening initiatives that work towards reducing social barriers to access, and increasing the use of green and blue environments [ 106 , 107 ].

Geographic proximity and opportunities for physical activity

The sedentary lifestyle characterising modern society has also led to a clear reduction in physical activity across age groups [ 102 ]. As regular physical activity has been shown to reduce certain health risks (such as cardiovascular diseases or symptoms of depression and anxiety), health agencies such as the WHO have urged governments to promote physical activity to their populations as a way to limit the growing burden of ill health [ 27 , 108 ].

The results from this review support the need for enhanced engagement in physical activity, especially when practised in green or blue environments, as these environs likely magnify the mental, physical and cognitive gains. Importantly, structural enablers such as good accessibility [ 55 , 57 , 74 , 82 ] and closer geographic proximity to NOEs [ 60 , 69 , 76 ] led to increased physical activity. This is important for policymakers, as it highlights the need to consider access and proximity to green and blue spaces when designing health interventions that promote physical activity.

Limitations

Methodologically, the exclusion of studies based on self-reported measures of exposure (eg, number of visits in the last month) could have precluded the inclusion of additional relevant studies to this review. However, this was deemed necessary to limit the inherent risk of recall bias in these studies, which could have impacted the strength of the results. The absence of critical appraisal of individual sources of evidence precluded the possibility for our results to lead to statistically significant conclusions. Nevertheless, scoping reviews as per PRISMA-ScR guidelines do not necessarily require a critical appraisal of the evidence for structural integrity; as a minimum, they promote a stronger evidence base [ 23 ].

The comparison between health outcomes and types of green spaces or blue spaces was made difficult due to the variety of terms used to describe these areas. Similarly, for nature-based interventions, direct quantitative comparisons were difficult due to the absence of magnitudes, relative effects, varied heterogeneous study designs, and sample sizes.

CONCLUSIONS

Further research is still needed to establish the magnitude and relative effect of nature-based interventions, as well as to quantify the compounding effect of factors that improve engagement with green and blue spaces. This must be accompanied by a global improvement in study design. Nevertheless, this review has documented the increasing body of heterogeneous evidence in support of NBIs as effective tools to improve mental, physical and cognitive health outcomes. Enablers that facilitate greater engagement with natural outdoor environments, such as improved biodiversity, a sense of wilderness, and accessibility, as well as opportunities for physical activity and an absence of pollution, will likely improve health outcomes and further reduce public health inequalities.

Additional material

Acknowledgments.

Ethics statement: All data used were from published, secondary sources. No ethical clearance required.

Data availability: All data are available directly within the article or as supplementary data. The original research protocol is available on Open Science Framework https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/8J5Q3

Funding: This project was undertaken as part of an Imperial College London MSc thesis. No funding was allocated. The Article Processing Charge was funded by Imperial College Open Access Fund.

Authorship contributions: Conceptualisation, L.R.B.; methodology, L.R.B., R.M.N. and D.G.; data curation, R.M.N and D.G.; formal analysis, R.M.N.; visualisation R.M.N.; supervision L.R.B. and D.G., project administration L.R.B.; funding acquisition, none. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Disclosure of interest: The authors completed the ICMJE Disclosure of Interest Form (available upon request from the corresponding author) and disclose no relevant interests.

Humans have been altering nature for thousands of years – to shape a sustainable future, it’s important to understand that deep history

Executive Director, Museum of Natural and Cultural History, University of Oregon

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Todd Braje does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

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In July 2024, all eyes will turn to Paris for the Summer Olympic Games. Spectators from around the globe will converge on the City of Light to watch athletes compete and to soak in the culture, romance and history of one of the world’s most recognizable cities.

But an iconic Paris landmark, the Notre Dame cathedral, will still be under renovation after a devastating fire that ignited in the cathedral and burned for 12 hours on April 14, 2019. When the last embers were extinguished, most of Notre Dame’s wood and metal roof was destroyed, and its majestic spire had vanished, consumed by flames.

Notre Dame is nearly 1,000 years old and has been damaged and repaired many times. Its last major renovation was in the mid-1800s . The massive beams that framed the structure were fashioned from European oak trees harvested 300 to 400 years ago.

Today, these trees are common throughout north-central Europe, but few are tall enough to replace Notre Dame’s roof lattice and spire, thanks to centuries of deforestation. Planners had to search nationwide for enough suitably large oaks for the restoration.

As an archaeologist, I study long-term human interactions with nature . In my new book, “ Understanding Imperiled Earth: How Archaeology and Human History Inform a Sustainable Future ,” I describe how addressing modern environmental crises requires an understanding of deep history – not just written human records, but also ancient connections between humans and the natural world.

Many people assume that the devastating impacts humans have wrought on our planet came about with the industrial era , which began in the mid-1700s. But people have been transforming conditions on Earth for millennia. Looking backward can inform our journey forward.

From deforestation to reforestation

To see how this works, let’s consider the shortage of tall trees for Notre Dame from a wider perspective. Deforestation in Europe dates back at least 10,000 years to a time when early farmers swept across the continent, felling forests and creating agricultural and pastoral lands to form the landscapes of today .

Based on archaeological evidence, pollen-based modeling and written records, scientists have determined that forest cover across northern, central and western Europe reached its highest density about 10,000 to 12,000 years ago, followed by a gradual decline over the intervening millennia. By AD 1700, people were farming on 250 million acres (100 million hectares) of agricultural fields, most of which had been created by clearing native European forests.

Millions of acres of timber became fuel for domestic hearths, and then for furnaces and boilers during the Industrial Revolution. This process was so transformative that renowned British geographer H. C. Darby, writing in 1954, called it “probably the most important single factor that has changed the European landscape .”

Most of these forests were lost long before scientists could study them, but historical detective work can fill in the missing information. By identifying charred plant remains from ancient fire pits and analyzing pollen from lake and soil cores, archaeologists can map where ancient forests once flourished, determine which species were represented and reconstruct what forests looked like.

Today, European nations are working to restore forests across the continent in order to slow climate change and species loss. With historical information about past forests, modern scientists can make better choices about which tree species to plant, select the best locations and project how the trees may respond to future climate change.

Understanding what’s possible

In the past 50 years, the rate and scale of human impacts on Earth have intensified. In what scholars have dubbed “ the Great Acceleration ,” human activities such as clearing forests, converting lands for farming and development, overharvesting wildlife and fisheries, and warming the atmosphere through widespread use of fossil fuels have altered conditions for life.

For people born during this era of dizzying change, it can be hard to picture life on Earth before humans remade it. Scientists have pointed out the danger of so-called “ shifting baselines ” – the widespread tendency to assume that the current depleted state of nature is how things have always been. Knowing how ecosystems used to look and function, and how human actions have changed them, makes the scale of conservation tasks more clear.

History offers insights into how the world once looked, long before globalization and industrial activities reshaped the planet. Discarded animal bones, charcoal fragments, broken stone tools and other flotsam and jetsam of the ancient past provide clues about the sizes and abundances of animal species, the location and composition of native forests and landscapes, and fluctuating atmospheric conditions. They also indicate how humans, plants and animals responded to these changes.

Informing a resilient future

The past can help modern societies confront today’s environmental challenges in innumerable ways. Understanding how takes careful historical detective work and scientific creativity. Here are a few examples:

Tracing where Indigenous fisherfolk collected black abalone for over 10,000 years can guide restoration efforts for this endangered species . Numerous examples of effective Indigenous strategies are emerging from recent archaeological and anthropological research, showcasing innovative land management, sustainable agriculture and community resilience practices that have been honed over centuries .

Understanding the history of deforestation and land conversion patterns can help health experts anticipate future pandemics . Many infectious diseases move from wildlife to humans, and human activities such as deforestation and urbanization are increasingly bringing humans and wildlife into closer contact . This heightens the risk of zoonotic disease transmission.

Museum collections can help scientists document and understand species declines and build effective strategies to fight the loss of global biodiversity. For example, museum collections of preserved amphibians have allowed scientists to track the spread of the deadly chytrid fungus, aiding in the development of targeted conservation strategies to protect vulnerable frog species.

Humans can slow and, perhaps, reverse the ecological harms that they have caused, but Earth will never return to some past pristine state.

