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PRC: March 2022 Room Assignment for LET/ Teachers Board Exams (Final Lists)

Manila, Philippines – The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) has released the room assignments for the third batch of the Licensure Exam for Teachers/ LET to be conducted on March 27, 2022.

The licensure exams for professional teachers were administered by the Board of Professional Teachers headed by its Chairman, Glenda S. Arquiza, and its members, Dr. Rosita L. Navarro, Vice Chairman Dr. Paz Lucido, and its members Dr. Paraluman R. Giron and Dr. Nora M. Uy.

The Board of Professional Teachers will conduct the exams in Manila/National Capital Region (NCR), Baguio, Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Cauayan, Cebu, Davao, Iloilo, Koronadal, Legaspi, Lucena, Marinduque, Oriental Mindoro, Pagadian, Palawan, Pampanga, Rosales, Tacloban, Tuguegarao, Zamboanga and Kidapawan.

Room Assignments LET March 2022

The room assignments found below are courtesy of the Professional Regulation Commission.

  • National Capital Region/ Manila
  • Cagayan de Oro
  • Virac, Catanduanes
  • Kidapawan, Cotabato
  • Occidental Mindoro
  • Oriental Mindoro
  • Rosales, Pangasinan
  • Bongao, Tawi-Tawi

Reminders: Examinees must arrive by 5:30 a.m. on the scheduled date. Latecomers will not be admitted and examination fees will be forfeited…

Other Stories

  • PRC: March 2022 Room Assignment for LET/ Teachers Board Exams
  • PRC Board Exams 2022: New Schedule
  • PRC: 2021-2022 Teachers Board Exam (LET)

LET Schedule and Covergae

For Elementary Teachers Examinees Only

For Secondary Teachers Examinees Only

Note: In the January 30, 2022 Board Exam for Professional Teachers, separate Test Booklets will be used for the General Education (GE) and Professional Education (PE) courses for both Elementary and Secondary levels.

What to bring?

Don’t forget the following on examination day:

  • Notice of Admission (NOA)
  • Official Receipt
  • Two (2) or more pencils (No. 1 or No. 2)
  • Ball pens with BLACK ink only
  • One (1) piece long brown envelope
  • One (1) piece long transparent/plastic envelope (for keeping your valuables and other allowed items)
  • Health forms
  • Negative RT-PCR Test Results, if applicable, or Certificate of Quarantine

Examinees are not allowed to bring books, notes, or similar items in the examination room. Programmable calculators, as well as electronic gadgets such as Apple and Samsung products, are not allowed either. Bags of any kind are also not allowed inside the examination premises.

Examination Attire

  • Male examinee – Tucked-in white polo shirt with collar (without any seal, logo, or mark); Decent pants or slacks
  • Female examinees – Tucked-in white blouse or shirt with collar (without any seal, logo, or mark); Decent pants or slacks

Prohibition inside the examination rooms

  • Coded information or formulas can be found in books, notes, review materials, and other printed sources.
  • Calculators of all types and units (except for examinees with Mathematics major).
  • Apple, Samsung, and other smart watches, cell phones, ear plugs, transmitters, portable computers, Bluetooth, and other communication devices.
  • Bags of any kind, as well as any other test aids not listed in this program.

LET Schedule

As per the PRC announcement, the Licensure Examination for Teachers which was supposedly be held last March 2021 will now be held in four (4) batches of exams due to a large number of examinees.

Contact PRC

Should you have concerns related to the Licensure Examination for Professional Teachers (LEPT), you may also reach the Professional Regulatory Commission at the following contact details:

PRC Licensure Exam Division: [email protected] / [email protected] Facebook: @professionalregulationcommission Twitter: @PRC_main

Do you have clarifications/ comments about this article? Please feel free to drop one below.

prc room assignment march 27 2022

Thank you po❤️ waiting nlng po sa room God Bless po From NCR

prc room assignment march 27 2022

Elow po…… fully vaccine na po ako hinde ko na po bah kailangan ang rtpcr test…..?

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 27, 2024

prc room assignment march 27 2022

Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 27, 2024, 5:10pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:15pm ET on March 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) released its 38th report on the human rights situation in Ukraine on March 26, confirming several of ISW’s longstanding assessments about Russia’s systematic violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in occupied territories and towards Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). [1] The HRMMU report details activities between December 1, 2023 and February 29 2024, and includes new findings about Russia’s abuse of Ukrainian POWs during this timeframe, based on interviews with 60 recently released male POWs. [2] Nearly all of the POWs that HRMMU interviewed detailed how they were tortured by Russian forces with beatings and electric shocks and threatened with execution, and over half of the interviewees experienced sexual violence. HRMMU also reported that it has evidence of Russian forces executing at least 32 POWs in 12 different incidents during the reporting period and independently verified three of the executions. ISW observed open-source evidence of several POW executions during this reporting period: the execution of three Ukrainian POWs near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast on December 27, 2023; the execution of one Ukrainian POW near Klishchiivka, Donetsk Oblast on February 9, 2024; the executions of three Ukrainian POWs near Robotyne, the execution of six Ukrainian POWs near Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast, and the executions of two Ukrainian POWs near Vesele, Donetsk Oblast on or around February 18, 2024; and the execution of nine Ukrainian POWs near Ivanivske, Donetsk Oblast, on February 25. [3] The summary execution and mistreatment of POWs is a violation of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. [4] The HRMMU report also details the forced Russification of Ukrainian populations in occupied areas, including the imposition of Russian political, legal, and administrative systems onto occupied Ukraine in violation of Russia’s international legal obligations as an occupying power. [5] ISW has reported at length on the specifics of Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine, consistent with the findings of the UN HRMMU report. [6]

Russian officials are tying the US and the West to a broader set of “terrorist” attacks against Russia following the Crocus City Hall attack, likely to intensify rhetoric about alleged Western and Ukrainian threats to generate greater domestic support for the war in Ukraine. The Russian Investigative Committee and Prosecutor General’s Office stated on March 27 that they will consider an appeal from the Russian State Duma to investigate American and Western financing and organization of terrorist attacks against Russia. [7] The Russian Investigative Committee, Prosecutor General’s Office, and the Duma Deputies that made the appeal did not explicitly reference the Crocus City Hall attack. [8] Kremlin officials have previously tied Ukraine and the West to the Crocus City Hall attack but have yet to make a formal accusation, and the Kremlin may refrain from issuing an official accusation as all available evidence continues to show that the Islamic State (IS) is very likely responsible for the attack. [9] Russian officials routinely describe Ukrainian military strikes against legitimate military targets in occupied Ukraine and Russia as terrorism and consistently claim that Western actors help organize these strikes. [10] The Kremlin likely aims to seize on wider Russian social fears and anger following the Crocus City Hall attack by portraying Ukraine, the US, and the West as immediate terrorist threats. The Kremlin likely hopes that perceptions of Ukrainian and Western involvement in the Crocus City Hall attack will increase domestic support for the war in Ukraine, and Russian officials will likely invoke a broader view of what they consider terrorism to further cast Ukrainians as terrorists and the West as a sponsor of terrorism. [11] The Kremlin may still formally accuse Ukraine of conducting the Crocus City Hall attack if it believes that these other informational efforts are insufficient to generate the domestic response it likely desires. [12]