Nonetheless, I believe that history can help humans save Earth’s remaining wild, natural places that, along with cultural icons like Notre Dame, tell the stories of who we are. The goal is not to go backward, but to create a more resilient, sustainable and biodiverse planet.

• Earth science
• Conservation
• Sustainability
• Archaeology
• Deforestation
• Indigenous knowledge
• Human history
• Notre Dame Cathedral
• History of Earth
• Environmental change

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Cultural Relativity and Acceptance of Embryonic Stem Cell Research

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There is a debate about the ethical implications of using human embryos in stem cell research, which can be influenced by cultural, moral, and social values. This paper argues for an adaptable framework to accommodate diverse cultural and religious perspectives. By using an adaptive ethics model, research protections can reflect various populations and foster growth in stem cell research possibilities.

INTRODUCTION

Stem cell research combines biology, medicine, and technology, promising to alter health care and the understanding of human development. Yet, ethical contention exists because of individuals’ perceptions of using human embryos based on their various cultural, moral, and social values. While these disagreements concerning policy, use, and general acceptance have prompted the development of an international ethics policy, such a uniform approach can overlook the nuanced ethical landscapes between cultures. With diverse viewpoints in public health, a single global policy, especially one reflecting Western ethics or the ethics prevalent in high-income countries, is impractical. This paper argues for a culturally sensitive, adaptable framework for the use of embryonic stem cells. Stem cell policy should accommodate varying ethical viewpoints and promote an effective global dialogue. With an extension of an ethics model that can adapt to various cultures, we recommend localized guidelines that reflect the moral views of the people those guidelines serve.

Stem cells, characterized by their unique ability to differentiate into various cell types, enable the repair or replacement of damaged tissues. Two primary types of stem cells are somatic stem cells (adult stem cells) and embryonic stem cells. Adult stem cells exist in developed tissues and maintain the body’s repair processes. [1] Embryonic stem cells (ESC) are remarkably pluripotent or versatile, making them valuable in research. [2] However, the use of ESCs has sparked ethics debates. Considering the potential of embryonic stem cells, research guidelines are essential. The International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR) provides international stem cell research guidelines. They call for “public conversations touching on the scientific significance as well as the societal and ethical issues raised by ESC research.” [3] The ISSCR also publishes updates about culturing human embryos 14 days post fertilization, suggesting local policies and regulations should continue to evolve as ESC research develops. [4]  Like the ISSCR, which calls for local law and policy to adapt to developing stem cell research given cultural acceptance, this paper highlights the importance of local social factors such as religion and culture.

I.     Global Cultural Perspective of Embryonic Stem Cells

Views on ESCs vary throughout the world. Some countries readily embrace stem cell research and therapies, while others have stricter regulations due to ethical concerns surrounding embryonic stem cells and when an embryo becomes entitled to moral consideration. The philosophical issue of when the “someone” begins to be a human after fertilization, in the morally relevant sense, [5] impacts when an embryo becomes not just worthy of protection but morally entitled to it. The process of creating embryonic stem cell lines involves the destruction of the embryos for research. [6] Consequently, global engagement in ESC research depends on social-cultural acceptability.

a.     US and Rights-Based Cultures

In the United States, attitudes toward stem cell therapies are diverse. The ethics and social approaches, which value individualism, [7] trigger debates regarding the destruction of human embryos, creating a complex regulatory environment. For example, the 1996 Dickey-Wicker Amendment prohibited federal funding for the creation of embryos for research and the destruction of embryos for “more than allowed for research on fetuses in utero.” [8] Following suit, in 2001, the Bush Administration heavily restricted stem cell lines for research. However, the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005 was proposed to help develop ESC research but was ultimately vetoed. [9] Under the Obama administration, in 2009, an executive order lifted restrictions allowing for more development in this field. [10] The flux of research capacity and funding parallels the different cultural perceptions of human dignity of the embryo and how it is socially presented within the country’s research culture. [11]

b.     Ubuntu and Collective Cultures

African bioethics differs from Western individualism because of the different traditions and values. African traditions, as described by individuals from South Africa and supported by some studies in other African countries, including Ghana and Kenya, follow the African moral philosophies of Ubuntu or Botho and Ukama , which “advocates for a form of wholeness that comes through one’s relationship and connectedness with other people in the society,” [12] making autonomy a socially collective concept. In this context, for the community to act autonomously, individuals would come together to decide what is best for the collective. Thus, stem cell research would require examining the value of the research to society as a whole and the use of the embryos as a collective societal resource. If society views the source as part of the collective whole, and opposes using stem cells, compromising the cultural values to pursue research may cause social detachment and stunt research growth. [13] Based on local culture and moral philosophy, the permissibility of stem cell research depends on how embryo, stem cell, and cell line therapies relate to the community as a whole. Ubuntu is the expression of humanness, with the person’s identity drawn from the “’I am because we are’” value. [14] The decision in a collectivistic culture becomes one born of cultural context, and individual decisions give deference to others in the society.

Consent differs in cultures where thought and moral philosophy are based on a collective paradigm. So, applying Western bioethical concepts is unrealistic. For one, Africa is a diverse continent with many countries with different belief systems, access to health care, and reliance on traditional or Western medicines. Where traditional medicine is the primary treatment, the “’restrictive focus on biomedically-related bioethics’” [is] problematic in African contexts because it neglects bioethical issues raised by traditional systems.” [15] No single approach applies in all areas or contexts. Rather than evaluating the permissibility of ESC research according to Western concepts such as the four principles approach, different ethics approaches should prevail.

Another consideration is the socio-economic standing of countries. In parts of South Africa, researchers have not focused heavily on contributing to the stem cell discourse, either because it is not considered health care or a health science priority or because resources are unavailable. [16] Each country’s priorities differ given different social, political, and economic factors. In South Africa, for instance, areas such as maternal mortality, non-communicable diseases, telemedicine, and the strength of health systems need improvement and require more focus. [17] Stem cell research could benefit the population, but it also could divert resources from basic medical care. Researchers in South Africa adhere to the National Health Act and Medicines Control Act in South Africa and international guidelines; however, the Act is not strictly enforced, and there is no clear legislation for research conduct or ethical guidelines. [18]

Some parts of Africa condemn stem cell research. For example, 98.2 percent of the Tunisian population is Muslim. [19] Tunisia does not permit stem cell research because of moral conflict with a Fatwa. Religion heavily saturates the regulation and direction of research. [20] Stem cell use became permissible for reproductive purposes only recently, with tight restrictions preventing cells from being used in any research other than procedures concerning ART/IVF.  Their use is conditioned on consent, and available only to married couples. [21] The community's receptiveness to stem cell research depends on including communitarian African ethics.

c.     Asia

Some Asian countries also have a collective model of ethics and decision making. [22] In China, the ethics model promotes a sincere respect for life or human dignity, [23] based on protective medicine. This model, influenced by Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM), [24] recognizes Qi as the vital energy delivered via the meridians of the body; it connects illness to body systems, the body’s entire constitution, and the universe for a holistic bond of nature, health, and quality of life. [25] Following a protective ethics model, and traditional customs of wholeness, investment in stem cell research is heavily desired for its applications in regenerative therapies, disease modeling, and protective medicines. In a survey of medical students and healthcare practitioners, 30.8 percent considered stem cell research morally unacceptable while 63.5 percent accepted medical research using human embryonic stem cells. Of these individuals, 89.9 percent supported increased funding for stem cell research. [26] The scientific community might not reflect the overall population. From 1997 to 2019, China spent a total of $576 million (USD) on stem cell research at 8,050 stem cell programs, increased published presence from 0.6 percent to 14.01 percent of total global stem cell publications as of 2014, and made significant strides in cell-based therapies for various medical conditions. [27] However, while China has made substantial investments in stem cell research and achieved notable progress in clinical applications, concerns linger regarding ethical oversight and transparency. [28] For example, the China Biosecurity Law, promoted by the National Health Commission and China Hospital Association, attempted to mitigate risks by introducing an institutional review board (IRB) in the regulatory bodies. 5800 IRBs registered with the Chinese Clinical Trial Registry since 2021. [29] However, issues still need to be addressed in implementing effective IRB review and approval procedures.