Russian authorities are increasing legal pressure against migrants in Russia following recent Russian officials’ proposals for harsher measures against migrant communities in response to the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack. BBC News Russian Service stated that there has been a significant increase in the number of cases related to violations of the rules of entry for foreign citizens into Russia following the Crocus City Hall attack. [13] BBC News Russian Service reported on March 27 that 784 such cases have been registered since the morning of March 25, as compared with 1,106 during the entire previous week. A Russian lawyer who often works with Tajik citizens reportedly told BBC News Russian Service that over 100 people waited for a Moscow district court to hear their cases on March 25 alone and that Russian authorities are especially targeting migrants from Tajikistan during searches. BBC News Russian Service reported that representatives of the Tajik diaspora in Russia are expecting Russian authorities to conduct a large wave of deportations following the Crocus City Hall attack. A Russian insider source claimed on March 27 that unspecified actors gave the Moscow Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) an “unspoken” order to “not spare” migrants and for MVD employees to use their own judgement in the field. [14] The insider source claimed that a source suggested that Russian authorities are not preparing to conduct raids on migrant communities but will apply the “strictest measures” to migrants in “controversial situations.” Kremlin newswire TASS stated on March 27 that Russian police and Rosgvardia conducted a raid at the Wildberries warehouse in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast to check the documents of migrant workers, and Russian opposition outlet Baza reported that Russian authorities detained 21 people during the raid. [15] Several Russian ultranationalist milbloggers complained that the way Russian-language schools in Tajikistan are teaching about Russia’s historical imperial occupation of Tajikistan is discouraging Tajik migrants from integrating into Russian society, essentially blaming migrants for the alienation that Russian society subjects them to. [16] Select Russian officials recently called for the introduction of several anti-migrant policies, which Russian authorities are unlikely to enact given Russia’s reliance on migrants for its force generation and labor needs. [17] Russian authorities may continue the practice of raiding migrant workplaces and increase crackdowns at border crossings to temporarily placate emotional cries for retribution following the March 22 attack as the Kremlin continues to develop a cogent and practical response.

Key Takeaways:

  • The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) released its 38th report on the human rights situation in Ukraine on March 26, confirming several of ISW’s longstanding assessments about Russia’s systematic violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in occupied territories and towards Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
  • Russian officials are tying the US and the West to a broader set of “terrorist” attacks against Russia following the Crocus City Hall attack, likely to intensify rhetoric about alleged Western and Ukrainian threats to generate greater domestic support for the war in Ukraine.
  • Russian authorities are increasing legal pressure against migrants in Russia following recent Russian officials’ proposals for harsher measures against migrant communities in response to the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack.
  • Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and southwest of Donetsk City on March 27.
  • Russian Storm-Z personnel continue to complain about their poor treatment by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as the MoD tries to posture efficacy in its force generation and social benefit allocation system.

prc room assignment march 27 2022

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
  • Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 27, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Lake Lyman; southeast of Kupyansk near Ivanivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka. [18] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Terny, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim. [19] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov stated that elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Aida” detachment are operating near Bilohorivka. [20]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City with a D-30 universal joint glide munition (UMPB), a guided glide bomb, on March 27. [21] Ukrainian officials noted that the strike was the first Russian glide bomb strike against Kharkiv City since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022. [22] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated that the UMPB D-30 has a range of up to 90 kilometers and that Russian forces can launch the bomb from aircraft or ground-based Smerch multiple rocket launch systems (MLRS). [23] Russian forces struck Myrnohrad, Donetsk Oblast with three UMPB D-30SN guided glide bombs on March 10. [24]

prc room assignment march 27 2022

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces reportedly advanced west of Bakhmut, although there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area on March 27. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Bakhmut along a railway line and a section of the O0506 (Khromove-Chasiv Yar) highway by 1.15 kilometers in depth and 1.85 kilometers in width. [25] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are advancing near Ivanivske and are within 500 meters of the city limits of Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut). [26] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu credited elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) with seizing Ivanivske on March 24, although ISW has yet to observe visual evidence confirming that Russian forces have seized Ivanivske. [27] Positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut near Vesele; northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Bakhmut near Shumy and Pivdenne. [28] A Ukrainian military observer reported that Russian forces have intensified transfers of equipment and personnel along ground lines of communication (GLOCs) through Kadiivka, Pervomaisk, and Popasna (all east of Bakhmut), but did not specify the destination of these transfers. [29] Kadiivka, Pervomaisk, and Popasna all lie along the T0504 Luhansk City-Bakhmut highway that runs directly from the Russian rear in occupied Luhansk Oblast into Bakhmut, however.

prc room assignment march 27 2022

Russian forces recently advanced west of Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting in the area on March 27. Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka) and in Orlivka (west of Avdiivka). [30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Semenivka (northwest of Avdiivka) and are attacking Ukrainian positions within the settlement but that Ukrainian forces are actively counterattacking in the area. [31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 200 meters west of Orlivka on the western bank of the Durna River, 200 meters west of Tonenke (west of Avdiivka), 200 meters in the direction of Umanske (west of Avdiivka), 300 meters south of Tonenke towards Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka), and 100 meters south of Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka). [32] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims. Positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi and Semenivka; west of Avdiivka near Orlivka, Tonenke, and Umanske; and southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Nevelske, and Pervomaiske. [33]

prc room assignment march 27 2022

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional fighting west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 27. Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within central Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City). [34] Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Pobieda. [35] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka. [36]

prc room assignment march 27 2022

Positional engagements continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 27. [37]

prc room assignment march 27 2022

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 27, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne, near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne), northeast of Novoprokopivka (south of Robotyne), and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne). [38] Elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating within Robotyne. [39]

prc room assignment march 27 2022

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on March 27. [40]

prc room assignment march 27 2022

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 26 to 27 and on March 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 13 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces shot down 10 drones over Kharkiv, Sumy, and Kyiv oblasts on the night of March 26 to 27. [41] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian infrastructure in Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast. [42] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov stated that a Russian Kh-35U subsonic anti-ship cruise missile struck Kharkiv City on the morning of March 27. [43] Ukraine’s Eastern Air Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down an unspecified Russian cruise missile over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on March 27. [44] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces struck an industrial enterprise in Mykolaiv City with an Iskander-M ballistic missile on the afternoon of March 27. [45]

Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces have stored “several dozen” Zircon missiles in military facilities in occupied Crimea. [46] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated that Ukrainian air defense systems, such as Patriot and SAMP/T systems, can intercept Zircon missiles when they slow down to about 3,700 kilometers per hour on approach to a target. [47]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Storm-Z personnel continue to complain about their poor treatment by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as the MoD tries to present the efficacy of its force generation and social benefit allocation system. Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News posted a video appeal from Storm-Z fighters from Kaluga Oblast on March 27 wherein one fighter claimed that after signing contracts with the Russian MoD, Russian command sent a Storm-Z unit of 230 people to the frontline, of whom only 38 survived combat. [48] The Storm-Z fighter complained that he has been unable to receive combat veteran status or promised payments from the Russian authorities for his service. [49] Mobilization News released another video on March 27 wherein relatives of killed and wounded Storm-Z fighters complain to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Russian authorities have not issued the Storm-Z fighters combat status or granted payments in the event of their death or injury in Ukraine. [50] The relatives of the Storm-Z fighters blamed the Russian MoD and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu for the poor treatment and lack of benefits for Storm-Z fighters. The Russian MoD relies heavily on Storm-Z recruits from penal colonies to carry out costly infantry-led frontal assaults against Ukrainian positions and is very unlikely to address complaints concerning their poor treatment. The Russian MoD claimed on March 27 that it is issuing electronic combat veteran certificates and streamlining and digitizing the process for veterans to obtain payments and social benefits — but these privileges evidently do not apply evenly to all personnel who have signed contracts with the Russian MoD. [51]

Russian news outlet Vedemosti reported that US-sanctioned Russian company Baikal Electronics is struggling to domestically package semiconductor chips to produce processors and that over half of its domestically produced processors are defective. [52] Vedemosti reported that Baikal Electronics began to experiment with domestically packaging chips in Russia at the end of 2021 and that outdated equipment and a lack of experienced employees caused the large amount of processor defects.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian drone developer Albatross LLC told Kremlin newswire TASS that Russian forces used the Albatross M5 long-range reconnaissance drones to guide aviation and artillery strikes while repelling recent pro-Ukrainian Russian raids into Belgorod Oblast. [53] Albatross LLC noted that the modernized Albatross M5 drone has a maximum range of 60-80 kilometers.

Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti reported that Russian T-72B3, T-72B3M, T-80BVM, and T-90M tanks operating in Ukraine use Reflex-M guided weapon systems with the Invar-M/M1 anti-tank guided missiles to strike Ukrainian and Western-made vehicles. [54]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.

Russian officials are weaponizing international responses to the Crocus City Hall attack to accuse the West of espousing Russophobic policies and to baselessly blame Ukraine of involvement in the attack. Russian Ambassador to Austria Dmitry Lyubinsky claimed on March 27 that while the Austrian government reacted to the Crocus City Hall attack, it did not use the words “terrorist attack” or condemn the attack. [55] Lyubinsky accused Austria of having “taken a very special position in its hypocrisy” and a “daze of permissiveness” towards Ukraine and reiterated the Kremlin narrative baselessly connecting Ukraine to the attack. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reported that Russia has received 24-hour non-stop words of support from around the globe following the attack, but immediately pivoted to accuse Ukraine of involvement in the attack and blame NATO members of monopolizing the global fight against terror. [56]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

prc room assignment march 27 2022

[1] https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/2024-03-26%20OHCHR%20...

[2] https://ukraine.un.org/en/264368-un-says-russia-continues-torture-execut...

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[4] https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-conve...

[5] https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/2024-03-26%20OHCHR%20...

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20O...

[7] https://t.me/tass_agency/240300 ; https://t.me/astrapress/52521 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240322

[8] https://ria dot ru/20240327/rassledovanie-1936142056.html ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/03/27/deputaty-gosdumy-potrebovali-ot-sk-rassledovat-akty-terrorizma-kotorye-ssha-sovmestno-so-stranami-nato-i-spetssluzhbami-ukrainy-osuschestvlyayut-v-rossii

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032624

[10] https://t.me/tass_agency/239253%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://isw.pub/UkrWar020624... ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-calls-ukrainian-attack-belgor... ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct10

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324

[13] https://t.me/bbcrussian/62850

[14] https://t.me/vchkogpu/47045

[15] https://t.me/bazabazon/26432 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/26440 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/03/27/politsiya-i-rosgvardiya-priehali-s-reydom-na-sklad-wildberries-v-podmoskovnoy-elektrostali-u-rabotnikov-proveryayut-dokumenty-nekotoryh-uvozyat-v-voenkomat ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240303 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240290

[16] https://t.me/rybar/58588 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/16295 ; https://t.me/historiographe/12011 ; https://t.me/voenacher/63252

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89... ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37036 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025 ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/17835 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/38313 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8702

[20] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4620

[21] https://suspilne dot media/714544-zelenskij-zminiv-sekretara-rnbo-zvit-oon-sodo-stracenih-ukrainskih-polonenih-763-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1711553688&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/27/boyeprypas-yakym-rosiyany-vdaryly-po-harkovu-mozhe-letity-na-vidstan-do-90-km-oleg-synyegubov/

[22] https://suspilne dot media/714544-zelenskij-zminiv-sekretara-rnbo-zvit-oon-sodo-stracenih-ukrainskih-polonenih-763-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1711553688&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/27/boyeprypas-yakym-rosiyany-vdaryly-po-harkovu-mozhe-letity-na-vidstan-do-90-km-oleg-synyegubov/

[23] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/27/boyeprypas-yakym-rosiyany-vdaryly-po-harkovu-mozhe-letity-na-vidstan-do-90-km-oleg-synyegubov/

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031024

[25] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/64758; https://t.me/basurin_e/10068 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/13845

[26] https://t.me/rusich_army/13845

[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/37029 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/37044 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37051 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89... ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8702 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/16170 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/13845 ;

[29] https://t.me/samotniyskhid/4868

[30] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4888; https://t.me/kultshturmovika_ukraine/1773 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4889; https://t.me/c/1595839251/3625; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1772981767139430744?s=20

[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8702 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38373 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/16183 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8724 ; https://t.me/rybar/58575

[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8720

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4... ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37044 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37051 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38313 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8720 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8702 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55225

[34] https://t.me/tivaz_artillery/3650; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4893

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89... ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38313 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/118101 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55225

[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/118105

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89... ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37044 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37052 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4...

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89... ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7591 ; https://t.me/rybar/58575 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38313 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8715 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8692 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025

[39] https://t.me/batalyon15/4045

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89... ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38313

[41] https://t.me/kpszsu/12330

[42] https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/22717 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/27/vijska-rf-atakuvaly-izyum-shahedamy-poshkodzheno-gimnaziyu-poraneno-ohoronczya/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/8827?single

[43] https://t.me/synegubov/8827

[44] https://www.facebook.com/pvkshid/posts/pfbid0LGmUtBDdzmxud8zZ23FDoN8eKar...