The substantial government funding and focus on scientific advancement have sometimes overshadowed considerations of regional cultures, ethnic minorities, and individual perspectives, particularly evident during the one-child policy era. As government policy adapts to promote public stability, such as the change from the one-child to the two-child policy, [30] research ethics should also adapt to ensure respect for the values of its represented peoples.

Japan is also relatively supportive of stem cell research and therapies. Japan has a more transparent regulatory framework, allowing for faster approval of regenerative medicine products, which has led to several advanced clinical trials and therapies. [31] South Korea is also actively engaged in stem cell research and has a history of breakthroughs in cloning and embryonic stem cells. [32] However, the field is controversial, and there are issues of scientific integrity. For example, the Korean FDA fast-tracked products for approval, [33] and in another instance, the oocyte source was unclear and possibly violated ethical standards. [34] Trust is important in research, as it builds collaborative foundations between colleagues, trial participant comfort, open-mindedness for complicated and sensitive discussions, and supports regulatory procedures for stakeholders. There is a need to respect the culture’s interest, engagement, and for research and clinical trials to be transparent and have ethical oversight to promote global research discourse and trust.

d.     Middle East

Countries in the Middle East have varying degrees of acceptance of or restrictions to policies related to using embryonic stem cells due to cultural and religious influences. Saudi Arabia has made significant contributions to stem cell research, and conducts research based on international guidelines for ethical conduct and under strict adherence to guidelines in accordance with Islamic principles. Specifically, the Saudi government and people require ESC research to adhere to Sharia law. In addition to umbilical and placental stem cells, [35] Saudi Arabia permits the use of embryonic stem cells as long as they come from miscarriages, therapeutic abortions permissible by Sharia law, or are left over from in vitro fertilization and donated to research. [36] Laws and ethical guidelines for stem cell research allow the development of research institutions such as the King Abdullah International Medical Research Center, which has a cord blood bank and a stem cell registry with nearly 10,000 donors. [37] Such volume and acceptance are due to the ethical ‘permissibility’ of the donor sources, which do not conflict with religious pillars. However, some researchers err on the side of caution, choosing not to use embryos or fetal tissue as they feel it is unethical to do so. [38]

Jordan has a positive research ethics culture. [39] However, there is a significant issue of lack of trust in researchers, with 45.23 percent (38.66 percent agreeing and 6.57 percent strongly agreeing) of Jordanians holding a low level of trust in researchers, compared to 81.34 percent of Jordanians agreeing that they feel safe to participate in a research trial. [40] Safety testifies to the feeling of confidence that adequate measures are in place to protect participants from harm, whereas trust in researchers could represent the confidence in researchers to act in the participants’ best interests, adhere to ethical guidelines, provide accurate information, and respect participants’ rights and dignity. One method to improve trust would be to address communication issues relevant to ESC. Legislation surrounding stem cell research has adopted specific language, especially concerning clarification “between ‘stem cells’ and ‘embryonic stem cells’” in translation. [41] Furthermore, legislation “mandates the creation of a national committee… laying out specific regulations for stem-cell banking in accordance with international standards.” [42] This broad regulation opens the door for future global engagement and maintains transparency. However, these regulations may also constrain the influence of research direction, pace, and accessibility of research outcomes.

e.     Europe

In the European Union (EU), ethics is also principle-based, but the principles of autonomy, dignity, integrity, and vulnerability are interconnected. [43] As such, the opportunity for cohesion and concessions between individuals’ thoughts and ideals allows for a more adaptable ethics model due to the flexible principles that relate to the human experience The EU has put forth a framework in its Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being allowing member states to take different approaches. Each European state applies these principles to its specific conventions, leading to or reflecting different acceptance levels of stem cell research. [44]

For example, in Germany, Lebenzusammenhang , or the coherence of life, references integrity in the unity of human culture. Namely, the personal sphere “should not be subject to external intervention.” [45]  Stem cell interventions could affect this concept of bodily completeness, leading to heavy restrictions. Under the Grundgesetz, human dignity and the right to life with physical integrity are paramount. [46] The Embryo Protection Act of 1991 made producing cell lines illegal. Cell lines can be imported if approved by the Central Ethics Commission for Stem Cell Research only if they were derived before May 2007. [47] Stem cell research respects the integrity of life for the embryo with heavy specifications and intense oversight. This is vastly different in Finland, where the regulatory bodies find research more permissible in IVF excess, but only up to 14 days after fertilization. [48] Spain’s approach differs still, with a comprehensive regulatory framework. [49] Thus, research regulation can be culture-specific due to variations in applied principles. Diverse cultures call for various approaches to ethical permissibility. [50] Only an adaptive-deliberative model can address the cultural constructions of self and achieve positive, culturally sensitive stem cell research practices. [51]

II.     Religious Perspectives on ESC

Embryonic stem cell sources are the main consideration within religious contexts. While individuals may not regard their own religious texts as authoritative or factual, religion can shape their foundations or perspectives.

The Qur'an states:

“And indeed We created man from a quintessence of clay. Then We placed within him a small quantity of nutfa (sperm to fertilize) in a safe place. Then We have fashioned the nutfa into an ‘alaqa (clinging clot or cell cluster), then We developed the ‘alaqa into mudgha (a lump of flesh), and We made mudgha into bones, and clothed the bones with flesh, then We brought it into being as a new creation. So Blessed is Allah, the Best of Creators.” [52]

Many scholars of Islam estimate the time of soul installment, marked by the angel breathing in the soul to bring the individual into creation, as 120 days from conception. [53] Personhood begins at this point, and the value of life would prohibit research or experimentation that could harm the individual. If the fetus is more than 120 days old, the time ensoulment is interpreted to occur according to Islamic law, abortion is no longer permissible. [54] There are a few opposing opinions about early embryos in Islamic traditions. According to some Islamic theologians, there is no ensoulment of the early embryo, which is the source of stem cells for ESC research. [55]

In Buddhism, the stance on stem cell research is not settled. The main tenets, the prohibition against harming or destroying others (ahimsa) and the pursuit of knowledge (prajña) and compassion (karuna), leave Buddhist scholars and communities divided. [56] Some scholars argue stem cell research is in accordance with the Buddhist tenet of seeking knowledge and ending human suffering. Others feel it violates the principle of not harming others. Finding the balance between these two points relies on the karmic burden of Buddhist morality. In trying to prevent ahimsa towards the embryo, Buddhist scholars suggest that to comply with Buddhist tenets, research cannot be done as the embryo has personhood at the moment of conception and would reincarnate immediately, harming the individual's ability to build their karmic burden. [57] On the other hand, the Bodhisattvas, those considered to be on the path to enlightenment or Nirvana, have given organs and flesh to others to help alleviate grieving and to benefit all. [58] Acceptance varies on applied beliefs and interpretations.

Catholicism does not support embryonic stem cell research, as it entails creation or destruction of human embryos. This destruction conflicts with the belief in the sanctity of life. For example, in the Old Testament, Genesis describes humanity as being created in God’s image and multiplying on the Earth, referencing the sacred rights to human conception and the purpose of development and life. In the Ten Commandments, the tenet that one should not kill has numerous interpretations where killing could mean murder or shedding of the sanctity of life, demonstrating the high value of human personhood. In other books, the theological conception of when life begins is interpreted as in utero, [59] highlighting the inviolability of life and its formation in vivo to make a religious point for accepting such research as relatively limited, if at all. [60] The Vatican has released ethical directives to help apply a theological basis to modern-day conflicts. The Magisterium of the Church states that “unless there is a moral certainty of not causing harm,” experimentation on fetuses, fertilized cells, stem cells, or embryos constitutes a crime. [61] Such procedures would not respect the human person who exists at these stages, according to Catholicism. Damages to the embryo are considered gravely immoral and illicit. [62] Although the Catholic Church officially opposes abortion, surveys demonstrate that many Catholic people hold pro-choice views, whether due to the context of conception, stage of pregnancy, threat to the mother’s life, or for other reasons, demonstrating that practicing members can also accept some but not all tenets. [63]

Some major Jewish denominations, such as the Reform, Conservative, and Reconstructionist movements, are open to supporting ESC use or research as long as it is for saving a life. [64] Within Judaism, the Talmud, or study, gives personhood to the child at birth and emphasizes that life does not begin at conception: [65]

“If she is found pregnant, until the fortieth day it is mere fluid,” [66]

Whereas most religions prioritize the status of human embryos, the Halakah (Jewish religious law) states that to save one life, most other religious laws can be ignored because it is in pursuit of preservation. [67] Stem cell research is accepted due to application of these religious laws.