[45] https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/8840 ; https://t.me/dsns_mykolaiv/4948 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7600

[46] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/27/u-sylah-oborony-povidomyly-pro-kilkist-rosijskyh-czyrkoniv-u-krymu/

[47] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/27/u-povitryanyh-sylah-povidomyly-pro-sposoby-zbyttya-rosijskyh-czyrkoniv/

[48] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18111

[49] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18111

[50] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18114

[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/37031

[52] https://www.severreal.org/a/bolshe-poloviny-rossiyskih-protsessorov-bayk... ; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/technology/articles/2024/03/26/1027924-razrabotchik-protsessorov-baikal-lokalizuet-odin-iz-etapov-proizvodstva

[53] https://t.me/tass_agency/240240 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240241 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240268

[54] https://ria dot ru/20240327/rakety-1936068479.html

[55] https://t.me/RusBotWien_RU/4869

[56] https://t.me/MID_Russia/38112

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prc room assignment march 27 2022

ROOM ASSIGNMENTS: LET January 2022, Teachers Board Exam, 2nd Batch (Final Examinees)

MANILA, Philippines – The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) released the January 2022 Licensure Exam for Teachers (LET) 2nd batch list of final examinees and room assignments few weeks before the exams.

The January 2022 BLEPT/ teachers licensure exams are originally scheduled on March 2020 but later re-scheduled to January 30, 2022 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. LET is subdivided into four batches in 2021-2022 due to large volume of examinees. It will now be held on September 2021, January 2022, March 2022 and June 2022.

The exams will be conducted at PRC testing centers located at the National Capital Region, Bacolod, Baguio, Bohol, Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Catanduanes, Catarman, Cauayan, Cebu, Davao, Dumaguete, Iloilo, Jolo, Koronadal, Laoag, Legaspi, Lucena, Marinduque, Masbate, Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Pagadian, Palawan, Pampanga, Romblon, Rosales, Tacloban, Tawi-tawi, Tuguegarao, Zamboanga and Kidapawan.

The Board of Professional Teachers is headed by its Chairman, Glenda S. Arquiza, and its members, Dr. Rosita L. Navarro, Vice Chairman Dr. Paz Lucido, and its members Dr. Paraluman R. Giron and Dr. Nora M. Uy.

List of Final Examinees/Room Assignments (LET 2nd Batch)

  • Elementary (PWD)
  • Agriculture and Fishery Arts
  • Biological Sciences
  • Mathematics
  • Physical Sciences
  • Social Studies
  • Values Education
  • Filipino – PWD
  • Elementary and Secondary
  • Oriental Mindoro
  • Biological Sciences (PWD)

Examinees shall report before 5:30 in the morning on the said date because late comers will not be admitted as examination fees for late examinees will also be forfeited.

  • LET Coverage: Licensure Exam for Teachers September 2021
  • LET Reviewer (Unofficial): General Education (GenEd), Professional Education (ProfEd)
  • How to Pass Licensure Exam? Tips from Board Passers

What to bring on the day of LET?

Here are the things to bring during the examination proper:

  • Notice of Admission
  • Official Receipt
  • One (1) piece of metered-stamped window mailing envelope
  • Two (2) or more pencils (NO. 2)
  • Ball pens (black ink only)
  • One (1) piece long brown envelope
  • One (1) piece long transparent/plastic envelope (for keeping your valuables and other allowed items)
  • Health Forms (Pursuant to Joint Administrative Order No. 01, series of 2020)
  • Negative RT-PCR Test Results (if applicable), or Certificate of Quarantine or copy of the Complete Vaccination Card for fully vaccinated examinees to be submitted to the proctor on the examination day.

What to wear on examination day?

Here are the specified dress codes from PRC:

  • For male examinees, tucked-in white polo shirt with collar (without any seal, logo, or mark); decent pants or slacks
  • For female examinees, tucked-in white blouse or shirt with collar (without any seal, logo, or mark); decent pants or slacks
  • Examinees shall be well-groomed, with hair properly clipped and/or pony tailed.

What are not allowed during board exams?

  • Books, notes, review materials, and other printed materials containing coded information or formulas
  • Calculators regardless of model or unit (except for examinees with Mathematics major)
  • Apple, Samsung and other smart watches, cellular phones, ear plugs, transmitters, portable computers, Bluetooth and other electronic devices which may be used for communication purposes;
  • Bags of any kind

On the use of calculator

Examinees for the secondary level with major in Mathematics are allowed to use calculators. However, the calculator must only include addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, trigonometric function, logarithm and xy functions.

One (1) calculator will be allowed inside the examination room per examinee which will also be thoroughly inspected by the examination personnel.

Board exams during the COVID-19 pandemic

The following precautionary health and safety guidelines shall be observed at all times during the conduct of the PRC licensure exams:

  • Wearing of face mask and face shield. Examinees are also required to bring alcohol-based sanitizers.
  • Examination personnel shall be provided with face mask, face shield and latex gloves.
  • Observe physical distancing by maintaining 1-meter distance from one another.
  • Body temperature will be checked using thermal scanner prior to entry at examination premises. Those with fever, colds or cough are not allowed to take the exams. Their payment will not be forfeited and can be used in the next licensure exam.
  • Examinees are advised to bring their food as they will not be allowed to exit the examination room during break time and lunch time.
  • Examinees shall sanitize before entering the examination room, after using the rest room and before distribution of test questionnaires.

PRC added that they will not be responsible of any lost personal belongings.

2021-2022 Teachers Licensure Exam Schedule

Shown below is the schedule for 2021-2022 LET/ Teachers board exams for the previously postponed LET due to the pandemic.

The application for the LET 2021 is closed while the new applicants can apply for September 2022 LET schedule .

Reference(s)

  • Program for teachers licensure exams for 2022 from PRC.

For those who want to clarify something, PRC advised to email them through the Licensure Exam Division at below contacts:

  • [email protected]

To receive regular updates about January 2022 LET as well as other related announcements, we advise our visitors to bookmark this page, visit PRC official website, follow us at our social media pages via  Facebook  and  Twitter  or join the members discussions at our  Facebook Group .

If you have comments/reactions about this article, feel free to share it at the comment section below.

Good morning Po yong RTPCRT pwede po ba yong ANTIGEN kc po mura lang kapos po sa budget at fully vacinated nman po ako at nkabooster na slamat po.

Pag po fully vaxxed, no need na. Just a copy of your vax card

wala pa po ba room assignments sa legaspi?

Meron na po pero di ko alam kung pano buksan.

Good day po! Ask ko Lang po about po sa pag transfer exam po Ng kapatid ko from manila-masbate!!!

This JANUARY 2022 po dapat exam nya pero Wala po name nya sa list?

Any suggestions po?!!

Thanks in advance ????

Punta ka po sa PRC mismo. Yung name ko din wala sa list then pumunta ko sa PRC, sinama naman nila name ko.

Paano po maisama ang name sa room assignment? hindi po kasi nakasama name ko pero kasama ako sa list ng mga mag eexam this 2nd batch. Wala lng yung pangalan ko sa room assignment.

Good day po, may naka usap po aqng isang examee last September. Tinanong q siya kung may Swab test pa po ba na ipakit during exam.. sabi niya meron daw po. Pero nabasa ko ang LET covid 19 guidelines, wala nmn pong Swab test. Anu po ba ang totoo? Salamat poh.

Good day po,paano Makita ang list Ng name Ng gensan?Salamat po.

Sa Koronadal po.. kasama sana ako sa list of examinee pero late kona nalan na nasa list of examinee pala ako ..Kaya di ako naka exam.. paano kaya gagawin dito ..Paano maka exam sa 3rd batch..

Kailan po Next ng exam ng teacher po,at paano po mag register

We are looking the list of examinees with room assignment but nothing. How do we prepare this and how do we know that our names are included in the second batch? Please help us. Thanks.

Nahanap mo ba yong name mo? Ako di ko alam kung kasama ba name ko sa 2nd batch kasi kahit anong hanap ng list wala akong may nkita.. buti pa sa ibang lugar kasi post talaga list nila

ako rin diko nakita kong anong batch ako paano ba to?

Good day! Asking about, Health Forms (Pursuant to Joint Administrative Order No. 01, series of 2020),san ko po ito kunin?and about Negative RT-PCR Test Results (if applicable), or Certificate of Quarantine or copy of the Complete Vaccination Card for fully vaccinated examinees to be submitted to the proctor on the examination day. If fully vaccinated ka,vaccine card lang dalhin po?thanks

Gudpm.anong batch po ko magexam?

good day noong Jan 2020 pa po ako nagfile ng exam ng dahil sa lockdown ay nadelay ang pagtake ng let, kelan po malalaman ang sunod na exam wala na naman akong name dito sa second batch. maraming salamat po.

Ano po ang dress code

Good morning po anong batch po akl mag eexam

Good Day!po pwd ba malaman kung meron na kayo post nang new batch for Let Board exam for this year March,June and Sept.Para malaman namin kung saan batch kami kabilang.Maraming salamat!po God bless us always????????????????

Sched ko sa exam march 2020 dahil sa covid napostpon .. bkit wla pa din name ko sa 2nd batch?

Good Morning po, paano po kapag nagpositive po sa araw na bago mag exam at hindi po makapunta sa mismong araw ng exam ano po ang dapat gawin? maraming salamat po sa pag-sagot.

Good day. May list na po ba para sa second batch for manila? Thank you.

Pa help naman po..Di ako naka exam this second batch kasi walang lumalabas na list of examinee ng GemSan… ngayon ko lnf nalaman na dapat Koronadal pala ako na belong ..Davao kasi original address ko ..Nag Gensan lang ako kasi ubos na slot ng Davao that time ng pag apply ko..Pwede po ba ako maka exam sa 3rd batch ..Paano ang gagawin ko ..Patulong naman po salamat

Gud am po naka sama po aku sa list Ng mag eexam second batch kaya lng di po aku naka exam dahin na quarantine po aku makaka exam pa po ba aku sa 3rd back.tnxs

Maam good afternoon,Ano po ba ang kailangang requarements para makasali sa exam?

Baka may balak kayo iadvance ang listahan ng mga mag-eexam for the 3rd and 4th batch sa NCR? Grabe na yung mental health issues na dinulot niyo sa amin. As in PRC.

Pano po malalaman kung nakasama ako sa 2nd Bach ng list na mag exam?kasi ngaung 3rd batch wala po kasi ako.. hindi ko po kasi alam.. Kung kelan ang mga schedule ng exam.kung sakali po na nasa second batch ako ano po ang gagawin ko para po maka exam ako sa susunodna schedule ng exam..

anung need dalhin

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prc room assignment march 27 2022

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March 27, 2024

Russian offensive campaign assessment, march 27, 2024.

March 27, 2024, 5:10pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:15pm ET on March 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) released its 38th report on the human rights situation in Ukraine on March 26, confirming several of ISW’s longstanding assessments about Russia’s systematic violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in occupied territories and towards Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). [1] The HRMMU report details activities between December 1, 2023 and February 29 2024, and includes new findings about Russia’s abuse of Ukrainian POWs during this timeframe, based on interviews with 60 recently released male POWs. [2] Nearly all of the POWs that HRMMU interviewed detailed how they were tortured by Russian forces with beatings and electric shocks and threatened with execution, and over half of the interviewees experienced sexual violence. HRMMU also reported that it has evidence of Russian forces executing at least 32 POWs in 12 different incidents during the reporting period and independently verified three of the executions. ISW observed open-source evidence of several POW executions during this reporting period: the execution of three Ukrainian POWs near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast on December 27, 2023; the execution of one Ukrainian POW near Klishchiivka, Donetsk Oblast on February 9, 2024; the executions of three Ukrainian POWs near Robotyne, the execution of six Ukrainian POWs near Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast, and the executions of two Ukrainian POWs near Vesele, Donetsk Oblast on or around February 18, 2024; and the execution of nine Ukrainian POWs near Ivanivske, Donetsk Oblast, on February 25. [3] The summary execution and mistreatment of POWs is a violation of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. [4] The HRMMU report also details the forced Russification of Ukrainian populations in occupied areas, including the imposition of Russian political, legal, and administrative systems onto occupied Ukraine in violation of Russia’s international legal obligations as an occupying power. [5] ISW has reported at length on the specifics of Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine, consistent with the findings of the UN HRMMU report. [6]

Russian officials are tying the US and the West to a broader set of “terrorist” attacks against Russia following the Crocus City Hall attack, likely to intensify rhetoric about alleged Western and Ukrainian threats to generate greater domestic support for the war in Ukraine. The Russian Investigative Committee and Prosecutor General’s Office stated on March 27 that they will consider an appeal from the Russian State Duma to investigate American and Western financing and organization of terrorist attacks against Russia. [7] The Russian Investigative Committee, Prosecutor General’s Office, and the Duma Deputies that made the appeal did not explicitly reference the Crocus City Hall attack. [8] Kremlin officials have previously tied Ukraine and the West to the Crocus City Hall attack but have yet to make a formal accusation, and the Kremlin may refrain from issuing an official accusation as all available evidence continues to show that the Islamic State (IS) is very likely responsible for the attack. [9] Russian officials routinely describe Ukrainian military strikes against legitimate military targets in occupied Ukraine and Russia as terrorism and consistently claim that Western actors help organize these strikes. [10] The Kremlin likely aims to seize on wider Russian social fears and anger following the Crocus City Hall attack by portraying Ukraine, the US, and the West as immediate terrorist threats. The Kremlin likely hopes that perceptions of Ukrainian and Western involvement in the Crocus City Hall attack will increase domestic support for the war in Ukraine, and Russian officials will likely invoke a broader view of what they consider terrorism to further cast Ukrainians as terrorists and the West as a sponsor of terrorism. [11] The Kremlin may still formally accuse Ukraine of conducting the Crocus City Hall attack if it believes that these other informational efforts are insufficient to generate the domestic response it likely desires. [12]