We recognize that all religions contain subsets and sects. The variety of environmental and cultural differences within religious groups requires further analysis to respect the flexibility of religious thoughts and practices. We make no presumptions that all cultures require notions of autonomy or morality as under the common morality theory , which asserts a set of universal moral norms that all individuals share provides moral reasoning and guides ethical decisions. [68] We only wish to show that the interaction with morality varies between cultures and countries.

III.     A Flexible Ethical Approach

The plurality of different moral approaches described above demonstrates that there can be no universally acceptable uniform law for ESC on a global scale. Instead of developing one standard, flexible ethical applications must be continued. We recommend local guidelines that incorporate important cultural and ethical priorities.

While the Declaration of Helsinki is more relevant to people in clinical trials receiving ESC products, in keeping with the tradition of protections for research subjects, consent of the donor is an ethical requirement for ESC donation in many jurisdictions including the US, Canada, and Europe. [69] The Declaration of Helsinki provides a reference point for regulatory standards and could potentially be used as a universal baseline for obtaining consent prior to gamete or embryo donation.

For instance, in Columbia University’s egg donor program for stem cell research, donors followed standard screening protocols and “underwent counseling sessions that included information as to the purpose of oocyte donation for research, what the oocytes would be used for, the risks and benefits of donation, and process of oocyte stimulation” to ensure transparency for consent. [70] The program helped advance stem cell research and provided clear and safe research methods with paid participants. Though paid participation or covering costs of incidental expenses may not be socially acceptable in every culture or context, [71] and creating embryos for ESC research is illegal in many jurisdictions, Columbia’s program was effective because of the clear and honest communications with donors, IRBs, and related stakeholders.  This example demonstrates that cultural acceptance of scientific research and of the idea that an egg or embryo does not have personhood is likely behind societal acceptance of donating eggs for ESC research. As noted, many countries do not permit the creation of embryos for research.

Proper communication and education regarding the process and purpose of stem cell research may bolster comprehension and garner more acceptance. “Given the sensitive subject material, a complete consent process can support voluntary participation through trust, understanding, and ethical norms from the cultures and morals participants value. This can be hard for researchers entering countries of different socioeconomic stability, with different languages and different societal values. [72]

An adequate moral foundation in medical ethics is derived from the cultural and religious basis that informs knowledge and actions. [73] Understanding local cultural and religious values and their impact on research could help researchers develop humility and promote inclusion.

IV.     Concerns

Some may argue that if researchers all adhere to one ethics standard, protection will be satisfied across all borders, and the global public will trust researchers. However, defining what needs to be protected and how to define such research standards is very specific to the people to which standards are applied. We suggest that applying one uniform guide cannot accurately protect each individual because we all possess our own perceptions and interpretations of social values. [74] Therefore, the issue of not adjusting to the moral pluralism between peoples in applying one standard of ethics can be resolved by building out ethics models that can be adapted to different cultures and religions.

Other concerns include medical tourism, which may promote health inequities. [75] Some countries may develop and approve products derived from ESC research before others, compromising research ethics or drug approval processes. There are also concerns about the sale of unauthorized stem cell treatments, for example, those without FDA approval in the United States. Countries with robust research infrastructures may be tempted to attract medical tourists, and some customers will have false hopes based on aggressive publicity of unproven treatments. [76]

For example, in China, stem cell clinics can market to foreign clients who are not protected under the regulatory regimes. Companies employ a marketing strategy of “ethically friendly” therapies. Specifically, in the case of Beike, China’s leading stem cell tourism company and sprouting network, ethical oversight of administrators or health bureaus at one site has “the unintended consequence of shifting questionable activities to another node in Beike's diffuse network.” [77] In contrast, Jordan is aware of stem cell research’s potential abuse and its own status as a “health-care hub.” Jordan’s expanded regulations include preserving the interests of individuals in clinical trials and banning private companies from ESC research to preserve transparency and the integrity of research practices. [78]

The social priorities of the community are also a concern. The ISSCR explicitly states that guidelines “should be periodically revised to accommodate scientific advances, new challenges, and evolving social priorities.” [79] The adaptable ethics model extends this consideration further by addressing whether research is warranted given the varying degrees of socioeconomic conditions, political stability, and healthcare accessibilities and limitations. An ethical approach would require discussion about resource allocation and appropriate distribution of funds. [80]

While some religions emphasize the sanctity of life from conception, which may lead to public opposition to ESC research, others encourage ESC research due to its potential for healing and alleviating human pain. Many countries have special regulations that balance local views on embryonic personhood, the benefits of research as individual or societal goods, and the protection of human research subjects. To foster understanding and constructive dialogue, global policy frameworks should prioritize the protection of universal human rights, transparency, and informed consent. In addition to these foundational global policies, we recommend tailoring local guidelines to reflect the diverse cultural and religious perspectives of the populations they govern. Ethics models should be adapted to local populations to effectively establish research protections, growth, and possibilities of stem cell research.

For example, in countries with strong beliefs in the moral sanctity of embryos or heavy religious restrictions, an adaptive model can allow for discussion instead of immediate rejection. In countries with limited individual rights and voice in science policy, an adaptive model ensures cultural, moral, and religious views are taken into consideration, thereby building social inclusion. While this ethical consideration by the government may not give a complete voice to every individual, it will help balance policies and maintain the diverse perspectives of those it affects. Embracing an adaptive ethics model of ESC research promotes open-minded dialogue and respect for the importance of human belief and tradition. By actively engaging with cultural and religious values, researchers can better handle disagreements and promote ethical research practices that benefit each society.

This brief exploration of the religious and cultural differences that impact ESC research reveals the nuances of relative ethics and highlights a need for local policymakers to apply a more intense adaptive model.

[1] Poliwoda, S., Noor, N., Downs, E., Schaaf, A., Cantwell, A., Ganti, L., Kaye, A. D., Mosel, L. I., Carroll, C. B., Viswanath, O., & Urits, I. (2022). Stem cells: a comprehensive review of origins and emerging clinical roles in medical practice.  Orthopedic reviews ,  14 (3), 37498. https://doi.org/10.52965/001c.37498

[2] Poliwoda, S., Noor, N., Downs, E., Schaaf, A., Cantwell, A., Ganti, L., Kaye, A. D., Mosel, L. I., Carroll, C. B., Viswanath, O., & Urits, I. (2022). Stem cells: a comprehensive review of origins and emerging clinical roles in medical practice.  Orthopedic reviews ,  14 (3), 37498. https://doi.org/10.52965/001c.37498

[3] International Society for Stem Cell Research. (2023). Laboratory-based human embryonic stem cell research, embryo research, and related research activities . International Society for Stem Cell Research. https://www.isscr.org/guidelines/blog-post-title-one-ed2td-6fcdk ; Kimmelman, J., Hyun, I., Benvenisty, N.  et al.  Policy: Global standards for stem-cell research.  Nature   533 , 311–313 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1038/533311a

[4] International Society for Stem Cell Research. (2023). Laboratory-based human embryonic stem cell research, embryo research, and related research activities . International Society for Stem Cell Research. https://www.isscr.org/guidelines/blog-post-title-one-ed2td-6fcdk

[5] Concerning the moral philosophies of stem cell research, our paper does not posit a personal moral stance nor delve into the “when” of human life begins. To read further about the philosophical debate, consider the following sources:

Sandel M. J. (2004). Embryo ethics--the moral logic of stem-cell research.  The New England journal of medicine ,  351 (3), 207–209. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp048145 ; George, R. P., & Lee, P. (2020, September 26). Acorns and Embryos . The New Atlantis. https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/acorns-and-embryos ; Sagan, A., & Singer, P. (2007). The moral status of stem cells. Metaphilosophy , 38 (2/3), 264–284. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24439776 ; McHugh P. R. (2004). Zygote and "clonote"--the ethical use of embryonic stem cells.  The New England journal of medicine ,  351 (3), 209–211. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp048147 ; Kurjak, A., & Tripalo, A. (2004). The facts and doubts about beginning of the human life and personality.  Bosnian journal of basic medical sciences ,  4 (1), 5–14. https://doi.org/10.17305/bjbms.2004.3453

[6] Vazin, T., & Freed, W. J. (2010). Human embryonic stem cells: derivation, culture, and differentiation: a review.  Restorative neurology and neuroscience ,  28 (4), 589–603. https://doi.org/10.3233/RNN-2010-0543

[7] Socially, at its core, the Western approach to ethics is widely principle-based, autonomy being one of the key factors to ensure a fundamental respect for persons within research. For information regarding autonomy in research, see: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, & National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1978). The Belmont Report. Ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human subjects of research.; For a more in-depth review of autonomy within the US, see: Beauchamp, T. L., & Childress, J. F. (1994). Principles of Biomedical Ethics . Oxford University Press.