Russian authorities are increasing legal pressure against migrants in Russia following recent Russian officials’ proposals for harsher, measures against migrant communities in response to the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack. BBC News Russian Service stated that there has been a significant increase in the number of cases related to violations of the rules of entry for foreign citizens into Russia following the Crocus City Hall attack. [13] BBC News Russian Service reported on March 27 that 784 such cases have been registered since the morning of March 25, as compared with 1,106 during the entire previous week. A Russian lawyer who often works with Tajik citizens reportedly told BBC News Russian Service that over 100 people waited for a Moscow district court to hear their cases on March 25 alone and that Russian authorities are especially targeting migrants from Tajikistan during searches. BBC News Russian Service reported that representatives of the Tajik diaspora in Russia are expecting Russian authorities to conduct a large wave of deportations following the Crocus City Hall attack. A Russian insider source claimed on March 27 that unspecified actors gave the Moscow Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) an “unspoken” order to “not spare” migrants and for MVD employees to use their own judgement in the field. [14] The insider source claimed that a source suggested that Russian authorities are not preparing to conduct raids on migrant communities but will apply the “strictest measures” to migrants in “controversial situations.” Kremlin newswire TASS stated on March 27 that Russian police and Rosgvardia conducted a raid at the Wildberries warehouse in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast to check the documents of migrant workers, and Russian opposition outlet Baza reported that Russian authorities detained 21 people during the raid. [15] Several Russian ultranationalist milbloggers complained that the way Russian-language schools in Tajikistan are teaching about Russia’s historical imperial occupation of Tajikistan is discouraging Tajik migrants from integrating into Russian society, essentially blaming migrants for the alienation that Russian society subjects them to. [16] Select Russian officials recently called for the introduction of several anti-migrant policies, which Russian authorities are unlikely to enact given Russia’s reliance on migrants for its force generation and labor needs. [17] Russian authorities may continue the practice of raiding migrant workplaces and increase crackdowns at border crossings to temporarily placate emotional cries for retribution following the March 22 attack as the Kremlin continues to develop a cogent and practical response.

Key Takeaways:

  • The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) released its 38th report on the human rights situation in Ukraine on March 26, confirming several of ISW’s longstanding assessments about Russia’s systematic violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in occupied territories and towards Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
  • Russian officials are tying the US and the West to a broader set of “terrorist” attacks against Russia following the Crocus City Hall attack, likely to intensify rhetoric about alleged Western and Ukrainian threats to generate greater domestic support for the war in Ukraine.
  • Russian authorities are increasing legal pressure against migrants in Russia following recent Russian officials’ proposals for harsher, measures against migrant communities in response to the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack.
  • Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and southwest of Donetsk City on March 27.
  • Russian Storm-Z personnel continue to complain about their poor treatment by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as the MoD tries to posture efficacy in its force generation and social benefit allocation system.

prc room assignment march 27 2022

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
  • Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 27, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Lake Lyman; southeast of Kupyansk near Ivanivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka. [18] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Terny, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim. [19] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov stated that elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Aida” detachment are operating near Bilohorivka. [20]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City with a D-30 universal joint glide munition (UMPB), a guided glide bomb, on March 27. [21] Ukrainian officials noted that the strike was the first Russian glide bomb strike against Kharkiv City since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022. [22] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated that the UMPB D-30 has a range of up to 90 kilometers and that Russian forces can launch the bomb from aircraft or ground-based Smerch multiple rocket launch systems (MLRS). [23] Russian forces struck Myrnohrad, Donetsk Oblast with three UMPB D-30SN guided glide bombs on March 10. [24]

prc room assignment march 27 2022

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces reportedly advanced west of Bakhmut, although there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area on March 27. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Bakhmut along a railway line and a section of the O0506 (Khromove-Chasiv Yar) highway by 1.15 kilometers in depth and 1.85 kilometers in width. [25] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are advancing near Ivanivske and are within 500 meters of the city limits of Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut). [26] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu credited elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) with seizing Ivanivske on March 24, although ISW has yet to observe visual evidence confirming that Russian forces have seized Ivanivske. [27] Positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut near Vesele; northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Bakhmut near Shumy and Pivdenne. [28] A Ukrainian military observer reported that Russian forces have intensified transfers of equipment and personnel along ground lines of communication (GLOCs) through Kadiivka, Pervomaisk, and Popasna (all east of Bakhmut), but did not specify the destination of these transfers. [29] Kadiivka, Pervomaisk, and Popasna all lie along the T0504 Luhansk City-Bakhmut highway that runs directly from the Russian rear in occupied Luhansk Oblast into Bakhmut, however.

Russian forces recently advanced west of Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting in the area on March 27. Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka) and in Orlivka (west of Avdiivka). [30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Semenivka (northwest of Avdiivka) and are attacking Ukrainian positions within the settlement but that Ukrainian forces are actively counterattacking in the area. [31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 200 meters west of Orlivka on the western bank of the Durna River, 200 meters west of Tonenke (west of Avdiivka), 200 meters in the direction of Umanske (west of Avdiivka), 300 meters south of Tonenke towards Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka), and 100 meters south of Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka). [32] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims. Positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi and Semenivka; west of Avdiivka near Orlivka, Tonenke, and Umanske; and southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Nevelske, and Pervomaiske. [33]

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional fighting west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 27. Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within central Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City). [34] Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Pobieda. [35] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka. [36]

Positional engagements continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 27. [37]

prc room assignment march 27 2022

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 27, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne, near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne), northeast of Novoprokopivka (south of Robotyne), and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne). [38] Elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating within Robotyne. [39]

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on March 27. [40]

prc room assignment march 27 2022

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 26 to 27 and on March 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 13 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces shot down 10 drones over Kharkiv, Sumy, and Kyiv oblasts on the night of March 26 to 27. [41] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian infrastructure in Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast. [42] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov stated that a Russian Kh-35U subsonic anti-ship cruise missile struck Kharkiv City on the morning of March 27. [43] Ukraine’s Eastern Air Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down an unspecified Russian cruise missile over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on March 27. [44] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces struck an industrial enterprise in Mykolaiv City with an Iskander-M ballistic missile on the afternoon of March 27. [45]

Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces have stored “several dozen” Zircon missiles in military facilities in occupied Crimea. [46] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated that Ukrainian air defense systems, such as Patriot and SAMP/T systems, can intercept Zircon missiles when they slow down to about 3,700 kilometers per hour on approach to a target. [47]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Storm-Z personnel continue to complain about their poor treatment by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as the MoD tries to present the efficacy of its force generation and social benefit allocation system. Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News posted a video appeal from Storm-Z fighters from Kaluga Oblast on March 27 wherein one fighter claimed that after signing contracts with the Russian MoD, Russian command sent a Storm-Z unit of 230 people to the frontline, of whom only 38 survived combat. [48] The Storm-Z fighter complained that he has been unable to receive combat veteran status or promised payments from the Russian authorities for his service. [49] Mobilization News released another video on March 27 wherein relatives of killed and wounded Storm-Z fighters complain to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Russian authorities have not issued the Storm-Z fighters combat status or granted payments in the event of their death or injury in Ukraine. [50] The relatives of the Storm-Z fighters blamed the Russian MoD and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu for the poor treatment and lack of benefits for Storm-Z fighters. The Russian MoD relies heavily on Storm-Z recruits from penal colonies to carry out costly infantry-led frontal assaults against Ukrainian positions and is very unlikely to address complaints concerning their poor treatment. The Russian MoD claimed on March 27 that it is issuing electronic combat veteran certificates and streamlining and digitizing the process for veterans to obtain payments and social benefits — but these privileges evidently do not apply evenly to all personnel who have signed contracts with the Russian MoD. [51]