[8] Sherley v. Sebelius , 644 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 2011), citing 45 C.F.R. 46.204(b) and [42 U.S.C. § 289g(b)]. https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/6c690438a9b43dd685257a64004ebf99/$file/11-5241-1391178.pdf

[9] Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005, H. R. 810, 109 th Cong. (2001). https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hr810/text ; Bush, G. W. (2006, July 19). Message to the House of Representatives . National Archives and Records Administration. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060719-5.html

[10] National Archives and Records Administration. (2009, March 9). Executive order 13505 -- removing barriers to responsible scientific research involving human stem cells . National Archives and Records Administration. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/removing-barriers-responsible-scientific-research-involving-human-stem-cells

[11] Hurlbut, W. B. (2006). Science, Religion, and the Politics of Stem Cells.  Social Research ,  73 (3), 819–834. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971854

[12] Akpa-Inyang, Francis & Chima, Sylvester. (2021). South African traditional values and beliefs regarding informed consent and limitations of the principle of respect for autonomy in African communities: a cross-cultural qualitative study. BMC Medical Ethics . 22. 10.1186/s12910-021-00678-4.

[13] Source for further reading: Tangwa G. B. (2007). Moral status of embryonic stem cells: perspective of an African villager. Bioethics , 21(8), 449–457. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00582.x , see also Mnisi, F. M. (2020). An African analysis based on ethics of Ubuntu - are human embryonic stem cell patents morally justifiable? African Insight , 49 (4).

[14] Jecker, N. S., & Atuire, C. (2021). Bioethics in Africa: A contextually enlightened analysis of three cases. Developing World Bioethics , 22 (2), 112–122. https://doi.org/10.1111/dewb.12324

[15] Jecker, N. S., & Atuire, C. (2021). Bioethics in Africa: A contextually enlightened analysis of three cases. Developing World Bioethics, 22(2), 112–122. https://doi.org/10.1111/dewb.12324

[16] Jackson, C.S., Pepper, M.S. Opportunities and barriers to establishing a cell therapy programme in South Africa.  Stem Cell Res Ther   4 , 54 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1186/scrt204 ; Pew Research Center. (2014, May 1). Public health a major priority in African nations . Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/05/01/public-health-a-major-priority-in-african-nations/

[17] Department of Health Republic of South Africa. (2021). Health Research Priorities (revised) for South Africa 2021-2024 . National Health Research Strategy. https://www.health.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/National-Health-Research-Priorities-2021-2024.pdf

[18] Oosthuizen, H. (2013). Legal and Ethical Issues in Stem Cell Research in South Africa. In: Beran, R. (eds) Legal and Forensic Medicine. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32338-6_80 , see also: Gaobotse G (2018) Stem Cell Research in Africa: Legislation and Challenges. J Regen Med 7:1. doi: 10.4172/2325-9620.1000142

[19] United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. (1998). Tunisia: Information on the status of Christian conversions in Tunisia . UNHCR Web Archive. https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230522142618/https://www.refworld.org/docid/3df0be9a2.html

[20] Gaobotse, G. (2018) Stem Cell Research in Africa: Legislation and Challenges. J Regen Med 7:1. doi: 10.4172/2325-9620.1000142

[21] Kooli, C. Review of assisted reproduction techniques, laws, and regulations in Muslim countries.  Middle East Fertil Soc J   24 , 8 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1186/s43043-019-0011-0 ; Gaobotse, G. (2018) Stem Cell Research in Africa: Legislation and Challenges. J Regen Med 7:1. doi: 10.4172/2325-9620.1000142

[22] Pang M. C. (1999). Protective truthfulness: the Chinese way of safeguarding patients in informed treatment decisions. Journal of medical ethics , 25(3), 247–253. https://doi.org/10.1136/jme.25.3.247

[23] Wang, L., Wang, F., & Zhang, W. (2021). Bioethics in China’s biosecurity law: Forms, effects, and unsettled issues. Journal of law and the biosciences , 8(1).  https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsab019 https://academic.oup.com/jlb/article/8/1/lsab019/6299199

[24] Wang, Y., Xue, Y., & Guo, H. D. (2022). Intervention effects of traditional Chinese medicine on stem cell therapy of myocardial infarction.  Frontiers in pharmacology ,  13 , 1013740. https://doi.org/10.3389/fphar.2022.1013740

[25] Li, X.-T., & Zhao, J. (2012). Chapter 4: An Approach to the Nature of Qi in TCM- Qi and Bioenergy. In Recent Advances in Theories and Practice of Chinese Medicine (p. 79). InTech.

[26] Luo, D., Xu, Z., Wang, Z., & Ran, W. (2021). China's Stem Cell Research and Knowledge Levels of Medical Practitioners and Students.  Stem cells international ,  2021 , 6667743. https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/6667743

[27] Luo, D., Xu, Z., Wang, Z., & Ran, W. (2021). China's Stem Cell Research and Knowledge Levels of Medical Practitioners and Students.  Stem cells international ,  2021 , 6667743. https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/6667743

[28] Zhang, J. Y. (2017). Lost in translation? accountability and governance of Clinical Stem Cell Research in China. Regenerative Medicine , 12 (6), 647–656. https://doi.org/10.2217/rme-2017-0035

[29] Wang, L., Wang, F., & Zhang, W. (2021). Bioethics in China’s biosecurity law: Forms, effects, and unsettled issues. Journal of law and the biosciences , 8(1).  https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsab019 https://academic.oup.com/jlb/article/8/1/lsab019/6299199

[30] Chen, H., Wei, T., Wang, H.  et al.  Association of China’s two-child policy with changes in number of births and birth defects rate, 2008–2017.  BMC Public Health   22 , 434 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-022-12839-0

[31] Azuma, K. Regulatory Landscape of Regenerative Medicine in Japan.  Curr Stem Cell Rep   1 , 118–128 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40778-015-0012-6

[32] Harris, R. (2005, May 19). Researchers Report Advance in Stem Cell Production . NPR. https://www.npr.org/2005/05/19/4658967/researchers-report-advance-in-stem-cell-production

[33] Park, S. (2012). South Korea steps up stem-cell work.  Nature . https://doi.org/10.1038/nature.2012.10565

[34] Resnik, D. B., Shamoo, A. E., & Krimsky, S. (2006). Fraudulent human embryonic stem cell research in South Korea: lessons learned.  Accountability in research ,  13 (1), 101–109. https://doi.org/10.1080/08989620600634193 .