Russian news outlet Vedemosti reported that US-sanctioned Russian company Baikal Electronics is struggling to domestically package semiconductor chips to produce processors and that over half of its domestically produced processors are defective. [52] Vedemosti reported that Baikal Electronics began to experiment with domestically packaging chips in Russia at the end of 2021 and that outdated equipment and a lack of experienced employees caused the large amount of processor defects.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian drone developer Albatross LLC told Kremlin newswire TASS that Russian forces used the Albatross M5 long-range reconnaissance drones to guide aviation and artillery strikes while repelling recent pro-Ukrainian Russian raids into Belgorod Oblast. [53] Albatross LLC noted that the modernized Albatross M5 drone has a maximum range of 60-80 kilometers.

Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti reported that Russian T-72B3, T-72B3M, T-80BVM, and T-90M tanks operating in Ukraine use Reflex-M guided weapon systems with the Invar-M/M1 anti-tank guided missiles to strike Ukrainian and Western-made vehicles. [54]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.

Russian officials are weaponizing international responses to the Crocus City Hall attack to accuse the West of espousing Russophobic policies and to baselessly blame Ukraine of involvement in the attack. Russian Ambassador to Austria Dmitry Lyubinsky claimed on March 27 that while the Austrian government reacted to the Crocus City Hall attack, it did not use the words “terrorist attack” or condemn the attack. [55] Lyubinsky accused Austria of having “taken a very special position in its hypocrisy” and a “daze of permissiveness” towards Ukraine and reiterated the Kremlin narrative baselessly connecting Ukraine to the attack. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reported that Russia has received 24-hour non-stop words of support from around the globe following the attack, but immediately pivoted to accuse Ukraine of involvement in the attack and blame NATO members of monopolizing the global fight against terror. [56]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

prc room assignment march 27 2022

[1] https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/2024-03-26%20OHCHR%2038th%20Periodic%20Report.pdf

[2] https://ukraine.un.org/en/264368-un-says-russia-continues-torture-execute-ukrainian-pows

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2023

[4] https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-treatment-prisoners-war

[5] https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/2024-03-26%20OHCHR%2038th%20Periodic%20Report.pdf

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf

[7] https://t.me/tass_agency/240300 ; https://t.me/astrapress/52521 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240322

[8] https://ria dot ru/20240327/rassledovanie-1936142056.html ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/03/27/deputaty-gosdumy-potrebovali-ot-sk-rassledovat-akty-terrorizma-kotorye-ssha-sovmestno-so-stranami-nato-i-spetssluzhbami-ukrainy-osuschestvlyayut-v-rossii

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032624

[10] https://t.me/tass_agency/239253%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://isw.pub/UkrWar020624%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://isw.pub/UkrWar031824%C2%A0 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-calls-ukrainian-attack-belgorod-terrorism-promises-more-strikes-2024-01-01/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2024 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct10

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324

[13] https://t.me/bbcrussian/62850

[14] https://t.me/vchkogpu/47045

[15] https://t.me/bazabazon/26432 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/26440 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/03/27/politsiya-i-rosgvardiya-priehali-s-reydom-na-sklad-wildberries-v-podmoskovnoy-elektrostali-u-rabotnikov-proveryayut-dokumenty-nekotoryh-uvozyat-v-voenkomat ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240303 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240290

[16] https://t.me/rybar/58588 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/16295 ; https://t.me/historiographe/12011 ; https://t.me/voenacher/63252

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2024

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37036 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025 ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/17835 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/38313 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8702

[20] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4620

[21] https://suspilne dot media/714544-zelenskij-zminiv-sekretara-rnbo-zvit-oon-sodo-stracenih-ukrainskih-polonenih-763-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1711553688&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/27/boyeprypas-yakym-rosiyany-vdaryly-po-harkovu-mozhe-letity-na-vidstan-do-90-km-oleg-synyegubov/

[22] https://suspilne dot media/714544-zelenskij-zminiv-sekretara-rnbo-zvit-oon-sodo-stracenih-ukrainskih-polonenih-763-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1711553688&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/27/boyeprypas-yakym-rosiyany-vdaryly-po-harkovu-mozhe-letity-na-vidstan-do-90-km-oleg-synyegubov/

[23] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/27/boyeprypas-yakym-rosiyany-vdaryly-po-harkovu-mozhe-letity-na-vidstan-do-90-km-oleg-synyegubov/

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031024

[25] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/64758; https://t.me/basurin_e/10068 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/13845

[26] https://t.me/rusich_army/13845

[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/37029 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2024

[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/37044 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37051 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4kHDoHuABYPPUB5vnfakuyQw21x2MKXQ1fcsLqAgYeuSQVWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8702 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/16170 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/13845 ;

[29] https://t.me/samotniyskhid/4868

[30] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4888; https://t.me/kultshturmovika_ukraine/1773 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4889; https://t.me/c/1595839251/3625; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1772981767139430744?s=20

[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8702 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38373 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/16183 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8724 ; https://t.me/rybar/58575

[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8720

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4kHDoHuABYPPUB5vnfakuyQw21x2MKXQ1fcsLqAgYeuSQVWl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37044 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37051 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38313 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8720 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8702 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55225

[34] https://t.me/tivaz_artillery/3650; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4893

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4kHDoHuABYPPUB5vnfakuyQw21x2MKXQ1fcsLqAgYeuSQVWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38313 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/118101 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55225

[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/118105

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37044 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37052 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4kHDoHuABYPPUB5vnfakuyQw21x2MKXQ1fcsLqAgYeuSQVWl

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4kHDoHuABYPPUB5vnfakuyQw21x2MKXQ1fcsLqAgYeuSQVWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7591 ; https://t.me/rybar/58575 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38313 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8715 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8692 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025

[39] https://t.me/batalyon15/4045

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38313

[41] https://t.me/kpszsu/12330

[42] https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/22717 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/27/vijska-rf-atakuvaly-izyum-shahedamy-poshkodzheno-gimnaziyu-poraneno-ohoronczya/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/8827?single

[43] https://t.me/synegubov/8827

[44] https://www.facebook.com/pvkshid/posts/pfbid0LGmUtBDdzmxud8zZ23FDoN8eKarYJkLS6YrsSUzB62HVo7uSrXWhxPxnnzAhuSUyl

[45] https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/8840 ; https://t.me/dsns_mykolaiv/4948 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7600

[46] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/27/u-sylah-oborony-povidomyly-pro-kilkist-rosijskyh-czyrkoniv-u-krymu/

[47] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/27/u-povitryanyh-sylah-povidomyly-pro-sposoby-zbyttya-rosijskyh-czyrkoniv/

[48] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18111

[49] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18111

[50] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18114

[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/37031

[52] https://www.severreal.org/a/bolshe-poloviny-rossiyskih-protsessorov-baykal-okazalis-brakovannymi/32879476.html ; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/technology/articles/2024/03/26/1027924-razrabotchik-protsessorov-baikal-lokalizuet-odin-iz-etapov-proizvodstva

[53] https://t.me/tass_agency/240240 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240241 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240268

[54] https://ria dot ru/20240327/rakety-1936068479.html

[55] https://t.me/RusBotWien_RU/4869

[56] https://t.me/MID_Russia/38112

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    Find your examination location and room assignment ahead of your exam schedule. Registration eServices. ... List of Second Batch of Examinees from NCR for the Licensure Examination for Professional Teachers on March 27, 2022. Posted on 04 March, 2022. The Professional Regulation Commission - National Capital Region (PRC-NCR) informs the ...

  7. Room Assignments: March 2022 LET in Catanduanes, Legazpi, Masbate

    MANILA, Philippines - The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) releases the list of examinees and room assignments for the March 27, 2022 licensure exam for teachers (LET) or teachers board exam. Check out here for Catanduanes, Legazpi and Masbate test centers. PRC decided to divide the examinees into batches in order to comply with the ...

  8. Manila/NCR Room Assignments for March 2022 LET

    MANILA, Philippines - The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) central office has released the list of examinees and room assignments for Metro Manila (NCR) Licensure Exam for Teachers (LET) to be held on March 27, 2022 (Sunday). This will be the second batch of LET in Manila after the postponement of Batch 1 exams last September 2021 ...

  9. 2022 Schedule of Examination

    Reso 2022 -1474 - Rescheduling the January 17-21 and 24-26, 2022 Optometrists Licensure Examination-Practical Phase in the National Capital Region to January 24-28, 2022 and January 31 - February 04, 2022, Respectively. September 27, 2021. November 27, 2021. January 31, 2022.

  10. ROOM ASSIGNMENT: March 2022 MedTech Licensure Exam (MTLE)

    MANILA, Philippines - The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) releases the list of room assignments for the March 2022 Medical Technologists (Medtech) board exams few weeks or days before the exams. The March 2022 MedTech board exams will be conducted on March 16-17, 2022 at PRC testing centers located at Metro Manila, Baguio, Cagayan de ...

  11. New Schedule of Licensure Examination for Professional Teachers

    Posted on 28 May, 2021. Pursuant to Resolution No. 1363 (s. 2021), the Professional Regulation Commission informs the public that the previously postponed Licensure Examination for Professional Teachers (LEPT) shall be conducted into four (4) batches due to the large number of examinees: 1st Batch. September 26, 2021. 2nd Batch. January 30, 2022.

  12. Room Assignments: March 2022 LET in Cebu, Dumaguete, Bohol

    MANILA, Philippines - The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) releases the list of examinees and room assignments for March 27, 2022 Batch 3 licensure exam for teachers (LET) or teachers board exam. Check out here for Cebu, Dumaguete and Bohol testing centers. PRC decided to divide the examinees into batches in order to comply with the ...

  13. PRC Board

    prcboard.com. ROOM ASSIGNMENT: March 2022 MedTech Licensure Exam (MTLE) MANILA, Philippines - The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) releases the list of room assignments for the March 2022 Medical Technologists (Medtech) board exams few weeks or days before the exams. The March 2022 MedTech board exams will be conducted on March 16-17 ...

  14. ROOM ASSIGNMENTS: March 2022 Veterinarian Board Licensure Exams

    Here is the room assignments for March 2022 Veterinarian licensure exams. Metro Manila. Baguio. Cagayan de Oro. Cebu. Davao. Legaspi. Tuguegarao. Examinees shall report before 5:30 in the morning on the said date because late comers will not be admitted as examination fees for late examinees will also be forfeited.

  15. Exhibitors, List of Companies at Moscow TeleShow, Moscow, Russia

    Exhibitor directory and list of 77 exhibiting companies participating in 2015 edition of Moscow TeleShow, Moscow to be held in March. Exhibitors, List of Companies at Moscow TeleShow, Moscow, Russia SUGGESTED SEARCHES

  16. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 27, 2024

    Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 26 to 27 and on March 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 13 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces shot down 10 drones over Kharkiv, Sumy, and Kyiv oblasts on the night of March 26 to 27 ...

  17. ROOM ASSIGNMENTS: June 2022 LET, Licensure Exam for ...

    MANILA, Philippines - The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) releases the June 2022 Licensure Exam for Teachers (LET) room assignments few weeks before the exams. The Licensure Exam for Teachers (LET) will be conducted on June 26, 2022 at PRC testing centers located at NCR, Baguio, Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Cebu, Davao, Iloilo, Koronadal ...

  18. Room Assignment Exam Schedule Tab

    Find your examination location and room assignment ahead of your exam schedule. Registration eServices. ... March 2, 2020: Electronics Technicians: 3: F: ... PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC) Main Office. P. Paredes St, Sampaloc, Manila, 1008 Metro Manila ...

  19. Technoforum 2022(Moscow)

    Technoforum is Russia''s only exhibition showcasing a whole range of equipment for natural and artificial materials; A unique opportunity for leading manuf. Technoforum 2022 is held in Moscow, Russia, from 10/24/2022 to 10/24/2022 in Expocentre Fairgrounds.

  20. ROOM ASSIGNMENTS: LET January 2022, Teachers Board Exam, 2nd Batch

    MANILA, Philippines - The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) released the January 2022 Licensure Exam for Teachers (LET) 2nd batch list of final examinees and room assignments few weeks before the exams. The January 2022 BLEPT/ teachers licensure exams are originally scheduled on March 2020 but later re-scheduled to January 30, 2022 due ...

  21. Room Assignments: March 2022 LET in Tacloban, Catarman, Bacolod, Iloilo

    MANILA, Philippines - The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) releases the list of examinees and room assignments for March 27, 2022 (Sunday) licensure exam for teachers (LET) or teachers board exam. Check out here for Tacloban, Catarman, Bacolod and Iloilo test centers. PRC decided to divide the examinees into batches in order to comply ...

  22. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 27, 2024

    Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 26 to 27 and on March 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 13 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces shot down 10 drones over Kharkiv, Sumy, and Kyiv oblasts on the night of March 26 to 27.

  23. March 2022 LET Butuan, Mati Room Assignments

    MANILA, Philippines - The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) releases the list of examinees and room assignments for the March 27, 2022 (Sunday) licensure exam for teachers (LET) or teachers board exam. Check out here for Butuan and Mati test centers. PRC decided to divide the examinees into batches in order to comply with the ...