[35] Alahmad, G., Aljohani, S., & Najjar, M. F. (2020). Ethical challenges regarding the use of stem cells: interviews with researchers from Saudi Arabia. BMC medical ethics, 21(1), 35. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-020-00482-6

[36] Association for the Advancement of Blood and Biotherapies.  https://www.aabb.org/regulatory-and-advocacy/regulatory-affairs/regulatory-for-cellular-therapies/international-competent-authorities/saudi-arabia

[37] Alahmad, G., Aljohani, S., & Najjar, M. F. (2020). Ethical challenges regarding the use of stem cells: Interviews with researchers from Saudi Arabia.  BMC medical ethics ,  21 (1), 35. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-020-00482-6

[38] Alahmad, G., Aljohani, S., & Najjar, M. F. (2020). Ethical challenges regarding the use of stem cells: Interviews with researchers from Saudi Arabia. BMC medical ethics , 21(1), 35. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-020-00482-6

Culturally, autonomy practices follow a relational autonomy approach based on a paternalistic deontological health care model. The adherence to strict international research policies and religious pillars within the regulatory environment is a great foundation for research ethics. However, there is a need to develop locally targeted ethics approaches for research (as called for in Alahmad, G., Aljohani, S., & Najjar, M. F. (2020). Ethical challenges regarding the use of stem cells: interviews with researchers from Saudi Arabia. BMC medical ethics, 21(1), 35. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-020-00482-6), this decision-making approach may help advise a research decision model. For more on the clinical cultural autonomy approaches, see: Alabdullah, Y. Y., Alzaid, E., Alsaad, S., Alamri, T., Alolayan, S. W., Bah, S., & Aljoudi, A. S. (2022). Autonomy and paternalism in Shared decision‐making in a Saudi Arabian tertiary hospital: A cross‐sectional study. Developing World Bioethics , 23 (3), 260–268. https://doi.org/10.1111/dewb.12355 ; Bukhari, A. A. (2017). Universal Principles of Bioethics and Patient Rights in Saudi Arabia (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/124; Ladha, S., Nakshawani, S. A., Alzaidy, A., & Tarab, B. (2023, October 26). Islam and Bioethics: What We All Need to Know . Columbia University School of Professional Studies. https://sps.columbia.edu/events/islam-and-bioethics-what-we-all-need-know

[39] Ababneh, M. A., Al-Azzam, S. I., Alzoubi, K., Rababa’h, A., & Al Demour, S. (2021). Understanding and attitudes of the Jordanian public about clinical research ethics.  Research Ethics ,  17 (2), 228-241.  https://doi.org/10.1177/1747016120966779

[40] Ababneh, M. A., Al-Azzam, S. I., Alzoubi, K., Rababa’h, A., & Al Demour, S. (2021). Understanding and attitudes of the Jordanian public about clinical research ethics.  Research Ethics ,  17 (2), 228-241.  https://doi.org/10.1177/1747016120966779

[41] Dajani, R. (2014). Jordan’s stem-cell law can guide the Middle East.  Nature  510, 189. https://doi.org/10.1038/510189a

[42] Dajani, R. (2014). Jordan’s stem-cell law can guide the Middle East.  Nature  510, 189. https://doi.org/10.1038/510189a

[43] The EU’s definition of autonomy relates to the capacity for creating ideas, moral insight, decisions, and actions without constraint, personal responsibility, and informed consent. However, the EU views autonomy as not completely able to protect individuals and depends on other principles, such as dignity, which “expresses the intrinsic worth and fundamental equality of all human beings.” Rendtorff, J.D., Kemp, P. (2019). Four Ethical Principles in European Bioethics and Biolaw: Autonomy, Dignity, Integrity and Vulnerability. In: Valdés, E., Lecaros, J. (eds) Biolaw and Policy in the Twenty-First Century. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, vol 78. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05903-3_3

[44] Council of Europe. Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (ETS No. 164) https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list?module=treaty-detail&treatynum=164 (forbidding the creation of embryos for research purposes only, and suggests embryos in vitro have protections.); Also see Drabiak-Syed B. K. (2013). New President, New Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research Policy: Comparative International Perspectives and Embryonic Stem Cell Research Laws in France.  Biotechnology Law Report ,  32 (6), 349–356. https://doi.org/10.1089/blr.2013.9865

[45] Rendtorff, J.D., Kemp, P. (2019). Four Ethical Principles in European Bioethics and Biolaw: Autonomy, Dignity, Integrity and Vulnerability. In: Valdés, E., Lecaros, J. (eds) Biolaw and Policy in the Twenty-First Century. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, vol 78. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05903-3_3

[46] Tomuschat, C., Currie, D. P., Kommers, D. P., & Kerr, R. (Trans.). (1949, May 23). Basic law for the Federal Republic of Germany. https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf

[47] Regulation of Stem Cell Research in Germany . Eurostemcell. (2017, April 26). https://www.eurostemcell.org/regulation-stem-cell-research-germany

[48] Regulation of Stem Cell Research in Finland . Eurostemcell. (2017, April 26). https://www.eurostemcell.org/regulation-stem-cell-research-finland

[49] Regulation of Stem Cell Research in Spain . Eurostemcell. (2017, April 26). https://www.eurostemcell.org/regulation-stem-cell-research-spain

[50] Some sources to consider regarding ethics models or regulatory oversights of other cultures not covered:

Kara MA. Applicability of the principle of respect for autonomy: the perspective of Turkey. J Med Ethics. 2007 Nov;33(11):627-30. doi: 10.1136/jme.2006.017400. PMID: 17971462; PMCID: PMC2598110.

Ugarte, O. N., & Acioly, M. A. (2014). The principle of autonomy in Brazil: one needs to discuss it ...  Revista do Colegio Brasileiro de Cirurgioes ,  41 (5), 374–377. https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-69912014005013

Bharadwaj, A., & Glasner, P. E. (2012). Local cells, global science: The rise of embryonic stem cell research in India . Routledge.

For further research on specific European countries regarding ethical and regulatory framework, we recommend this database: Regulation of Stem Cell Research in Europe . Eurostemcell. (2017, April 26). https://www.eurostemcell.org/regulation-stem-cell-research-europe   

[51] Klitzman, R. (2006). Complications of culture in obtaining informed consent. The American Journal of Bioethics, 6(1), 20–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160500394671 see also: Ekmekci, P. E., & Arda, B. (2017). Interculturalism and Informed Consent: Respecting Cultural Differences without Breaching Human Rights.  Cultura (Iasi, Romania) ,  14 (2), 159–172.; For why trust is important in research, see also: Gray, B., Hilder, J., Macdonald, L., Tester, R., Dowell, A., & Stubbe, M. (2017). Are research ethics guidelines culturally competent?  Research Ethics ,  13 (1), 23-41.  https://doi.org/10.1177/1747016116650235

[52] The Qur'an  (M. Khattab, Trans.). (1965). Al-Mu’minun, 23: 12-14. https://quran.com/23

[53] Lenfest, Y. (2017, December 8). Islam and the beginning of human life . Bill of Health. https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2017/12/08/islam-and-the-beginning-of-human-life/

[54] Aksoy, S. (2005). Making regulations and drawing up legislation in Islamic countries under conditions of uncertainty, with special reference to embryonic stem cell research. Journal of Medical Ethics , 31: 399-403.; see also: Mahmoud, Azza. "Islamic Bioethics: National Regulations and Guidelines of Human Stem Cell Research in the Muslim World." Master's thesis, Chapman University, 2022. https://doi.org/10.36837/ chapman.000386

[55] Rashid, R. (2022). When does Ensoulment occur in the Human Foetus. Journal of the British Islamic Medical Association , 12 (4). ISSN 2634 8071. https://www.jbima.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2-Ethics-3_-Ensoulment_Rafaqat.pdf.

[56] Sivaraman, M. & Noor, S. (2017). Ethics of embryonic stem cell research according to Buddhist, Hindu, Catholic, and Islamic religions: perspective from Malaysia. Asian Biomedicine,8(1) 43-52.  https://doi.org/10.5372/1905-7415.0801.260

[57] Jafari, M., Elahi, F., Ozyurt, S. & Wrigley, T. (2007). 4. Religious Perspectives on Embryonic Stem Cell Research. In K. Monroe, R. Miller & J. Tobis (Ed.),  Fundamentals of the Stem Cell Debate: The Scientific, Religious, Ethical, and Political Issues  (pp. 79-94). Berkeley: University of California Press.  https://escholarship.org/content/qt9rj0k7s3/qt9rj0k7s3_noSplash_f9aca2e02c3777c7fb76ea768ba458f0.pdf https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520940994-005

[58] Lecso, P. A. (1991). The Bodhisattva Ideal and Organ Transplantation.  Journal of Religion and Health ,  30 (1), 35–41. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27510629 ; Bodhisattva, S. (n.d.). The Key of Becoming a Bodhisattva . A Guide to the Bodhisattva Way of Life. http://www.buddhism.org/Sutras/2/BodhisattvaWay.htm

[59] There is no explicit religious reference to when life begins or how to conduct research that interacts with the concept of life. However, these are relevant verses pertaining to how the fetus is viewed. (( King James Bible . (1999). Oxford University Press. (original work published 1769))

Jerimiah 1: 5 “Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee; and before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee…”

In prophet Jerimiah’s insight, God set him apart as a person known before childbirth, a theme carried within the Psalm of David.

Psalm 139: 13-14 “…Thou hast covered me in my mother's womb. I will praise thee; for I am fearfully and wonderfully made…”

These verses demonstrate David’s respect for God as an entity that would know of all man’s thoughts and doings even before birth.

[60] It should be noted that abortion is not supported as well.

[61] The Vatican. (1987, February 22). Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation Replies to Certain Questions of the Day . Congregation For the Doctrine of the Faith. https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.html

[62] The Vatican. (2000, August 25). Declaration On the Production and the Scientific and Therapeutic Use of Human Embryonic Stem Cells . Pontifical Academy for Life. https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acdlife/documents/rc_pa_acdlife_doc_20000824_cellule-staminali_en.html ; Ohara, N. (2003). Ethical Consideration of Experimentation Using Living Human Embryos: The Catholic Church’s Position on Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Human Cloning. Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology . Retrieved from https://article.imrpress.com/journal/CEOG/30/2-3/pii/2003018/77-81.pdf.

[63] Smith, G. A. (2022, May 23). Like Americans overall, Catholics vary in their abortion views, with regular mass attenders most opposed . Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/05/23/like-americans-overall-catholics-vary-in-their-abortion-views-with-regular-mass-attenders-most-opposed/

[64] Rosner, F., & Reichman, E. (2002). Embryonic stem cell research in Jewish law. Journal of halacha and contemporary society , (43), 49–68.; Jafari, M., Elahi, F., Ozyurt, S. & Wrigley, T. (2007). 4. Religious Perspectives on Embryonic Stem Cell Research. In K. Monroe, R. Miller & J. Tobis (Ed.),  Fundamentals of the Stem Cell Debate: The Scientific, Religious, Ethical, and Political Issues  (pp. 79-94). Berkeley: University of California Press.  https://escholarship.org/content/qt9rj0k7s3/qt9rj0k7s3_noSplash_f9aca2e02c3777c7fb76ea768ba458f0.pdf https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520940994-005

[65] Schenker J. G. (2008). The beginning of human life: status of embryo. Perspectives in Halakha (Jewish Religious Law).  Journal of assisted reproduction and genetics ,  25 (6), 271–276. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10815-008-9221-6

[66] Ruttenberg, D. (2020, May 5). The Torah of Abortion Justice (annotated source sheet) . Sefaria. https://www.sefaria.org/sheets/234926.7?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en

[67] Jafari, M., Elahi, F., Ozyurt, S. & Wrigley, T. (2007). 4. Religious Perspectives on Embryonic Stem Cell Research. In K. Monroe, R. Miller & J. Tobis (Ed.),  Fundamentals of the Stem Cell Debate: The Scientific, Religious, Ethical, and Political Issues  (pp. 79-94). Berkeley: University of California Press.  https://escholarship.org/content/qt9rj0k7s3/qt9rj0k7s3_noSplash_f9aca2e02c3777c7fb76ea768ba458f0.pdf https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520940994-005

[68] Gert, B. (2007). Common morality: Deciding what to do . Oxford Univ. Press.

[69] World Medical Association (2013). World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects. JAMA , 310(20), 2191–2194. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2013.281053 Declaration of Helsinki – WMA – The World Medical Association .; see also: National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. (1979).  The Belmont report: Ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human subjects of research . U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/belmont-report/read-the-belmont-report/index.html

[70] Zakarin Safier, L., Gumer, A., Kline, M., Egli, D., & Sauer, M. V. (2018). Compensating human subjects providing oocytes for stem cell research: 9-year experience and outcomes.  Journal of assisted reproduction and genetics ,  35 (7), 1219–1225. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10815-018-1171-z https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6063839/ see also: Riordan, N. H., & Paz Rodríguez, J. (2021). Addressing concerns regarding associated costs, transparency, and integrity of research in recent stem cell trial. Stem Cells Translational Medicine , 10 (12), 1715–1716. https://doi.org/10.1002/sctm.21-0234

[71] Klitzman, R., & Sauer, M. V. (2009). Payment of egg donors in stem cell research in the USA.  Reproductive biomedicine online ,  18 (5), 603–608. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1472-6483(10)60002-8

[72] Krosin, M. T., Klitzman, R., Levin, B., Cheng, J., & Ranney, M. L. (2006). Problems in comprehension of informed consent in rural and peri-urban Mali, West Africa.  Clinical trials (London, England) ,  3 (3), 306–313. https://doi.org/10.1191/1740774506cn150oa

[73] Veatch, Robert M.  Hippocratic, Religious, and Secular Medical Ethics: The Points of Conflict . Georgetown University Press, 2012.

[74] Msoroka, M. S., & Amundsen, D. (2018). One size fits not quite all: Universal research ethics with diversity.  Research Ethics ,  14 (3), 1-17.  https://doi.org/10.1177/1747016117739939

[75] Pirzada, N. (2022). The Expansion of Turkey’s Medical Tourism Industry.  Voices in Bioethics ,  8 . https://doi.org/10.52214/vib.v8i.9894

[76] Stem Cell Tourism: False Hope for Real Money . Harvard Stem Cell Institute (HSCI). (2023). https://hsci.harvard.edu/stem-cell-tourism , See also: Bissassar, M. (2017). Transnational Stem Cell Tourism: An ethical analysis.  Voices in Bioethics ,  3 . https://doi.org/10.7916/vib.v3i.6027

[77] Song, P. (2011) The proliferation of stem cell therapies in post-Mao China: problematizing ethical regulation,  New Genetics and Society , 30:2, 141-153, DOI:  10.1080/14636778.2011.574375

[78] Dajani, R. (2014). Jordan’s stem-cell law can guide the Middle East.  Nature  510, 189. https://doi.org/10.1038/510189a

[79] International Society for Stem Cell Research. (2024). Standards in stem cell research . International Society for Stem Cell Research. https://www.isscr.org/guidelines/5-standards-in-stem-cell-research

[80] Benjamin, R. (2013). People’s science bodies and rights on the Stem Cell Frontier . Stanford University Press.

Mifrah Hayath

SM Candidate Harvard Medical School, MS Biotechnology Johns Hopkins University

Olivia Bowers

MS Bioethics Columbia University (Disclosure: affiliated with Voices in Bioethics)

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Images with harder-to-reconstruct visual representations leave stronger memory traces

Using a computational model to quantify difficulty in reconstructing images from compressed codes, Lin et al. show that reconstruction errors interface perception and memory by modulating how well images are encoded.

• Ilker Yildirim

Mendelian randomization analyses reveal causal relationships between brain functional networks and risk of psychiatric disorders

Mu et al. use two-sample Mendelian randomization analyses to examine the causal impact of resting-state fMRI phenotypes on 12 psychiatric disorders.

• Changgai Mu
• Xinglun Dang
• Xiong-Jian Luo

Electrophysiological signatures of veridical head direction in humans

How do we orient ourselves in space? Using electroencephalography and intracranial electroencephalography, Griffiths et al. identify a complex network of brain regions that track head direction in free-moving human participants.

• Benjamin J. Griffiths
• Thomas Schreiner
• Tobias Staudigl

The role of the human hippocampus in decision-making under uncertainty

This study examines individuals with autoimmune limbic encephalitis, a condition that impairs the hippocampus, to understand how they evaluate rewards and efforts in uncertain scenarios compared to healthy controls. The findings reveal that while patients with autoimmune limbic encephalitis retain their sensitivity to uncertainty, their capability to assess rewards and efforts is notably diminished when uncertainty is a factor.

• Bahaaeddin Attaallah
• Pierre Petitet
• Masud Husain

Ouvrai opens access to remote virtual reality studies of human behavioural neuroscience

The authors introduce Ouvrai, an open-source solution that facilitates the design and execution of remote virtual reality studies, capitalizing on the surge in virtual reality headset ownership.

• Evan Cesanek
• Sabyasachi Shivkumar
• Daniel M. Wolpert

Long ties accelerate noisy threshold-based contagions

How is contagion affected by changes to network structure? Recent work has claimed a ‘weakness of long ties’ for complex contagions that rely on social reinforcement, unlike biological contagions. Eckles et al. substantially revise this conclusion.

• Dean Eckles
• Elchanan Mossel
• Subhabrata Sen

Memorability shapes perceived time (and vice versa)

In this Article, Ma et al. show, across a series of experiments, that time and memorability (the probability of recalling a visual stimulus) mutually influence one another, suggesting that time is a feature of visual processing that is intrinsic to perceptual experience.

• Ayana D. Cameron
• Martin Wiener

A neurofunctional signature of subjective disgust generalizes to oral distaste and socio-moral contexts

In support of an evolutionary model that links distaste, disgust and socio-moral processes, Gan et al. use functional magnetic resonance imaging to develop a neuromarker for subjective core disgust that generalizes to oral distaste and unfairness.

• Xianyang Gan
• Benjamin Becker

Goal commitment is supported by vmPFC through selective attention

Using a combination of fMRI and lesion patient studies, Holton et al. show that human vmPFC causes goal perseveration during incremental goal pursuit.

• Eleanor Holton
• Nils Kolling

Multi-ancestry meta-analysis of tobacco use disorder identifies 461 potential risk genes and reveals associations with multiple health outcomes

In 653,790 individuals, this multi-ancestral meta-analysis of tobacco use disorder finds 461 potential risk genes and hundreds of associations with health outcomes, showcasing the utility of electronic health records for genetic research.

• Sylvanus Toikumo
• Mariela V. Jennings
• Sandra Sanchez-Roige

A systematic review and multivariate meta-analysis of the physical and mental health benefits of touch interventions

This pre-registered systematic review and multilevel meta-analysis examined the effects of receiving touch for promoting mental and physical well-being, quantifying the efficacy of touch interventions for different ways of administration.

• Julian Packheiser
• Helena Hartmann
• Frédéric Michon

Large-scale whole-exome sequencing of neuropsychiatric diseases and traits in 350,770 adults

In this large-scale exome-wide association study, Deng, Wu, Yang, He et al. report genetic associations of protein-coding variants with neurodegenerative diseases and mental disorders, including for 50 new genes.

• Yue-Ting Deng
• Bang-Sheng Wu

Neural evidence for attentional capture by salient distractors

This study uses a unique dataset with intracranial electroencephalography recordings from 18 neurosurgical patients performing a visual search task to uncover neuronal network dynamics and brain regions associated with attentional capture.

• Xianghong Meng
• Benchi Wang

Long-term risk of psychiatric disorder and psychotropic prescription after SARS-CoV-2 infection among UK general population

Among 406,438 adults in the UK, Wang et al. find that people with SARS-CoV-2 infection were at increased risk (at 1 year) of incident and prevalent psychiatric disorders and psychotropic prescriptions, especially those hospitalized for COVID-19 or those not fully vaccinated.

• Daniel Prieto-Alhambra

Decomposition of an odorant in olfactory perception and neural representation

This study demonstrates the decomposition of an odour compound in olfactory perception and central neural representation and establishes a direct correspondence between the coding of submolecular chemical features and odour quality.

• Yanqing Wang

Battling the coronavirus ‘infodemic’ among social media users in Kenya and Nigeria

Which interventions limit the spread of COVID-19 misinformation online? In an experiment on Facebook Messenger in Kenya and Nigeria, nudges to consider an information’s accuracy worked best.

• Molly Offer-Westort
• Leah R. Rosenzweig
• Susan Athey

Biomimetic versus arbitrary motor control strategies for bionic hand skill learning

Challenging long-held assumptions, this research reveals that people can learn to control bionic hands just as effectively, and in some ways better, using arbitrary control strategies compared with control strategies that mimic the human body.

• Hunter R. Schone
• Malcolm Udeozor
• Chris I. Baker

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Google helped make an exquisitely detailed map of a tiny piece of the human brain

A small brain sample was sliced into 5,000 pieces, and machine learning helped stitch it back together.

• Cassandra Willyard archive page

A team led by scientists from Harvard and Google has created a 3D, nanoscale-resolution map of a single cubic millimeter of the human brain. Although the map covers just a fraction of the organ—a whole brain is a million times larger—that piece contains roughly 57,000 cells, about 230 millimeters of blood vessels, and nearly 150 million synapses. It is currently the highest-resolution picture of the human brain ever created.

To make a map this finely detailed, the team had to cut the tissue sample into 5,000 slices and scan them with a high-speed electron microscope. Then they used a machine-learning model to help electronically stitch the slices back together and label the features. The raw data set alone took up 1.4 petabytes. “It’s probably the most computer-intensive work in all of neuroscience,” says Michael Hawrylycz, a computational neuroscientist at the Allen Institute for Brain Science, who was not involved in the research. “There is a Herculean amount of work involved.”

Many other brain atlases exist, but most provide much lower-resolution data. At the nanoscale, researchers can trace the brain’s wiring one neuron at a time to the synapses, the places where they connect. “To really understand how the human brain works, how it processes information, how it stores memories, we will ultimately need a map that’s at that resolution,” says Viren Jain, a senior research scientist at Google and coauthor on the paper, published in Science on May 9 . The data set itself and a preprint version of this paper were released in 2021 .

Brain atlases come in many forms. Some reveal how the cells are organized. Others cover gene expression. This one focuses on connections between cells, a field called “connectomics.” The outermost layer of the brain contains roughly 16 billion neurons that link up with each other to form trillions of connections. A single neuron might receive information from hundreds or even thousands of other neurons and send information to a similar number. That makes tracing these connections an exceedingly complex task, even in just a small piece of the brain..  

To create this map, the team faced a number of hurdles. The first problem was finding a sample of brain tissue. The brain deteriorates quickly after death, so cadaver tissue doesn’t work. Instead, the team used a piece of tissue removed from a woman with epilepsy during brain surgery that was meant to help control her seizures.

Once the researchers had the sample, they had to carefully preserve it in resin so that it could be cut into slices, each about a thousandth the thickness of a human hair. Then they imaged the sections using a high-speed electron microscope designed specifically for this project. 

Next came the computational challenge. “You have all of these wires traversing everywhere in three dimensions, making all kinds of different connections,” Jain says. The team at Google used a machine-learning model to stitch the slices back together, align each one with the next, color-code the wiring, and find the connections. This is harder than it might seem. “If you make a single mistake, then all of the connections attached to that wire are now incorrect,” Jain says. 

“The ability to get this deep a reconstruction of any human brain sample is an important advance,” says Seth Ament, a neuroscientist at the University of Maryland. The map is “the closest to the  ground truth that we can get right now.” But he also cautions that it’s a single brain specimen taken from a single individual. 

The map, which is freely available at a web platform called Neuroglancer , is meant to be a resource other researchers can use to make their own discoveries. “Now anybody who’s interested in studying the human cortex in this level of detail can go into the data themselves. They can proofread certain structures to make sure everything is correct, and then publish their own findings,” Jain says. (The preprint has already been cited at least 136 times .) 

The team has already identified some surprises. For example, some of the long tendrils that carry signals from one neuron to the next formed “whorls,” spots where they twirled around themselves. Axons typically form a single synapse to transmit information to the next cell. The team identified single axons that formed repeated connections—in some cases, 50 separate synapses. Why that might be isn’t yet clear, but the strong bonds could help facilitate very quick or strong reactions to certain stimuli, Jain says. “It’s a very simple finding about the organization of the human cortex,” he says. But “we didn’t know this before because we didn’t have maps at this resolution.”

The data set was full of surprises, says Jeff Lichtman, a neuroscientist at Harvard University who helped lead the research. “There were just so many things in it that were incompatible with what you would read in a textbook.” The researchers may not have explanations for what they’re seeing, but they have plenty of new questions: “That’s the way science moves forward.” 

Biotechnology and health

How scientists traced a mysterious covid case back to six toilets.

When wastewater surveillance turns into a hunt for a single infected individual, the ethics get tricky.

An AI-driven “factory of drugs” claims to have hit a big milestone

Insilico is part of a wave of companies betting on AI as the "next amazing revolution" in biology

• Antonio Regalado archive page

The quest to legitimize longevity medicine

Longevity clinics offer a mix of services that largely cater to the wealthy. Now there’s a push to establish their work as a credible medical field.

• Jessica Hamzelou archive page

There is a new most expensive drug in the world. Price tag: $4.25 million

But will the latest gene therapy suffer the curse of the costliest drug?

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